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ABSTRACT 
 
Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) Exposure Assessment 
in Hospital Environment 
 
by 
 
Nottasorn Plipat 
 
 
 
Chair: James S. Koopman 
 
 
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is an important cause of 
healthcare-associated infections. Contaminated hands of healthcare workers (HCWs) are 
vectors of transmission, but the contribution of the contaminated environment is not well 
characterized. The goal of this dissertation is to provide insights into the role of the 
hospital environment in MRSA exposure to patients. 
First, a 20-month prospective study was conducted using nasal swab surveillance 
data in an intensive care unit (ICU) to examine MRSA acquisition risk associated with 
having MRSA-positive patients in the ICU during the ICU stay. The study showed that the 
more recent exposure to MRSA-positive patients in the ICU and the greater number of 
MRSA-positive patients in the ICU led to a greater hazard of MRSA acquisition among 
MRSA-negative patients.  
Second, we developed an MRSA fate and transport model for two hypothetical 
hospital rooms based on the Environmental Infection Transmission System (EITS) 
xiv 
 
framework. We demonstrated a significant role of environmental surfaces in 
contaminating and re-contaminating HCWs. The model revealed the effect of S. aureus 
continuous shedding from the colonized patient onto room surfaces. The surfaces are 
quickly re-contaminated with MRSA even after the most efficacious decontamination. Our 
findings highlight the importance of decontamination frequency in addition to 
decontamination efficacy.  
Third, we constructed a stochastic agent based model using the same structure as 
the previous model, but with more realistic features. We demonstrated that HCW’s 
compliance is essential in determining the effectiveness of hand hygiene, although the 
time when it is performed and its efficacy are also important. The model emphasizes the 
significance of the hand hygiene opportunity before and after touching a patient’s 
surrounding environment, in addition to at the entry and exit of a patient’s room. Despite 
100% compliance at the entry and exit of a patient’s room, we show that contaminated 
environmental surfaces are the dominant contamination sources to HCWs’ hands. 
Additionally, this model shows the value of hand hygiene efficacy. With 100% 
compliance and 70% efficacy, HCWs’ hands remain contaminated enough to subsequently 
contaminate the uncolonized patient’s environment, which later become another exposure 
route to the patient.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
Background and Significance 
 
Staphylococcus aureus, a coagulase-positive, gram-positive bacterium, is among 
the most successful human pathogens. Both methicillin-sensitive S. aureus (MSSA) and 
methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA) can cause mild to fatal diseases, spread locally 
and globally, colonize numerous human body parts, and persist in various environments 
outside of hosts. The objective of this introductory chapter is to provide background 
knowledge and the significance of MRSA healthcare-associated infections. This chapter 
includes the history of MRSA, the current classifications, the burden of MRSA diseases, 
the prevalence of colonization and risk factors for MRSA infections. It also includes a 
section on community-associated MRSA and its impact on healthcare-associated 
infections (HAI). Routes of transmission in healthcare settings are discussed based on 
possible MRSA exposure pathways through healthcare workers’ hands and/or the 
hospital environment. Lastly, the chapter ends with current infection control measures. 
1.1  History of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) 
Staphyloccoccus aureus was first discovered in 1880 by a surgeon, Alexander 
Ogston, who described staphylococcal disease and its role in sepsis and abscesses [1]. 
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Over 100 years later, S. aureus remains a dangerous threat to human health and has 
become one of the leading causes of hospital-acquired infection worldwide [1-3].  
In the early 1940s, S. aureus infection was a fatal disease with the a mortality rate 
for bacteremia of about 80% [4]. Naturally, S. aureus is a susceptible pathogen to any 
antimicrobial that has ever been developed [5]. This exquisite susceptibility of S. aureus 
led to Alexander Fleming’s discovery of penicillin, which was at the time a miracle drug 
that transformed fatal diseases to curable diseases. A few years after its introduction in 
the mid-1940s, however, penicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus was encountered in 
clinical practice.  
In the 1950s a virulent penicillin-resistant clone of S. aureus was first reported in 
Australia and later termed the 80/81 strain according to its bacteriophage susceptibility 
pattern [3, 6]. The 80/81 strain was responsible for hospital outbreaks in many parts of 
the world. By the mid-1950s, penicillin-resistant S. aureus increased to an extent that 
penicillin no longer remained useful therapy for staphylococcal infections [7]. Penicillin-
resistant S.aureus was pandemic throughout the late 1950s to early 1960s [8].  The 80/81 
strains began to decline in the 1960s following the introduction of methicillin (formerly 
named as celbenine), the first semisynthetic derivative of penicillin which was chemically 
modified to withstand the degradative action of penicillinase [7]. 
Methicillin-resistant Staphyloccoccus aureus (MRSA) was first reported in 1961, 
within a year of methicillin introduction [9, 10]. Since then, MRSA strains have spread 
among hospitals and disseminated worldwide. The National Nosocomial Infections 
Surveillance System (NNISS) reported an increase of MRSA in large U.S. hospitals from 
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4% in the 1980s to 50% in the late 1990s. In some hospitals, methicillin-resistant strains 
represented up to 80% of all S. aureus strains [7, 11].  
Even though MRSA has been recognized as prominent nosocomial pathogen, in 
the past few decades MRSA has emerged outside of healthcare settings, spreading in the 
community [12, 13]. These community-associated MRSA strains have also been shown 
to be the cause of healthcare-associated infections [14]. Further information on 
community-associated MRSA and its impact on healthcare-associated infections is in 
section 1.5.  
1.1.1 Origin of methicillin resistance 
While the first report of methicillin resistance was in 1961, the specific gene 
responsible for methicillin resistance was not identified until over 20 years later [5]. The 
structural gene for methicillin resistance, mecA, encodes a novel penicillin-binding 
protein (PBP)-2a (or PBP2`), which has reduced affinity for β-lactam antibiotics. This 
gene is carried on a mobile genetic element, Staphylococcal Chromosomal Cassette 
(SCCmec) [15]. The original donor of mecA to staphylococci is unknown, as the element 
has not yet been identified outside this genus. The origin of the cassette SCCmec could be 
from staphylococci other that S. aureus [16]. It has been suggested that Staphylococcus 
sciuri harbored the ancestor of PBP2a, because the PBP found in S. sciuri showed 87.8% 
amino-acid sequence identity with PBP2a [17]. As of 2009, there are eight SCCmec types 
and numerous subtypes described by the International Working Group on the 
Classification of Staphylococcal Cassette Chromosome elements (IWG-SCC)[18]. 
 
 
4 
 
1.2 Classification 
Originally, the infection classification scheme was based on the body site of 
infection, such as lung, blood stream, urinary tract, etc. and the location of the patient 
where the pathogen was acquired [19]. This latter criterion has led to the classification of 
community-acquired and nosocomial (hospital-acquired) infections. The purpose of this 
classification is to aid clinicians in identifying patients at-risk for antibiotic resistant 
organisms, which were primarily in hospital settings. Implicit in the management of 
nosocomial infections is that patients will receive initial therapy with broad-spectrum 
antibiotics for coverage of potentially resistant organisms. However, using these simple 
classifications for patient management is no longer adequate [19]. Antibiotic resistance 
can be found both in hospital and community settings, although resistant profiles may 
differ between community-associated MRSA and healthcare-associated MRSA. To better 
address these differences, it is necessary to know not only time of positive MRSA 
detection  (which helps indicate location of acquisition), but also a clinical history to help 
differentiate healthcare and community associations.  
Table 1.1 shows the classification of healthcare-associated infections (HAI) with 
multidrug resistant organisms including methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus. This 
classification was recommended by the Society of Healthcare Epidemiology of America 
(SHEA) and the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) 
in 2008 [20]. According to the recommendation, healthcare-associated infections 
encompass hospital-onset and community-onset infections. Infections identified in 
patients after 48-72 hours of hospitalization or within 48-72 hours after hospital discharge 
are defined as nosocomial in the absence of evidence of active or incubating infection on 
admission. These nosocomial infections are termed “hospital-onset”, and are only a 
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subset of all healthcare-associated infections. Infection with disease onset in the 
community in persons with recent exposures to a healthcare system is called a 
“community-onset” healthcare-associated infection [20]. While the criteria may be 
burdensome because it requires a clinical assessment of the disease onset, it is likely 
more specific with fewer false positive HAIs. One strategy to simplify the criteria is to 
use 3 calendar-days instead of 48-72 hours rule. That is, the organism is considered 
hospital-onset if it is isolated after the third calendar day of hospitalization, with the first 
day being the day of admission with an overnight stay.  
While there is a need to make classification practical, the current criteria may not 
be guaranteed to be accurate and misclassification could occur. Since colonization may 
last for months or years, patients may be misclassified as having a healthcare-associated 
infection, when they actually became infected by endogenous strains acquired from the 
community. Also, patients with a prior history of MRSA infection may likely be labeled 
as having recurrent healthcare-associated infections, when the infection was acquired in 
the community [21, 22].  
In this dissertation, when referring to published references, exact terminology 
according to the citations will be used to maintain the original definitions.  
Table 1.1: Definitions used for epidemiologic classification of infections with multidrug-
resistant organisms (MDROs) including 1) methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, 
2) vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus species, 3) multidrug-resistant gram-negative 
bacilli, and 4) vancomycin-resistant S. aureus. This table is from the Society for 
Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA) and the Healthcare Infection Control 
Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) position paper [20]. 
Classification Definitions 
Temporal 
Hospital-onset 
 
 
 
Specimen was collected from patient after defined time period of 
hospitalization to best reflect that the pathogens were acquired in 
the hospital. Recommended definition is based on specimen being 
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Community-onset 
collected >3 calendar days after patient was admitted to the hospital 
(first day is date of admission). This is known as the “3 midnights 
rule.” For example, if a patient is admitted to the hospital at any 
time on a Monday, only MDROs that are isolated after midnight 
Wednesday would be considered to represent hospital-onset 
infection (i.e., specimen was collected on day 4 of hospitalization). 
All hospital-onset infections are considered healthcare-associated. 
 
Specimen was collected before defined time period of 
hospitalization to best reflect that the pathogens were acquired 
either in the community (including other institutions or homes) or 
during a previous hospitalization. Recommended definition is 
based on specimens being collected ≤ 3 calendar days after the 
patient was admitted to the hospital. A subset of community-onset 
infections may be healthcare-associated. 
Clinical 
Healthcare-
associated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nosocomial 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Community-
associated 
 
 
 
 
 
Categorization requires evaluation of the patient’s clinical history, 
as well as the timing of specimen collection for clinical cultures. 
Patient has an identified association with recent healthcare delivery, 
such as current or recent hospitalization, use of an indwelling 
venous catheter, residence in a long-term care or rehabilitation 
hospital, recent surgery, and/or receipt of outpatient dialysis. These 
types of exposures to healthcare settings may vary as a result of 
study design and availability of data. Therefore, if data are 
available, community-onset infections (see above) could be 
categorized as healthcare-associated, to better understand the role 
played by healthcare facilities in the potential transmission of 
MDROs. 
 
 
Categorization requires evaluation of the patient’s clinical history, 
as well as the timing of specimen collection for clinical cultures. 
The infection in a patient was likely to have been acquired during 
the hospital stay, without any evidence that infection was 
incubating or present on admission. 
 
 
Categorization requires the evaluation of the patient clinical 
history, as well as the timing of the specimen collection for clinical 
cultures. Patient has no documented healthcare-associated risk 
factors (i.e., community-onset infection (see above) and there is no 
identified association between patient and recent healthcare 
delivery). 
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1.3 Burden of healthcare-associated staphylococcal diseases  
 From 1975 to 1995 the National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance (NNIS) 
system at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) collected monthly 
reports of nosocomial infections from over 270 institutions in the U.S. From this data, 
nosocomial infections remained remarkably stable - approximately 5-6 hospital acquired 
infections per 100 admissions [23]. In 2002, the CDC reported that the estimated number 
of healthcare-associated infections in U.S. hospitals was approximately 1.7 million [24]. 
The overall annual direct medical costs of healthcare-associated infections (HAI) to U.S. 
hospitals ranges from $35.7 billion to $45 billion for inpatient hospital services [25].  
A retrospective analysis of the 2000 and 2001 editions of the Agency of 
Healthcare Research and Quality’s Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) database revealed 
that staphylococcal infections accounted for 0.8% of all hospital inpatients stays, or 
295,045 stays per year [26]. These inpatients with S. aureus infection had on average 3 
times the length of hospital stay, 3 times the total hospital cost, and 5 times the risk of in-
hospital deaths [26]. Another analysis from 1998 to 2003 NIS showed substantial 
increases in inpatient S. aureus infections and the economic burden from 1998 to 2003, 
whereas the in-hospital mortality rate decreased [27].  
In view of the differences in the economic impact of methicillin-sensitive 
(MSSA) and methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA) infections, a study using the New 
York State 1995 Statewide Planning and Research Cooperative System (SPARC) 
database showed similar direct medical costs between methicillin-sensitive and 
methicillin-resistant strains, but the resistant infections leads to more deaths [28]. The 
CDC estimated the nationwide burden of invasive MRSA diseases using population-
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based, active case finding, to be over 94,000 life-threatening MRSA infections and 
nearly 19,000 deaths in 2005 [29].  
While the prevalence of MRSA infections is recognized to increase, its impact on 
the overall incidence of Staphylococcus aureus infection is unclear. A systematic review 
of 45 studies indicates that the emergence of healthcare-associated MRSA and 
community-associated MRSA had led to an increase in the overall incidence of S. aureus 
infection, with MRSA principally adding to, rather than replacing, methicillin-sensitive S. 
aureus [30].         
1.4 Clinical manifestations 
S. aureus is among the most common human pathogens, capable of causing 
infections of any body parts in mild to fatal forms both in community and hospital 
settings. In a surveillance study conducted by the National Nosocomial Surveillance 
System (NNIS) from 1990 to 1999, S. aureus was the most common cause of nosocomial 
infections overall [31, 32]. Other studies have shown that S. aureus is the leading cause 
of nosocomial bloodstream infections [31, 33, 34]. A British study of two large hospitals 
including 216,644 inpatients from April 1997 to March 2004 noted that the overall 
incidence of S. aureus bloodstream infections had significantly increased, primarily 
driven by the increase of MRSA bacteremia [35]. This finding is magnified by the worse 
outcome of MRSA bacteremia and infective endocarditis, which is the most severe 
complication of bacteremia, when compared with MSSA [36]. 
Staphylococcal pneumonia was once uncommon, accounting for 1-5 % of all 
community-acquired pneumonia and occurring mostly in association with influenza [37-
39]. In healthcare settings, S. aureus pneumonia was considered an important, but 
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infrequent cause of nosocomial pneumonia. However, in this past 2 decades S. aureus 
pulmonary infections have increased [37]. A retrospective cohort study of 59 U.S. 
hospital inpatient databases showed that S. aureus was a major pathogen of all 
pneumonia including healthcare-associated pneumonia, community-acquired pneumonia, 
hospital-acquired pneumonia and ventilator-associated pneumonia [38]. In this cohort, S. 
aureus was identified as the only pathogen independently associated with pneumonia 
mortality. Currently, MRSA accounts for 20-40% of all hospital-acquired pneumonia and 
ventilator-associated pneumonia. This is likely due to the overall increase of methicillin 
resistance in S. aureus, and the frequent and prolonged use of ventilator support in aging 
and vulnerable patients [37].  
Other clinical manifestations of MRSA infections may include infections in skin 
and soft tissue, bone and joint, urinary tract, and central nervous system. The rise of S. 
aureus skin and soft tissue infections (SSTI) is largely related to community-associated 
MRSA.  
1.5 Community-associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus and its 
impact on healthcare-associated infection 
Since its emergence in 1961, MRSA has historically affected individuals with 
healthcare exposures almost exclusively [10, 40]. MRSA outside of healthcare settings 
was first reported in Detroit, Michigan in 1982. These MRSA strains were called 
“community-acquired MRSA”, and were noted to be a source of nosocomial outbreaks, 
accounting for 30% of all nosocomial staphylococcal infections in January 1981 [41, 42]. 
The associated risk factors for these patients were drug use, serious underlying illness, 
previous hospitalization or previous antimicrobial therapy. However, according to the 
classifications shown in Table 1.1, some of these patients would not fit in the community-
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associated category, but in the community-onset healthcare-associated MRSA category 
[20, 41]. Later in the same decade, there were two additional U.S. reports from two 
Children’s hospitals which also noted community origins of MRSA infections [43, 44].  
During this same time in the early 1980s, there was an emergence of community-
associated MRSA in the indigenous population of Western Australia and in the Northern 
Territory. These patients were from rural and remote Aboriginal communities without 
prior hospital contacts, which fit in the current category of community associated MRSA. 
In contrast to the U.S., where one strain (USA 300) was responsible for the majority of 
community-associated infections, in Australia there were several genetically diverse 
strains, which independently emerged from geographically distinct regions [45]. Since 
then, MRSA in community settings has been described among young, otherwise 
previously healthy individuals in many regions of the world [46-51]. 
The characteristic S. aureus infections in the community are skin and soft tissue 
infections (SSTI) ranging from mild to severe manifestations, such as deep soft tissue 
abscesses or necrotizing fasciitis [21]. Other types of infections include community-
acquired pneumonia, blood stream infections, bone and joint infections, toxic shock 
syndrome, staphylococcal scalded skin syndrome, or food poisoning [52].  
Community-associated MRSA strains possess certain unique, but not exclusive, 
characteristics. They usually have small SCCmec cassettes (type IV or V), and are 
generally not as resistant to antibiotics as healthcare-associated MRSA strains—
community-associated strains being more likely susceptible to non- β-lactam antibiotics 
[52]. This profile is in contrast to the traditional nosocomial MRSA which has a 
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multidrug-resistant profile, possibly related to the continuing antibiotic pressures in 
hospital environments.  
Many community-associated strains produce Panton-Valentine Leucocidin (PVL), 
a cytolytic toxin which targets human neutrophils [53]. In 1999, a French observational 
study of 172 clinical isolates suggested that PVL was a virulence factor associated with 
more severe illnesses of SSTI [54]. Nonetheless, the role of PVL in determining severity 
and outcomes of complicated SSTIs has been controversial. A more recent study in 2009 
included 522 clinical MRSA isolates from 17 countries and showed that patients with 
PVL-positive MRSA isolates were more likely to be young North Americans who 
presented with large abscesses, than patients whose MRSA isolates were PVL-negative. 
However, patients with PVL-positive MRSA were more likely to be cured compared to 
those with PVL-negative MRSA [55]. The finding suggested that the presence of the 
PVL-encoding gene in an MRSA strain by itself should not be an indicator for a specific 
clinical treatment. In the U.S., PVL may represent a diagnostic marker for the most 
abundant CA-MRSA strain, known as USA 300 [56]. 
Although community-associated MRSA strains originated from the community, 
they have also been noted to emerge as a cause of healthcare-associated infections in 
developed countries. A systematic review of 18 outbreaks of community-acquired MRSA 
strains in healthcare settings between 2003 and 2010 provided interesting outbreak 
features and supporting evidence that community-associated MRSA strains may be 
overtaking traditional healthcare-associated MRSA as a common cause of hospital 
infections [14]. From the review, most of the outbreaks were caused by a single strain. 
Twelve of 18 outbreaks were in pediatric and obstetrics, specialities where the 
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healthcare-associated MRSA prevalence is low, and several outbreaks demonstrated 
transmission within households. Interestingly, healthcare workers were found commonly 
to be the source of the outbreaks and the target of infections [14]. 
  In addition to the emergence of human community-associated MRSA strains into 
healthcare settings, in this past decade there have also been reports of animal and 
livestock MRSA strains which have led to outbreaks in hospitals [57-59].  
This phenomenon of community-associated MRSA taking over healthcare 
settings has several important implications [14].First, mixing of the community and the 
hospital strains healthcare setting increases the pool of susceptible populations to include 
not only the elderly and/or chronically ill patients, but also healthcare workers, visitors 
and their community contacts. 
Second, having community-associated MRSA strains in hospital settings also 
means exposing these relatively more susceptible strains to more antibiotic pressure in 
the hospital environment, which may influence their future resistance profile.  
Third, this mixing also exposes PVL-producing community-associated MRSA strains to 
hospitalized patients, which may increase the morbidity in nosocomial MRSA infections. 
Nonetheless, a study from Detroit, Michigan showed that community-associated strains 
when inside hospitals behave more like healthcare-associated infections, causing invasive 
infections rather than complicated SSTIs like in community settings [60]. Finally, while 
efforts to control MRSA have primarily focused in the healthcare system, the expanding 
community reservoir and the dynamic environment within healthcare settings may pose a 
new dimension of infection control strategies to more actively include control within the 
community as well [14].  
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1.6 Colonization 
S. aureus is a common commensal organism on human skin and mucosa. The 
anterior nares of the nose are the main ecological niche, while numerous other body sites 
may also harbor S. aureus including skin, pharynx, perineum and the gastrointestinal tract 
[61-68].  
Measures of colonization status may vary depending on the studied population, 
the type of study (cross-sectional or longitudinal), the sampling quality, the sampling 
site(s) and the detection methods [22]. Globally, it is noted that the S. aureus colonization 
prevalence may be lower in tropical countries [61]. A nasal swab survey from July 2001 
to May 2002 in two university hospitals in Indonesia included 3,995 inpatients, 
outpatients and relatives of patients and found 362 (9.1%) individuals to be S.aureus 
nasal carriers [69]. In Pakistan, 1,660 nasal swabs were collected from healthy 
individuals who accompanied patients to a community laboratory from January 2002 to 
December 2003. A total of 246 (14.8%) individuals were identified as nasal carriers for 
S.aureus [70]. In Malaysia, nasal swabs of 346 health adults found 81 (23.4%) 
individuals to be S.aureus nasal carriers [71].  
In view of age, a British study of 100 infant-mother pairs showed colonization 
status varies substantially from being the most prevalent (45%) during the first 8 weeks 
of life to 21% by 6 months. The usual sources of infant strains were their mothers [72].  
In the general population, the prevalence of nasal colonization varies greatly. 
About 12-30% are persistent carriers and 16-70% may be intermittent carriers [61, 73, 
74]. In 1997 a review reported a mean nasal carriage of 37.2% among the general 
population [75]. However, a more recent review in 2005, which included studies since 
2000, reported a S. aureus nasal carriage of 27% among healthy adults. The proposed 
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explanations of the decline were improved personal hygiene, changes in socioeconomic 
class, and smaller family sizes [61, 76, 77]. In the U.S. the National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Survey showed an overall decrease of S. aureus nasal colonization from 
32.4% in 2001-2002 to 28.6% in 2003-2004, but the prevalence of MRSA nasal 
colonization has increased from 0.8% to 1.5%, respectively [78]. 
In longitudinal studies, populations could be defined as persistent, intermittent 
and non-carriers. That said, there is no general consensus on how many cultures should 
be taken and how many cultures should be positive to define persistence [61]. One study 
that used quantitative and qualitative nasal culture data to differentiate persistent and 
intermittent or non-carriers proposed a “culture rule” [79]. This study suggested that two 
consecutive weekly positive cultures could predict the persistent carriage state with a 
reliability of 93.6%.  
Determinant factors of colonization may include the host, the environment, and 
the nasal microbial ecology [22, 80]. In view of host factors, persistent carriers were 
shown to preferentially reselect their autologous strains from artificial inoculation with 
mixed strains [81]. Patients with certain diseases were more likely to be colonized with S. 
aureus. These diseases include diabetes mellitus, chronic renal disease, chronic skin 
diseases (e.g. psoriasis and atopic dermatitis), and nasal anatomical abnormalities [22]. 
Nose picking was also associated with increased S.aureus carriage [82]. 
In view of environmental factors, crowding in households and hospitals, and the 
level of hygiene are associated with risk of carriage. Conditions in prisons, public 
housing projects, military barracks, and daycare centers are also known as associated risk 
factors for acquisition [22].  
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For the microbial ecological factors, bacterial interference has been postulated to 
be a major determinant of carrier and non-carrier states [80, 83-85]. Using a neonatal rat 
model and culture-based detection method, one study showed that multiple strains of 
common commensal organisms such as Streptococcus pneumoniae or Haemophilus 
influenza can coexist, but S. aureus strains require a host to have no other S. aureus 
present to colonize [83]. Studies using culture-independent analysis of 16S rRNA also 
supported previous findings [84, 85]. A study of human nasal microbiota among 26 
inpatients found S. aureus nasal colonization to be negatively correlated with the 
abundances of other commensal organisms including S. epidermidis and several 
actinobacterial groups [84]. A study examining bacterial microbiota of the nostril and 
oropharynx in seven healthy adults showed an inverse correlation between the prevalence 
of Firmicutes and other phyla; Proteobacteria and Actinobacteria at both sites. In the 
nose, this inverse correlation existed between the Firmicutes family Staphylococcaceae 
and Actinobacteria families, suggesting potential antagonism between these groups [85].  
1.7 Risk factors of acquiring healthcare-associated infection 
Hosts, pathogen and environmental factors, the three components of the 
epidemiological triad, all contribute to acquisition risk. Individuals who are colonized 
with S. aureus have an increased risk of subsequent infections with their own strains, i.e. 
endogenous infections [22, 86-88]. Studies have shown that S. aureus carriage is 
associated with increased risk of staphylococcal diseases in both community and 
healthcare settings. In the community, carriage has been linked to increased risks of skin 
and soft tissue infections, osteomyelitis, rhinosinusitis, endocarditis, as well as toxic 
shock syndrome [22]. In healthcare settings, carriage has been shown to increase risks of 
16 
 
postoperatively acquired surgical site infections and blood stream infections [86, 88, 89]. 
Furthermore, individuals who are colonized with methicillin-resistant S. aureus carry a 
higher risk of subsequent infections than those with methicillin-sensitive strains [87, 90-
92]. A prospective cohort study over a 4-year period in a 24-bed surgical and 19-bed 
medical ICU performed nasal cultures upon admissions on 9,523 patients [91]. The study 
found that risk factors for ICU S. aureus infections were MRSA nasal colonization upon 
admission (adjusted hazard ratio, 4.7), and MSSA nasal colonization (adjusted hazard 
ration, 2.5).  
In view of the patient’s environment, exposure to healthcare workers who were 
colonized with S. aureus may also be a risk factor for acquisition. In a review of 191 
MRSA outbreaks, 26 outbreaks were found where healthcare workers might have been 
the source. Of these, 11 had strong evidence that healthcare workers were the likely 
sources [93]. Eight of eleven had indistinguishable strains according to their molecular 
typing methods when comparing isolates recovered from patients and colonized health 
care workers. In addition to exposure to healthcare workers who may be carriers, 
exposure to contaminated rooms can also be a risk factor. A 20-month retrospective 
cohort study of patients admitted to 8 intensive care units, which performed routine and 
weekly screening for MRSA, showed that patients admitted to a room that was previously 
occupied by MRSA-positive patients had increased odds of MRSA acquisition, compared 
to patients whose prior room occupants were MRSA-negative [94]. Another retrospective 
cohort study of a 472-bed acute-care teaching hospital showed that roommates of patients 
with MRSA were at significant risk for becoming colonized. This study followed 198 
roommates of patients who had unrecognized MRSA colonization between 1996 and 
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2004. Subsequently, twenty-five patients (12.6%) acquired MRSA, all with strains 
indistinuguishable by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis from those of their roommate [95]. 
These studies showed that MRSA status of the room occupants, either previous room 
occupant or current roommates, is an important risk factor in MRSA acquisition.  
1.8 Routes of transmission  
The hands of healthcare workers were recognized as vectors in staphylococcal 
transmission as early as the 1960’s [40, 96]. When infants were housed in the same 
nursery and near an index infant known to be colonized with a defined strain of S. aureus, 
the exposed infants later became colonized with certain strains from the nurse who cared 
for them rather than the index infant strain. Exposure to the nurse’s hands even during a 
single session was sufficient for transmission, whereas hours of exposure to the nurse in 
the same room with no hand touching did not result in transmission. This finding in 
nurseries suggested a major role of healthcare workers’ hands in spreading the pathogens, 
while the airborne route appeared to be of less importance.  
Nevertheless, the circumstances that govern the transfer and acquisitions of S. 
aureus may vary widely in different parts of the hospital or the same part but different 
settings, so that the effective routes may differ [97]. “Cloud” babies were an example of 
S. aureus transmission via airborne route in nurseries. These babies disseminated an 
increase amount of S. aureus into the air, particularly in association with viral upper 
respiratory tract infections [98]. An outbreak in a surgical intensive care unit due to a 
cloud adult, a physician who was a carrier and suffering from a rhinoviral infection, has 
also been documented [99]. Outbreaks have also occurred where there was no link to 
healthcare worker as a source, but epidemiological evidence suggested airborne spread 
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through the air-channel duct into the patient’s room [100, 101]. Similarly, outbreaks 
occurred where the likely sources were contaminated environmental surfaces [102-104]. 
Collectively, in various hospital units (including general wards, burn units, operating 
rooms, and intensive care units,) environmental contamination by air or surfaces has been 
suggested as effective transmission routes [105-112]. 
Using advanced molecular techniques, several studies estimated that 15-67% of 
common nosocomial bacterial infections occurred through cross (patient-to-patient) 
transmission [113-115]. Patient-to-patient transmission is, however, a broad term that 
does not provide the exact mechanical exposure pathways. Patient-to-patient may be 
healthcare workers’ hand-mediated transmission or environmental-mediated 
transmission. For this dissertation, the exposure pathways according to the pattern of 
pathogen flow from the colonized or infected patient to the susceptible or the uncolonized 
patient are explicitly examined. The possible transmission routes are classified based on 
the final exposure source to the uncolonized patient.  
Figure 1.1 shows the three main exposure pathways: the actual patient-to-patient 
route, the hand mediated route and the environmental mediated route. Figure 1.1.a depicts 
the actual patient-to-patient route, where the colonized patient (PTc) makes skin-to-skin 
contact with the uncolonized patient (PTu) and transmits MRSA to the uncolonized 
patient. Figure 1.1.b represents the hand-mediated route, where hands of healthcare 
workers (HCW) can be contaminated by touching the colonized patient or contaminated 
surfaces. These hands later touch the uncolonized patient and transmit MRSA. This 
touching event is referred to as direct patient-HCW contact. Figure 1.1.c represents the 
environment-mediated route, where the environment (Env) may be air or contaminated 
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surfaces and objects (fomites). MRSA is transmitted when the uncolonized patient 
touches the contaminated surfaces. The event that the patient touches the surface will be 
referred to as an indirect contact route.  
 
 
a) 
 
b) 
 
c) 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Possible routes of MRSA transmission. This figure depicts how MRSA may 
be transmitted from a colonized patient (PTc) to an uncolonized patient (PTu). The three 
main categories are based on the source of MRSA that finally transfer to the uncolonized 
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patient. Figure 1.1a is the actual patient-to-patient route. Figure 1.1b is the hand-mediated 
route. Figure 1.1c is the environment-mediated route. HCW – healthcare worker. Env – 
environment. 
 
1.9  Current infection control strategy 
Control of antibiotic resistant organisms is a complex problem involving the 
interplay among pathogens, hosts and their environments. Understanding how resistance 
develops and how the pathogen spreads between hosts, taking into account their 
environment, are important in strategizing infection control. Several pathways may be 
involved in the appearance or spread of resistance in bacteria [116]. Those most relevant 
to MRSA are: introduction of a few resistant organisms into a population where 
resistance was previously not present, selection of a small and resistant subpopulation, 
and dissemination of inherently resistant organisms within the local setting [117]. 
To suppress resistance development and prevent further spreading, four main 
strategies have been proposed for endemic MRSA control. These are 1) prevention of 
selection of methicillin-resistant isolates in a population of S. aureus by antibiotic 
stewardship, 2) identification of carriers by screening and isolation, 3) elimination of the 
reservoirs by patient decolonization, and 4) prevention of patient-to-patient transmission 
by hand hygiene, contact precautions, and environmental decontamination [117, 118]. 
1.9.1 Prevention of selection of methicillin-resistant isolates by antibiotic 
stewardship. 
A review showed supporting evidence that antibiotic usage is directly associated 
with MRSA infections [117, 119]. This evidence included consistent associations 
between heavy antibiotic use and high MRSA prevalence in the patient, hospital or 
hospital unit levels. Patients who are colonized or infected by antibiotic resistant 
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organisms are more likely to have received prior antibiotic treatment. The proportion of 
methicillin resistance is higher among S. aureus isolates from hospitals, where the 
antibiotic pressure is higher, compared to S. aureus isolates from the communities. 
Within the same hospitals, the proportion of MRSA in intensive care units, where more 
antibiotics are used, is higher than in other inpatient units [119, 120]. The dose-response 
relationship of the antibiotic usage and the proportion of antibiotic resistant organisms 
were also shown to be linear. Additionally, there were temporal concomitant changes 
such that as antibiotic use increased, antibiotic resistant increased [121]. Thus, an 
antibiotic stewardship program is generally recommended to monitor and direct 
appropriate antimicrobial use at healthcare institutions with the purpose to prevent 
selective pressure for resistant strains to emerge.  
1.9.2 Identification of carriers by screening and isolation 
Identification of carriers and isolation are integral components of the search-and-
destroy strategy, which has been successful in some regions with low MRSA prevalence 
such as in the Netherlands [118, 122]. This strategy includes the use of active 
surveillance of persons at risk, the preemptive isolation of patients at risk, the strict 
isolation of known carriers, and eradication of MRSA carriage with intranasal mupirocin 
[123]. In the U.S., an active surveillance and isolation program has been legislatively 
mandated in some states such as Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylvania Minnesota, and 
Maine to screen certain patients for MRSA upon admission [124]. However, two 
recently-published large scale studies assessing the effectiveness of active surveillance 
programs reported conflicting results. One of these studies was a Veteran Affairs (VA) 
system-wide quality-improvement initiative program called ‘MRSA bundle’, which 
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included nearly 2-million admissions, transfers, or discharges in 150 hospitals with 196 
intensive care units (ICU) and 428 non-ICUs. The study concluded that implementation 
of the MRSA bundle, which consisted of universal nasal surveillance for MRSA, contact 
precautions, hand hygiene improvement, and institutional culture changes, was associated 
with a decrease in healthcare-associated transmission and infections with MRSA [125]. 
The other study was an unmasked, cluster-randomized, controlled trial involving more 
than 9000 patients admitted to 18 ICUs, which participated in the Strategies to Reduce 
Transmission of Antimicrobial Resistant Bacteria in intensive care units (STAR-ICUs) 
trial. In the intervention ICUs, interventions included nasal surveillance cultures and the 
expanded use of barrier precautions. Once contact precautions were initiated, they were 
continued for the entire ICU stay. Laboratory results were reported through a web-based 
system. Patients were placed in contact precautions if they had a history of being MRSA 
positive in the past year or if clinical or surveillance cultures became positive. In the 
control ICUs, nasal surveillance was performed, but the ICU staff did not have access to 
the results. The study concluded that the surveillance was not effective in reducing 
transmission of MRSA [126]. These two studies differed in several important aspects, 
including the study designs, the study populations, and the concomitant interventions 
[127]. Nonetheless, the most influential factor was likely related to their choices of 
laboratory techniques, which determined the laboratory reporting time. For the VA study 
this turnaround time was less than a day, since more than 90% of VA hospitals used real-
time polymerase-chain-reaction, but for the STAR-ICU trial study, this time was 5.2 days 
due to the centralized cultured-based method. This turnaround time only allowed 41% 
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captured isolation patient-days while in the ICUs, much less than the suggested level of 
over 80% for successful endemic MRSA control [128-130].  
1.9.3 Elimination of the reservoirs by patient decolonization 
Colonization is an important risk factor for subsequent infection [61]. Individuals 
who are either colonized or infected are the major sources of spread to others [22]. Thus, 
decolonization has two main purposes; 1) prevent subsequent infections in individuals 
who are already colonized, and 2) prevent transmission from colonized individuals to 
others by eradicating the S. aureus reservoir. The approach for eradication has been 
intranasal application of topical antibiotics, i.e. mupirocin either alone or in combination 
with antiseptic soaps, i.e. chlorhexidine, or in selected cases, oral systemic antibiotics 
[131]. A systematic review of 23 clinical trials suggested that short-term intranasal 
mupirocin is the most effective treatment, with a success rate in eradicating MRSA 
carriage of 90% in 1 week after treatment and up to 60% after a longer follow-up period 
[132].  
Despite the short-term successful rate in eradicating MRSA, several studies have 
shown that its impact in suppressing MRSA infections was inconsistent among various 
study populations [131-133]. Evidence supports that decolonization of S. aureus carriers 
before surgery reduces the risk of postoperative staphylococcal infections, particularly in 
patients undergoing cardiothoracic procedures. Decolonization might reduce infection 
rates in patients undergoing haemodialysis or continuous peritoneal dialysis, and could be 
useful in patients with recurrent staphylococcal skin and soft tissue infections. Routine 
recommendations for non-surgical carriers are not currently indicated. The role of 
decolonization in preventing transmission in endemic settings is not conclusive. 
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Nevertheless, decolonization of colonized healthcare workers or patients as a component 
of outbreak management may be considered [131, 134].  
1.9.4 Prevention of patient-to-patient transmission 
1.9.4.1 Hand hygiene 
Contaminated hands are considered the main vector of the spread of MRSA. 
Therefore, hand hygiene has been considered as the cornerstone of transmission 
prevention. Despite its importance, its simple procedure and the continuing campaigns, 
compliance remains a constant obstacle. One review reported hand hygiene compliance 
to be in the range of 20-50% using observational data from various time-periods [135]. 
An observational study using a 24-hour period in two 28-bed medical wards showed that 
compliance varied greatly among the 823 hand hygiene opportunities. Compliance before 
an aseptic task was reported as 100% (3/3); after body fluid exposure 93% (86/93); after 
patient contact 80% (114/142); before patient contact 68% (196/290); and after contact 
with surroundings 50% (65/129). 
Reported reasons for suboptimal compliance were lack of time, skin irritation 
from the hand hygiene agents, high workload and poorly accessible sinks [136]. An 
alternative use of alcohol-based hand disinfectant has overcome some of these obstacles 
and is now widely recommended [135, 137]. 
Substantial evidence supports that improvement of hand hygiene can reduce the 
incidence of healthcare-associated infection [135]. Nevertheless, some studies showed no 
association of improved hand hygiene compliance and reduction of nosocomial infection 
rates [138-141]. A 2-year prospective, controlled, cross-over trial of alcohol-based hand 
gel in 2 adult ICUs in a U.S. tertiary-care teaching hospital showed a statistically 
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significant improvement in compliance after the introduction of hand gel, increasing from 
37% to 68% in one ICU and 38% to 69% in the other unit. However, there was no 
substantial change in the rates of device-associated infection or infections due to 
multidrug-resistant pathogens [141]. In contrast, a 4-year prospective quasi-experimental 
study with hospital-wide program emphasis on using an alcohol-based hand rub showed a 
significant improvement of hand hygiene from 43% to 96%, with a significant reduction 
in the healthcare-associated infections of most hospital units [142].  
While improving and sustaining hand hygiene compliance has been a challenge in 
many institutions, controversy exists regarding the targeted compliance level and the 
utility of attempts to further increase compliance in settings where the baseline levels are 
already high [118]. Mathematical modeling suggests that such interventions to achieve 
compliance over 50% may not be beneficial in further reducing MRSA transmission.    
1.9.4.2    Environmental decontamination 
Over 40 years ago, Earle H. Spalding devised a rational approach to disinfection 
and sterilization of patient-care items and equipment [143]. This approach classifies 
patient-care items and equipment into three categories according to the degree of 
infection risk involved in their use. Critical items are considered high-risk for infection if 
they are contaminated. These are objects that enter sterile body sites and must be 
sterilized before use. Semi-critical items are those in contact with mucous membranes or 
nonintact skin and must undergo high-level disinfection. Non-critical items are those in 
contact with intact skin and should receive low-level disinfection [143].  
Hospital environmental surfaces are known to be contaminated with various 
organisms, including nosocomial pathogens [144, 145]. Because environmental surfaces 
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are frequently in contact with intact skin, and are generally viewed as an uncommon 
source of infection, they have been classified as noncritical and require cleaning and 
disinfection on a regularly scheduled basis.  
Nevertheless, there is growing evidence that contaminated surfaces may be an 
important transmission route. A review assessing the efficacy of environmental 
decontamination stated that the effect of surface disinfection is only transient, and 
microbial contamination can reach its former level within hours [146]. In addition, 
outbreaks that are linked to contamination in patients’ environment have been 
documented [102-104]. Studies in endemic settings that included clinical and 
environmental surveillance showed evidence to support environmental contamination as 
the source for subsequent infections using pulse field gel electrophoresis for S. aureus 
typing to demonstrate molecular identity between environmental and patient isolates 
[109, 110, 147]. These findings suggest that contaminated environment may also play an 
important role in MRSA transmission. More detail in supporting evidence of 
environmental mediation is in Chapter III. 
1.10 Summary 
MRSA has continued to be a public health threat since it was first discovered. 
Currently, MRSA is not only a prominent healthcare-associated pathogen, but also an 
important cause of community-associated infections. Populations at-risk for MRSA have 
expanded to include young, healthy individuals, in addition to vulnerable patients in 
healthcare facilities. The pathogen itself has evolved and showed its ability to resist all 
classes of antibiotics currently used. An effective infection control strategy is a 
combination of multiple interventions with a multidisciplinary approach requiring 
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participation from all levels, ranging from patients themselves to legislators. While the 
burden to the public health at large remains, successful stories of control of MRSA 
infections in institutions have been reported. Moreover, many advances in study 
methodology, including mathematical modeling and computer simulations, have been 
made which may allow us to better understand transmission systems and to better plan for 
infection control measures. Additionally, the available and feasible molecular tools used 
in this decade provide great potential to improve our insight in the interactions between 
hosts, pathogens and environments in the transmission process. To this end, an 
application of these advances to study MRSA transmission in the healthcare settings can 
be promising. Review of selected mathematical modeling and molecular techniques is 
provided in Chapter II.  
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CHAPTER II  
 
Selected Transmission Modeling Studies and                                                                  
S. aureus Molecular Typing Techniques 
 
This chapter provides a review of selected transmission modeling studies in 
healthcare settings. The focus is on studies that have incorporated healthcare workers’ 
and patients’ environments in some capacity. The latter part of the chapter includes a 
review of selected S. aureus molecular typing techniques that are potential tools to be 
incorporated in the future transmission study, which will be discussed later in chapter 
VII. 
2.1 Previous modeling studies in healthcare setting 
An infection transmission system is a dynamic complex system that includes 
hosts, pathogens and their environments. To overcome some of the complexities we 
require simplifying assumptions in modeling, so that we can gain insights into the 
system. Therefore, inferences from any models depend heavily on the model 
assumptions. Traditional statistical analysis models in epidemiological studies include a 
stratified comparison of risks, logistic regression and proportional hazard models, 
estimate parameters that relate exposure to disease in individuals. They assume that the 
outcome of one individual is independent of the outcomes of the others [1]. These 
assumptions may be appropriate in settings where there is no dependency among 
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individuals. However, they are inappropriate in a study of person-to-person infection 
transmission such as with the case of MRSA.  
On the contrary, the transmission model allows individuals to relate to one 
another by using parameters that express contact rates and transmission probability [1]. 
Understanding the contact patterns that lead to transmission is important for infection 
control planning. In this past few decades there has been an increasing use of 
mathematical modeling and computer simulations in the study of transmission. These 
tools allow us to form theoretical concepts, generate and test hypotheses, design studies 
and gain insights into the transmission system [2, 3].  
Many modeling studies in healthcare settings were adapted from the Ross-
Macdonald model [4-7]. The Ross-Macdonald was originally used to describe 
transmission of Malaria, where Anopheles mosquitoes were vectors that carried the 
parasites transiently [8]. This model was later applied to healthcare settings, where hands 
of healthcare workers were contaminated with nosocomial pathogens and transferred 
these pathogens to patients. Figure 2.1 shows an example schema of an applied Ross-
Macdonald model. 
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Figure 2.1: An applied Ross-Macdonald model of indirect patient-healthcare worker-
patient vancomycin resistant enterococci (VRE) transmission in an ICU showing the 
possible effect of infection control measures. Once patients become colonized they are 
assumed to remain colonized for the duration of their stay in the ICU. Dashed lines 
represent contacts between healthcare workers (HCW) and patients [6]. 
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Figure 2.2: A schematic representation of flow of individuals (solid lines) among states 
and flow of pathogens (dotted lines) in the environment (E) for the environmental 
infection transmission system (EITS) model [9]. The three states of individuals are 
susceptible (S), infected (I), and removed or immune (R). The model parameters are pick-
up rate (ρ, pathogen/person/day), the probability that a susceptible individual becomes 
infectious per pathogen picked up (π), recovery rate (γ, 1/day), pathogen deposit rate (α, 
pathogen/infected/day), and elimination rate (µ, 1/day). 
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Although many models have incorporated healthcare workers as vectors, few had 
incorporated the environment as a reservoir (Table 2.1). A mathematical modeling study 
to quantify the contribution of antibiotic exposure to the dissemination of vancomycin-
resistant enterococci (VRE) was performed [10]. The model was an ordinary differential 
equation based model comprising of 6 main compartments; patients colonized with VRE 
receiving and not receiving antibiotics, uncolonized patients receiving and not receiving 
antibiotics, contaminated and uncontaminated healthcare workers. The model predicted 
that preventing the initiation or enhancing discontinuation of unnecessary antibiotic 
therapy could have a greater impact if it was targeted on uncolonized patients. Also, the 
model predicted that eliminating the influx of VRE resulted in the eradication of the 
pathogens from the hospital [10]. Nevertheless, an extension of this model by adding the 
environment as an additional compartment provided a new insight regarding the impact 
of environmental reservoirs on the transmission of VRE [11]. The results from the 
extended model showed that even if the colonized patient was prevented from entering 
the ward, VRE remained endemic [10, 11]. This extended model, however, only allowed 
healthcare workers, not patients, to make contact with the environmental reservoir. 
Another differential equation model included environment and also allowed both patients 
and healthcare workers to make contact with the environment. The study concluded that 
only the combination of interventions (hand hygiene, cohorting, screening and antibiotic 
reduction) including environmental decontamination could control a VRE outbreak [12].  
These previous compartmental models [11, 12] assumed homogenous mixing for 
the effective contacts that resulted in transmission. A patient’s risk of acquisition through 
healthcare workers and the environment is governed through the probability of 
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transmission. These studies did not explicitly model contact as a discrete event. Also, 
they did not include pathogen specific environmental parameters, contact patterns 
between patients and healthcare workers, nor contact patterns with environmental 
surfaces. Excluding these elements may impede the capability of these models to analyze 
the effects of host and environmental based interventions such as hand hygiene and 
surface decontamination.  
Recently, a new framework, Environmental Infection Transmission System 
(EITS), which incorporates explicit environmental processes, was developed as displayed 
in Figure 2.2 [9]. The framework incorporates the pathogen fate and transport processes 
to determine exposure doses to susceptible patients from different exposure routes. 
Contacts between hosts, pathogens and environments are explicitly incorporated. The 
exposure dose-response function then determines the acquisition risk. This EITS model 
has been applied for waterborne, airborne and fomite-mediated transmission [14-16]. In 
chapters V and VI of this dissertation, the EITS framework has been applied in the 
assessment of both hand- and environmentally-mediated MRSA exposure in a 
hypothetical hospital ward. 
2.2 S. aureus molecular typing methods and their applications 
              Modern molecular techniques have become powerful tools in epidemiological 
studies as well as in many other scientific areas. Molecular tools create informative data 
and sometimes enhance the existing data to more in-depth levels [17]. They also allow 
nomenclature systems to be developed providing identity for each isolate and diversity 
for the population. However, each molecular technique has a different discriminatory 
power. Discriminatory power is the average probability that a typing method will assign 
 49
the same strain type to strains randomly sampled from the same group. Determining an 
appropriate typing technique for a study depends not only on the discriminatory power, 
but also on the purpose of the investigation and the study time scale, which may affect 
the evolutionary changes of the pathogen. Thus, the most discriminatory technique may 
not suit a study, if the resulted groupings are not associated with the outcome of interest 
[18].  
2.2.1 Chromosomal DNA restriction patterns by pulse field gel electrophoresis 
(PFGE) 
  PFGE typing is the most widely used typing method, and generates a banding 
pattern for each isolate that serves as a molecular “fingerprint.” This method allows for 
an evaluation of the entire chromosome, which is the most fundamental component of the 
cell identity. The chromosomal DNA is first digested by the restriction enzyme SmaI. 
The resulting DNA fragments are then separated by agarose gel electrophoresis in an 
electric field with an alternating voltage gradient [19, 20]. The banding patterns are then 
interpreted with certain criteria. Interpreting PFGE banding patterns require knowledge 
about how random genetic events can alter the patterns [21]. Taking into account these 
variants due to random genetic events, a guideline proposed by the U.S. Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention for an outbreak investigation has frequently been used. It 
divides isolates into four categories; indistinguishable, closely related, possibly related, or 
different to the index isolate. According to the guideline, these categories are reliable if 
the PFGE resolves at least 10 distinct fragments [21].  
PFGE is one of the most discriminating typing methods. Depending on the 
number of bands observed, its discriminatory power can be defined as moderate to high 
[18]. PFGE typing has been used at local, regional and international levels. It is 
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applicable in short time scale outbreak investigations, where genetic variation is likely 
minimal and the investigation requires a method with high discrimination between the 
index isolate and the other non-index isolates. However, differentiation of short-term 
outbreaks and endemic infections may be difficult when the outbreak strains also belong 
to the local endemic strains [21]. 
One study used PFGE and other methods to evaluate 325 unique patients’ 
bloodstream MRSA isolates from a worldwide collection. The results showed that PFGE 
was superior in discriminating isolates into their original geographic regions, with four 
instances of indistinguishable PFGE patterns from more than one continent [22].  
An important limitation of PFGE is related to its inter-laboratory reproducibility. 
Given the nature of the band-based method, strict adherence to standardized protocols is 
needed for a common nomenclature. However, there has been limited success in 
harmonizing the PFGE protocols on an international scale [19].  
2.2.2 Multilocus sequence typing (MLST) 
MLST is a molecular typing method based on the sequence analysis of internal 
400 to 500-bp regions of seven S. aureus house-keeping genes [19, 23]. For each gene 
fragment, genetic polymorphisms in sequences are considered distinct alleles. Each strain 
is defined by the alleles at each of the sequenced housekeeping loci, which together 
comprise the allelic profile or sequence type [20]. These allelic profiles were then 
compared based upon the relatedness of lineages using the BURST algorithm (Based 
Upon Related Sequence Types) [24]. Strains with identical sequences at all seven genetic 
loci are assigned unique ‘sequence type’ (ST), and clusters of closely related STs are 
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called ‘clonal complexes’ (CC). For S. aureus, when five of the seven housekeeping 
genes are identical, strains are then clustered into a single CC [24]. 
The nomenclature of MRSA is currently based on the ST and the type of 
Staphylococal Chromosomal Cassette (SCCmec) element, which carries the structural 
gene, mecA, for methicillin resistance [24]. According to the 2009 guideline for the 
classification of SCCmec, there are 8 SCCmec types [25]. For example, strains of ST5 
may be ST5-MSSA, ST5-MRSA-I, ST5-MRSA-II or ST5-GISA-II, where GISA is 
glycopeptide intermediate resistant Staphylococcus aureus. Thus, ST5-MRSA-I is the 
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus sequence type 5, which carries SCCmec I 
resistant gene [25]. Sequences from MLST can be submitted to a central database 
(available at http://saureus/mlst.net/), which enables online inter-laboratory 
communication and identification of alleles and STs. As of October 18, 2011 this 
database contained 2124 STs based on 4226 isolates.  
MLST is a useful method for the study of population structure and molecular 
evolution of S. aureus. When used in conjunction with SCCmec characterization, it can 
reveal evolution of major MRSA clones [26]. Application of the recently estimated rate 
of (short-term) evolution for the MRSA core genome predicts that contemporary STs on 
average are many years old [26-28]. Thus, newly emerging and spreading strains will 
rarely be associated with novel STs [26]. So far, MLST excels in its use to identify broad 
population-based interrelationships. In local clinical settings, however, it is of limited use 
to trace the spread of individual S. aureus clones, due to insufficient discriminatory 
power. Another limitation of MLST is its high expense, labor and time requirements [26]. 
2.2.3 Single-locus sequence typing (SLST) 
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The SLST approach with most promise is the analysis of the polymorphic X 
region of the staphyloccal protein A (spa) gene, which is present in all strains of S. 
aureus. The polymorphism is due to 24-bp repeat sequences that may vary in both the 
number of repeats and the overall sequences in the polymorphic X or short sequence 
repeat region [20]. This variation is attributed to point mutation, as well as deletions and 
duplications of the repeats [19].  
Spa typing has a higher discriminative power than that of MLST, but lower than 
that of PFGE [19, 29]. Since it involves only a single locus sequence, it is also less 
expensive, less laborious and less time consuming than MLST. The spa sequences can be 
stored in a central database (available at http://spaserver.ridom.de/), which is likely the 
largest S. aureus typing database [19]. As of Oct 21, 2011, the database contained 9,469 
spa types from 188,276 isolates. The spa cluster analysis (spa clonal complex) is 
available based on the repeated pattern (BURP).  
Spa typing has become increasingly popular and has been used to study both the 
molecular evolution as well as hospital outbreaks of MRSA [30-32]. However, it also has 
its own limitations. The high mutation rates may result in evolutionary convergence. 
When spa typing was compared to a phylogenetic tree that was based on core genome 
SNPs, several spa sequences were found scattered in two or more distinct phylogenetic 
lineages [28, 33]. This finding could misleadingly suggest the geographical spread of 
individual clones. On the same note regarding the mutation rate, there appears to be 
differences between methicillin-sensitive (MSSA) and methicillin-resistant S. aureus 
(MRSA). While MSSA display relatively greater spa variability, there is a concern that 
spa typing may provide too little discriminatory power for MRSA despite the high 
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mutation rate at the spa locus. This limitation could be due to the unknown proportion of 
emerging MRSA strains that are associated with unique spa sequences and hence may be 
recognized by the basis of spa typing [26].  
A Belgian study comparing PFGE and spa typing to MLST based on a collection 
of 217 S. aureus strains during 13 years revealed that PFGE classification rarely violated 
the MLST assignment of CCs and STs, while the violation was more frequent for the spa 
classification [32]. The study suggested that spa typing should preferably be used in 
conjunction with other markers such as SCCmec typing, or resistance or virulent gene 
detection. Another study compared PFGE, spa typing and MLST based on a collection of 
198 S. aureus strains over 15 years from 19 countries [31] and supported the Belgian 
finding that the combination of spa typing and PFGE was better than spa alone.  When 
the results of PFGE and spa typing were conjugated, if two strains were classified 
together in the same PFGE-spa type, there was a 99.5% probability of also sharing the 
same MLST clonal complexes [31].  
2.2.4 Mapping genome-wide single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP)  
A recent investigation analyzed a whole genome of 63 S.aureus ST239 isolates 
from a global collection obtained over 21 years by mapping SNPs, insertions, and 
deletions to a reference sequence [28]. The study estimated the core genome divergence 
rate of 1 SNP every ~6 weeks. It analyzed the phylogenetic tree based on core genome 
SNPs and was able to identify intercontinental transmission events and expansion of 
subclonal variants which became dominant in the new geographical region [28].  
This study highlighted the potential use of the ancestry-based tracking approach 
to identify recent from distance transmission events, and thereby improving contact 
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tracing in endemic and outbreak settings [26]. When provided with meaningful 
epidemiological surveillance samples including isolates from healthcare workers, 
patients’ environmental samples, and patients’ own colonized samples, this typing 
approach could be of great potential to unravel preferential routes of S. aureus 
transmission.  
2.3 Summary 
The environmental infection transmission system (EITS) framework allows the 
study of a complex system among hosts, pathogens, environments and their relationships. 
It is beneficial for the study of MRSA patient-to-patient transmission, given that possible 
routes are closely linked to the interactions among healthcare workers, patients and the 
environments. It is also proper for an evaluation of hand-based and environmental-based 
interventions.  
Advanced molecular techniques can greatly enhance and facilitate the 
understanding of the transmission system. Integrating the use of modeling and molecular 
tools in a well-designed epidemiological study that includes clinical and environmental 
MRSA surveillance, as well as host contact patterns can be greatly informative and 
improve our insight in the MRSA transmission. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
Supporting Evidence for Environmental Mediated Transmission                            
and Model Parameterization 
 
Since S. aureus was first discovered, a considerable body of data has emerged 
regarding its spreading through the environment. To perform exposure assessment of the 
environmental mediation process in chapter V and VI, we will derive an environmental 
infection transmission system (EITS) framework, which allows incorporation of 
pathogen, environment, patients and healthcare workers in one system. In this chapter we 
perform a literature review to provide supporting evidence for environmental mediation 
processes based on the EITS concept. These processes include 1) shedding of pathogen 
into the environment, 2) pathogen survivability in the environment and on hands, 3) 
pathogen being transferred to hands of healthcare workers and/or to other patients, and 4) 
exposure dose-response or acquisition risk. Materials in this chapter will serve as basis 
for model parameterization in chapter V and VI.  
3.1  S. aureus is shed to the environment continuously and sometimes profusely. 
The ecological niche for Staphylococcus aureus are at the anterior nares, in the 
throat, in the gastrointestinal tract, and on the skin at numerous body parts including 
perineum, axilla, and wound [1]. With the exception of a less common direct person-to-
person transmission, the majority of pathogen transfer occurs through more indirect 
routes. Some of these routes may include 1) expulsion via respiratory droplets from the 
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nose, 2) contamination of nasal discharge onto hands, 3) release of pathogen from the 
skin into air, or 4) excretion in the feces [1, 2].   
Studies in 1956 and 1958 reported a series of investigations of these possible 
routes [2, 3].  To examine the number of S. aureus emitted from the nose, culture plates 
were held below the nose of eleven volunteers (6 nasal carriers and 5 non-carriers) during 
different types of activities including mouth breathing, nose breathing, coughing, 
counting, sneezing and snorting. The results showed that S. aureus was generally not 
expelled with these activities. Only as a result of snorting did large number of S. aureus 
emerge [2]. This study also examined 10 nasal carriers and 6 non-carriers for 
contamination on skin and clothing. The results showed that S. aureus was present on the 
skin and clothing of nasal carriers, but was found infrequently among non-carriers. The 
same study also quantified the release of S. aureus into free air. The experiment was 
carried out in a cubicle with culture plates held horizontally in each corners of the 
cubicle. The total number of colonies and those consisting of S. aureus on the exposed 
plates were counted assuming that each colony developed from one organism. Study 
results were expressed as cfu per 1 ft2 (930 cm2) per one minute. S. aureus count was the 
highest when volunteers were fully clothed and exercised in the cubicle, compared to 
when sitting still or when barely clothed and exercised or when agitating the volunteers’ 
clothes. The range of S. aureus deposited on the plates were 0.14 to 47.4 cfu/ft2/min [2]. 
Another experiment including 3 nasal carriers and 2 non-carriers washing and scrubbing 
hands with soap and water for 5 minutes showed a significant increase of S. aureus 
liberated into free air and isolated on culture plates standing in the four corners of the 
cubicle. S. aureus counts from the hand washing were in the range of 0.41 among non-
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carriers to 300.5 cfu/ft2/min among nasal carriers [2]. These original series of 
investigations in the 1956 study suggested that S. aureus likely transfer to others by 
indirect route involving i) egress in nasal secretions, ii) contamination of the skin, 
clothing, or bedding, iii) release of the organisms by friction, movement, or washing, and 
iv) transportation to others by air currents [2]. 
In 1958, further investigation on the role of skin and clothing contamination was 
undertaken. Seventy-six technicians, surgical dressers, and final-year medical students 
had nasal swabs; 30 (39.4%) were found to be nasal carriers. With the use of the cubicle 
as in Figure 3.1, quantification of S. aureus dispersal from skin and their clothing was 
investigated in 19 nasal carriers and 12 non-carriers. Measure for dispersal was reported 
in cfu/ft2/min. The range of MRSA dispersal among the nasal carriers was 0 – 27.8 
cfu/ft2/min. It was a surprising finding that the number of S. aureus in the nose gives little 
indication of the extent of skin and clothing contamination, or the ability to disperse. In 
particular, there was one individual who had the primary source on the perineum rather 
than in the nose [3].  
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Figure 3.1: Cubicle employed in the dispersal experiments. The position of the four 
culture plates exposed in each experiment is shown on right. The figure is from Hare and 
Ridley 1958 [3]. 
 
By early 1960s much attention was on the ability of S. aureus to disperse into air, 
but the underlying mechanism was unclear. There were questions of S. aureus floating 
freely in the air or attaching with textile fibers [4]. Skin scales were found in the air as 
early as in the 1855, and the possibility that they could carry organisms was suggested in 
1905. But it was not until 1962 that it was found that these desquamated skin scales are 
the vehicles that carry most of the bacteria dispersed into the air in hospitals [4, 5]. The 
average human skin area is 1.75 m2. This surface area comprise of approximately 2x109 
skin scales. A complete layer of cells can be lost and replaced on average every 24 hours. 
Hence, at least 107 skin particles may be shed every day [6, 7]. It was estimated that each 
airborne skin particle could carry four viable cocci of S. aureus [8]. 
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To investigate whether there were differences in dispersal ability between patients 
and healthy individuals, one study evaluated 127 laboratory staff, students, patients with 
and without skin diseases for  dispersal, as well as collected swabs of the nose and 
multiple body sites [6]. A dispersal test was performed while subjects were undressing in 
a cubicle similar to previous studies. But instead of using settling plates, it had two air slit 
samplers. The results showed that the ability to disperse was largely dependent on the 
degree of skin contamination. Patients with skin diseases dispersed more than those 
without. The range of dispersal was 0.25 to 100 cfu/ft3 in 2 minutes [6].  
To investigate the effect of clothing on dispersal and its extent in relation to 
various colonized body parts and gender, an experiment was conducted among 615 
laboratory technicians, doctors and nurses. Nasal swabs were collected and air samplings 
were performed using a special test chamber [9]. This was a rigid enclosure of about 
30m3 capacity, which volunteers entered. Air was drawn from the chamber through a 
tube to slit-samplers outside [10]. The results showed that 28% of women and 27% of 
men were nasal carriers, while 1% of women and 13% of men shed S. aureus into air. Of 
these dispersers, two men agreed for further experiments on clothing and body sites of 
shedding. Each man was tested wearing own clothes, then unclothed, then wearing clean 
or worn operating suits. Then, each man would wear polyethylene materials to cover 
different parts of the body. The results showed that wearing clothing increased S. aureus 
dispersal, particularly when wearing previously worn operating suits which released the 
highest quantity of S. aureus into air. The main site of shedding was the skin of the 
perineal area yielding 28-84 cfu/100 cu.ft. This finding supported the previous 1958 
study and others that perineal carriers were likely heavy dispersers [3, 11, 12]. 
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Given that these earlier studies were based on experiments in a confined space of 
a cubicle or a chamber, quantitative interpretation may not be generalized to the hospital 
air. A study to quantify S. aureus air count was conducted for 20 months in a 14-bed 
surgical ward divided into 4 rooms, and a 22-bed open ward using settling plates [13]. 
These plates were placed in each room in the surgical ward, and in 4 corners of the open 
ward. All 307 patients had nasal swabs collected upon entering the ward and weekly 
thereafter. Nurses and staff had hand swabs collected weekly and nasal swabs for the first 
two months of the study. The study showed that S. aureus dispersal in ward air did not 
spread from one room to another in a great extent when patients were found to be the 
source in the surgical ward. However, when the sources were the staff, S. aureus of the 
relevant types was found in all rooms and in the ward office. In the open ward, there were 
less differences between the counts on the four corners plates. There appeared to be a 
gradient of counts according to the distance from the highest count plate, i.e. the count on 
the plate 20 ft. distant averaged 26%, and the count on the plate 70 ft. distant averaged 
11% of the high-count plate. The study also showed that 62% (53/87) of nasal carriers 
dispersed S. aureus into the air. As shown in Figure 3.1a, the longer duration of the 
dispersal event the higher mean air count. Figure 3.1b shows that about 10% of the 
patients generated air counts that averaged more than 50 cfu/ft2/24 hrs. with the highest 
count up to 1000 cfu/ft2/24 hrs.  
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a. b. 
Figure 3.2a: Relation of staphylococcal air count during broadcast to duration of 
broadcast. Broadcast is the air dispersal event, which could have considerable day-to-day 
variation. Y-axis is the mean count (cfu/ft2/hr) of each broadcast. X-axis is the duration of 
each broadcast. The figure is from William 1967 [13]. 
Figure 3.2b: Air counts generated by patients admitted as nasal carriers of staphylococci. 
Y-axis is mean air count (cfu/ft2/24 hr). X-axis is the cumulative percentage of the nasal 
carriers. The figure shows that about 10% of the patients generated air counts that 
averaged more than 50 cfu/ft2/24 hrs. The figure is from William 1967 [13]. 
 
More recently, a study in 2009 performed air sampling to assess methicillin-
resistant S. aureus (MRSA) dispersal among staphylococcal pneumonia patients (n=20) 
and cystic fibrosis patients who were colonized with MRSA (n=4) during their hospital 
stays. The study used 10-minute air samplers, which aspirated air through a perforated 
plate and the resulting air-stream directly went to the agar surface [14].  MRSA was 
isolated from 21 out of 24 rooms. The range of air count was 1-78 cfu/m3, which was 
lower than the earlier reports. There was no significant difference in MRSA counts 
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between sampling locations at 0.5, 1 and 2-3 m. from the patient. Several reasons may 
explain the lower counts in this study compared to previous others. Firstly, air sampling 
in this study was performed when there was no movement in the room, while patients 
were in their beds. Secondly, almost all of these patients had received antibiotic therapy. 
Thirdly, this study was performed in 2009 when the room air-exchange and the 
ventilation system were likely different from those four decades ago.  
Several factors could influence the shedding and dispersal heterogeneity. Men 
were found as heavy disperser more commonly than women. Although when comparing 
the numbers of staphylococci dispersed, there was no difference between men and 
women [15]. Clothing can also affect dispersal by a few ways. First, it may increase 
dispersal by increasing friction and rubbing on the skin. Second, clothes may be 
reservoirs where contaminated scales accumulated before they are dispersed by overflow 
or movement. Third, if they are thick and have small textile pores, they may act as a 
shield and reduce dispersal [10].  However, this latter effect does not act well with 
everyday clothes since the pores are large enough for skin scales to pass through. Other 
factors that may increase dispersal are movement, skin diseases such as psoriasis, hand 
washing with soap and water, or showering [15-17]. Moreover, in addition to these 
external factors and differences between individuals, a large variability of S. aureus 
dispersal could also occur within the same individuals [12, 18]. 
3.1.1  Parameterization for chapter V and VI models 
Possible ranges of S.aureus dispersal are summarized in Table 3.1. According to 
the study of the size distribution of airborne particles carrying microorganisms, these 
particles are in the range of 4-20 µm with the median equivalent diameter of 14 (13-17) 
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µm [19]. For such particle size, the settling rate is such that the number contained in 1 ft3 
of air is approximately equal to the number that settle on 1 ft2 in 1 min [13]. Therefore in 
Table 3.1, the reported S. aureus air count is converted to the cfu/cm2/min for use in 
chapter 5 and 6, assuming all S. aureus in the air completely settle on the horizontal 
surfaces.  
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3.2  S.aureus survives and remains viable on surfaces and hands for a long period of 
time 
The potential of airborne particles to remain in the air or to settle on surfaces and 
floors is largely determined by the size or the diameter of the particles [21]. With a size 
of 13-17 µm skin desquamated cells, approximately all particles ultimately settle down to 
surfaces and floors [13, 21].  As seen in hospital environment, S.aureus can be found 
ubiquitously in various surfaces, including floors, carpets, bed linens, bed frames, over-
bed tables, blood pressure cuffs, nurse call buttons, as well as on nurse stations and 
furniture in public areas [22, 23]. In general, surfaces are frequently referred to as one of 
the following two categories: porous and nonporous or textile and non-textile. We will 
use the former category when referring to surfaces. Despite a wide range of gross 
characteristics, porous material is referred to as material with pores or deep recesses 
where organisms may reside. Nonporous material is frequently hard with a smooth 
surface that does not offer crevices in which microorganism may hide.  
S. aureus is known to survive in a variety of environmental niches by virtue of its 
adaptability and resistance to environmental stress [10, 11]. Studies showed that strains 
causing epidemics had more prolonged survival than non-epidemic strains [12, 13]. Some 
staphylococci epidemic strains may persist on surfaces for months [24-26]. An outbreak 
in a dermatology ward lasted for 14 months. With extensive surveillance among patients, 
healthcare workers and the environment, it was found that a blood pressure cuff and the 
patient’s communal shower were positive for S. aureus isolates identical to the patients’ 
isolates [25]. Initiation of infection control and housekeeping policies while ensuring 
negative environmental surveillance controlled the spread of the outbreak. These 
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initiations included changes of blood pressure cuffs between individual patients and daily 
cleaning of all communal areas on the ward and the shower areas. An outbreak in a male 
surgical ward lasted for 21 months despite emphasis on hand hygiene, isolation of 
affected patients and staggered closure and cleaning of ward bays. The outbreak came 
under control following an intervention, which included increasing the domestic cleaning 
time with emphasis on removal of dust and thorough cleaning of shared medical 
equipment [26]. The study showed indistinguishable strains between patients and the 
ward environment.  
The prolonged survivability of S. aureus in the environment not only contributes 
to its ability to disseminate but also makes decontamination in the hospital environment 
both more difficult and more important. A study to investigate S. aureus contamination of 
environmental surfaces in a dermatology ward revealed a significant difference of porous 
and nonporous surfaces. This study showed contamination of bathtub, stretcher and chair 
for the shower to be as high as 100-105 cfu in 900 cm2. But following disinfection, S. 
aureus continued to be detected on porous surfaces up to 2-1600 cfu depending on 
disinfectant types, while none was detected on nonporous surfaces [27]. 
3.2.1 Parameterization for chapter V and VI models 
Many studies have been performed to investigate the duration of survivability of 
various nosocomial pathogens in hospital, household or in experimental settings [28-34]. 
However, there were many differences in study designs and study conditions, and the 
outcome measures of these studies were not all consistent.  These measures were death 
rate per unit time [28-31], changes of concentration or % recovery over time [32-34], or 
duration of days of survival [35]. For model parameters in chapter V and VI, we have 
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selected references with quantitative measures that allow calculation of the die-off or the 
inactivation rate (µ) based on the reference initial and final concentrations over time as in 
equation 3.1 [31]. 
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3.2.2 Survival on porous surfaces 
A study was performed to evaluate S. aureus survival on contaminated 
standardized sterile fabrics, commonly used in dental clinics. The result suggested that S. 
aureus could survive 3-7 days on surfaces including cotton/polyester fabric and paper. 
From our calculations, the die-off rate is 0.000632 log cfu/min for cotton/polyester fabric 
[14]. Another study using household soiled and clean cloths showed a die-off rate of 
0.000612 cfu/min [15]. In chapter V and VI, we use a former result given it is more 
relevant to hospital settings.  
3.2.3 Survival on nonporous surfaces 
Laboratory experiments on decay rate of six different nonporous surfaces using 
culture and PCR methods found a much higher level of inactivation using a culture 
method in comparison to a quantitative PCR. From this study, we used the decay rate by 
culture method on plastic, which was 0.012 (log cfu/hr). We assume first order decay in a 
small time step of one minute; this decay rate on plastic was equated to 0.0002 log 
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cfu/min [16]. Another study using soiled and clean laminate surfaces showed decay rates 
of 0.00054 cfu/min and 0.000637 cfu/min on average, respectively [15].  
3.2.4 Survival on hands and skin 
A study that artificially applied nosocomial pathogens including S. aureus on four 
volunteers’ fingertips found that among five different pathogens, S. aureus was 
minimally second to Klebsiella pneumoniae in its survivability on fingertips. The greatest 
loss happened in the first five minutes and was due to desiccation. Thereafter, the decline 
was less pronounced. Here, we use data from this second phase assuming a first order 
decay. The die off rate on fingertips was 0.00353 log cfu/min [17]. 
Despite being a commensal organism on skin, S. aureus survives shorter on hands 
compared to on surfaces. This characteristic is not unique to S. aureus; other nosocomial 
pathogens such as Candida species, enterococci, or Klebsiella also have shorter survival 
on hands than on surfaces [33, 36, 37]. 
3.3  S. aureus can be transferred between contacting surfaces. These include both 
direct contacts (hand-to-hand or hand-to-skin) and indirect contacts (hands-to-
surfaces).  
Direct contact refers to contact between patients and healthcare workers. Indirect 
contact refers to contacts between healthcare workers or patients and environmental 
surfaces. In chapter V and VI, there is another contact when patients or healthcare 
workers touch their noses with their fingertips. This contact can leads to more 
contamination to the hands or self-inoculation in the nose of the patients or healthcare 
workers. After each contact microorganisms can be transferred between the two 
contacting surfaces [38]. Several factors can influence the microbial transfer between 
surfaces. These include the nature of the environmental surfaces, moisture of surfaces, 
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temperature and relative humidity in the air, whether contact was with or without 
pressure, the amount of bacteria on both contact surfaces as well as the bacterial species 
[38, 39].  
While many factors may determine microbial transfer between surfaces for each 
contact, the frequency of the contact is also important in determining how much 
cumulated exposure dose an individual received from each route. A prospective trained-
observer study in a 12-bed adult intensive care unit was conducted to determine the 
contact rates between healthcare workers and patients and used these to estimate the time 
needed for hand hygiene [40]. Direct contact was defined as healthcare workers’ contacts 
with intact skin, wound, body fluids and intravascular device. Indirect contacts were 
contacts with immediate patient’s environments such as contact with medical equipment, 
handling patient case notes, or touching equipment within bed space. The study showed 
that healthcare workers who cared for more than one patient during their shifts made, on 
average, 22 direct and 107 indirect contacts without adequate hand hygiene per patient 
per day [40]. Each patient was contacted directly 159 times and indirectly 191 times by 
many healthcare providers. Observed post-contact hand hygiene rates were 43% for 
direct contacts and 12% for indirect contacts [40]. As seen in this study contacts with 
surfaces were more frequent than direct person-to-person contacts, which is likely similar 
to everyday living. Nevertheless, this more frequent indirect exposure was less likely to 
be followed with hand hygiene. This finding raises a question if touching these 
contaminated surfaces leads to higher hands contamination among healthcare workers. 
3.3.1 Parameterization for chapter V and VI models 
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To compare the potential impact of these different contacts, a measure of the 
fraction of the organisms on one surface that is transferred to another contacting surface 
is used. This fraction is called transfer efficiency, which varied greatly depending on the 
tested surfaces and materials such as dishcloths, sponges, ground beef, carrot, stainless 
steel, and phone receivers [38, 39]. For chapter V and VI, there are transfer efficiencies 
for surfaces (porous and nonporous surfaces), hands and noses. 
3.3.2 Transfer from hands to surfaces and from surfaces to hands 
An earlier study in 1990 investigated the extent of which survival of organisms on 
cloths and laminate surfaces may be associated with cross-contamination of the hands. 
The study included 5 different organisms including S. aureus and the transfer was tested 
at time 0, 1, 2, and 24 hours after the contamination of surfaces. The results showed that 
organisms were transferred more efficiently from laminate surfaces than from cloths. The 
transfer efficiency from contaminated laminate surfaces to hands was the highest (43.5%) 
at one hour after contamination and decreased subsequently. The transfer efficiency from 
contaminated clothes to hands was also the highest (5.1%) at one hour after 
contamination, although there appeared to be regrowth of S. aureus at 24 hour. Regrowth 
of the residual survival led to increase in transfer efficiency. While this study was 
informative, the reported measures were not all quantitative in nature.  
A more recent study in 2001 proposed to develop a quantitative protocol for 
assessing the transfer of bacteria [38]. The study evaluated transfer of S. aureus from two 
types of fabric (100% cotton and 50-50% cotton-polyester) to fingerpads under three 
conditions (dry, moist, re-moist) when transfer was tested with or without friction. The 
results showed the higher levels of transfer between moist donors and/or recipients 
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surfaces as well as higher transfer when friction was applied [38]. While this study allows 
quantitative assessment and comparison of various transfer conditions, certain basic 
differences make direct comparison of the transfer efficiency levels difficult [34, 38]. For 
example, in the 1990 study, the contact time was 30 seconds, which is three times longer 
than in this study, and contact surface area was 2 fingertips, compared to 0.5 cm2 in this 
study. These differences may partly contribute to higher transfer efficiency in the earlier 
study.   
To determine the transfer efficiency of microorganisms from surfaces to hands 
and from fingertips to lower lip, a 2002 study was conducted using a different protocol 
than previously described [39]. The study found a significant difference in transfer 
efficiency between porous and nonporous surfaces. Efficiency for nonporous surfaces 
was in the range of 28% to 66%, while for porous it was <1%.  
3.3.3 Transfer from fingertip to nose and from nose to fingertip 
To our knowledge, there have been no studies on transfer efficiency from hand to 
nose as of now. However, bacterial transfer efficiency from fingertip to lower lip was 
studied and was in the range of 34% to 41% [39]. In the models in chapters V and VI, we 
assume transfer efficiency from hand to nose to be less than transfer efficiency from 
fingertip to lip due to less direct contact of the fingertip to the anterior nares, where 
S.aureus resides. We assume a lower efficiency of 20%. 
3.3.4 Transfer from hand to hand 
There is no study on transfer efficiency from hand to hand. We assume the 
efficiency from hand to hand to be similar to from fingertip to lip [39]. 
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3.4  S. aureus in the environment can lead to infection. 
S. aureus in the environment has been linked as the source of infections in 
epidemic, sporadic and endemic hospital settings. Several MRSA outbreaks were shown 
to be associated with environmental contamination. These outbreaks required extensive 
additional decontamination interventions [41-44]. A systematic review of 1,022 
outbreaks from 1966 to 2002 showed that S. aureus was among the most common causes 
representing 15% of all nosocomial outbreaks, compared to 13 other nosocomial 
pathogens, which each represented from 2 to 9% of the outbreaks [45]. Of all the 
outbreaks, the sources were the patients (25.7%), medical equipment or devices (11.9%), 
the environment (11.6%), the staff (10.9%), and contaminated drugs or food or care 
equipment (2.9 %). In 37% of the outbreaks, the authors were not able to identify the 
sources.  
In endemic settings, the risk associated with environmental sources has been 
examined indirectly by assessing the MRSA status of the prior room occupants or 
roommates. A 20-month retrospective cohort study of patients admitted to 8 intensive 
care units, which performed routine and weekly screening for MRSA, showed that 
patients admitted to a room that was previously occupied by MRSA patients had 
increased odds of MRSA acquisition, compared to patients whose prior room occupants 
were MRSA negative [46]. A retrospective cohort study of a 472-bed acute-care teaching 
hospital showed that roommates of patients with MRSA were at significant risk for 
becoming colonized. This study followed 198 roommates of patients who had 
unrecognized MRSA colonization between 1996 and 2004. Subsequently, twenty-five 
patients (12.6%) acquired MRSA, all with strains indistinuguishable by pulsed-field gel 
electrophoresis from those of their roommates [47]. While these data were suggestive of 
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risks due to environmental factors, they did not have laboratory confirmation of 
environmental sources.  
A 1-year prospective study was conducted to assess the effect of additional 
cleaner in a surgical ward and the environmental contamination and clinical outcome of 
MRSA infections [48]. The study assigned an additional cleaner into two matched wards 
with each ward receiving enhanced cleaning for six months in a crossover design. 
Clinical and environmental surveillances of hand-touch sites were monitored. The study 
showed that enhanced cleaning was associated with a 32.5% reduction in contamination 
levels and 26.6% reduction in new MRSA infections when wards received enhanced 
cleaning. Using pulse field gel electrophoresis, the study was able to identify 
indistinguishable MRSA strains first isolated in the environment, which later caused 
infections in patients, as well as isolated from the patients that later found in the 
environment [48].  
In general, determining sources of sporadic cases can be rather challenging. A 
unique report in 1980 of a 6-year surveillance of a single individual revealed how much 
impact one disperser could cause in both epidemic and sporadic settings [49]. A 
staphylococcal disperser employed as an operating room technician was found to be the 
source of 11 cases of wound sepsis over a three-year period. Using a phage-typing 
technique, the staphylococcal strains from technician’s nasal swabs, his aerial dispersal 
test, infected patients, and the operating room air samples were indistinguishable. Several 
attempts of various intranasal and systemic antibiotic regimens were given to control his 
skin dispersal. Subsequently, the dispersal was controlled by daily washing with 
chlorhexidine detergent. During the following 2 years when he remained on duty and 
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continued his chlorhexidine baths, there was only one case of wound sepsis attributed to 
the technician. In retrospect, however, it was later realized that the technician may have 
been the source of sporadic cases of wound infections over another 3 years. During this 
time he stopped the baths and ceased working in the operating room to take up another 
job within the hospital. In addition, his weekly skin dispersal surveillance was stopped 
[49]. 
Collectively, these studies revealed that exposure through the environment can 
pose a risk of S. aureus acquisition. To explicitly quantify and understand this risk due to 
environmental exposures, based on the EITS framework we would first need to perform a 
quantitative assessment of the exposure dose, and a qualitative assessment of the 
exposure patterns of the susceptible individuals. Then we can incorporate the dose-
response relationship to analyze the risk based on the environmental exposure dose and 
route. Thus far, there have been several experimental dose-response studies in animals 
such as rabbit and mice models, in newborns, as well as in adult volunteers where the 
outcome measures were either infection or colonization [50-56].  
3.5 Summary 
There is substantial evidence supporting environmental mediation of S.aureus 
transmission. S. aureus is a greatly adaptable commensal organism that can live in the 
nose, on the skin and at numerous other parts of the body. Colonized or infected 
individuals can shed S.aureus continuously and sometimes profusely into air via 
contaminated skin scales. These aerially dispersed skin scales later deposit on surfaces, 
floors, or on patients. The contaminated surfaces may serve as a contamination sources to 
healthcare workers and patients, when they touch these surfaces. Contaminated hands of 
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healthcare workers may also subsequently transfer S. aureus to susceptible patients. 
These literature reviews apply to both methicillin-sensitive (MSSA) and methicillin-
resistant S. aureus (MRSA).  
3.6 Dissertation goal and outline 
The overall goal of this dissertation is to provide further insight of the role of the 
contaminated environment in transmission of methicillin-resistant S. aureus in hospital 
settings. To do so, three studies were conducted as presented in chapters IV,V, and VI in 
this dissertation. The objectives and brief introductions for each chapter are as follows. 
3.6.1 Chapter IV 
The objectives of this chapter are i) to examine the MRSA acquisition risk 
associated with the presence of MRSA positive patients in the intensive care unit (ICU) 
among susceptible patients admitted to the same ICU, and ii) to examine the MRSA 
acquisition risk associated with MRSA status of the previous room occupants and the 
room vacant time prior to patient’s admission. We use Cox proportional hazard 
regression model analysis. The dataset came from the 20-bed surgical intensive care unit 
(SICU) at the University of Michigan Health System, a 930-bed tertiary care university 
hospital. This was part of a hospital targeted active surveillance program from October 1, 
2006 to June 15, 2008. This program included nasal swab cultures of all patients within 2 
days of admission, weekly and at discharge.  
3.6.2 Chapter V 
The objectives of this chapter are to determine the effect of MRSA continual 
shedding on i) the direct and indirect exposure patterns of nurses and the uncolonized 
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patient, and ii) the surface contamination levels following the decontamination 
interventions. The two interventions are daily surface decontamination and 
decontamination by wiping after each nurse touches the nonporous surfaces. We 
construct and analyze an ordinary differential equation based model representing two 
hypothetical hospital rooms. The model describes MRSA fate and transport between (1) 
two patients, a colonized patient and an uncolonized patient, who are in two separate 
hospital rooms, (2) porous and nonporous environmental surfaces in each room, and (3) 
nurses. 
3.6.3 Chapter VI 
The objectives of this chapter are to examine the effects of hand hygiene 
compliance at the entry and exit of a patient’s room to the exposure to the uncolonized 
patient, 2) to examine the impact of the contaminated environmental levels to hand 
hygiene compliance effect. For this chapter we construct and analyze a stochastic agent 
based model with the same structure of two hypothetical hospital rooms as in chapter V.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
Colonization Pressure as a Risk Factor for Methicillin-Resistant               
Staphylococcus aureus Acquisition in a Surgical Intensive Care Unit 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) continues to be a leading 
cause of healthcare-associated infections [1-3] . The route of transmission is generally 
accepted as patient-to-patient from contaminated healthcare workers’ hands [4] . While 
hands are transmission vectors, the major reservoir for contamination is from colonized 
or infected individuals [5]. These patients can transfer the pathogen directly to healthcare 
workers following skin-to-skin contact [4], as well as shed the pathogens on their 
desquamated skin cells onto the environment, resulting in environmental contamination 
[6, 7]. Clean hands then become contaminated by touching the contaminated surfaces [8, 
9]. 
The presence of colonized or infected patients is known to affect acquisition risks 
of other patients [10, 11]. The measure used to quantify the proportion of patients who 
are MRSA–positive who share the same general ward or intensive care unit with others in 
a given time is called “colonization pressure”. This measure was first described in 1994 
and has since been recognized as a risk factor for nosocomial infections [10, 12].  
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Colonization pressure is a measure of both exposure magnitude as well as 
exposure time. A systematic review of studies using colonization pressure showed that 
there have been various definitions of colonization pressure calculated over various 
lengths of time (one day, three days, one week, and one month) [10]. The inconsistent 
definitions impaired the ability to assess the actual exposure time or when the MRSA-
positive patient affects other individuals at risk. Given the continual shedding process of 
MRSA-positive patients and the rigorous daily surface decontamination regime in 
hospitals, we will examine whether a more recent exposure, such as a day before 
acquisition, may be more relevant and a better predictor than a longer exposure time. 
In addition to sharing wards or ICUs with MRSA-positive patients, sharing rooms 
with MRSA-positive patients also increased acquisition risk. A 20-month retrospective 
cohort study of patients admitted to 8 intensive care units, which performed routine and 
weekly screening for MRSA showed that patients admitted to a room that was previously 
occupied by MRSA patients had increased odds of MRSA acquisition, compared to 
patients whose prior room occupants were MRSA-negative [13]. Another retrospective 
cohort study of a 472-bed acute-care teaching hospital showed that roommates of patients 
with MRSA were at significant risk for becoming colonized. This study followed 198 
roommates of patients who had unrecognized MRSA colonization between 1996 and 
2004. Subsequently, twenty-five patients (12.6%) acquired MRSA, all with strains 
indistinuguishable by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis from those of their roommates [14]. 
These studies showed that the MRSA status of the room occupants’ either previous room 
occupant or current roommates is an important risk factor in MRSA acquisition.  
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This study aims to examine the relationship of MRSA acquisition risk and the 
environmental exposure to patients. These environmental exposures include the daily 
preacquisition colonization pressure in an intensive care unit, the prior room occupant 
MRSA status, and the vacant room time between patient admissions. 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Patients and settings 
We conducted a prospective cohort study of patients admitted to a 20-bed surgical 
intensive care unit (SICU). The SICU was an adult critical care unit where patients came 
from major general surgery, trauma, respiratory or multiple organ failure. The study was 
a part of the MRSA active surveillance program at a 930-bed tertiary care university 
hospital from October 1, 2006 to June 15, 2008. The program included nasal swab 
cultures of all patients within 2 days of admission, weekly and at discharge. Nasal swab 
specimens were obtained by SICU nurses. These specimens were then inoculated on 
selective chromogenic agar (MRSASelect: Bio-Rad Laboratories Inc., Hercules, CA) and 
incubated at 35°C in room air for 24 hours. Results were reported at the end of the 24-
hour incubation period. MRSA-positive patients were placed under contact precautions, 
where healthcare workers had mandatory gowns and gloves and instructions for strict 
hand hygiene. All rooms were cleaned daily and upon discharge. 
4.2.2 Data 
The nasal swab culture data was collected as part of the surveillance program. 
Admission cultures were taken within the first two days of SICU arrival. Then, weekly 
cultures and cultures at the time of discharge were taken. All clinical specimens from 
these patients that were positive for MRSA during the study period were also recorded. 
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The following data were extracted from the hospital data warehouse: age, gender, history 
of hospitalization in the previous year, diagnosis, date and time of admissions and 
discharges, and patient room number at any given day during SICU admissions. Acute 
Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation (APACHE) III scores were collected from the 
clinical information and decision support service. This study was approved by the  
Institutional Review Board of the University of Michigan Health System.  
4.2.3 Statistical analysis 
The primary outcome was MRSA acquisition among at-risk patients who had 
more than one culture and whose first culture was negative. MRSA acquisition is defined 
when subsequent nasal swab or clinical specimen became MRSA positive. We compared 
environmental exposures and patient characteristics between those who acquired and 
those who did not acquire MRSA using χ2 and student’s t-test for categorical and 
continuous variables, respectively. The environmental exposures are grouped into i) 
SICU variables, which represent the contextual exposure during the SICU stay, and ii) 
room variables, which represent the factors related to patients’ rooms. 
The SICU variables included daily colonization pressure, bed occupancy, number 
of admissions and discharges of the previous day and previous week of acquisition, and 
nurse to patient ratio. Colonization pressure measures both 1) the exposure magnitude, 
which is the number of MRSA-positive patients, and 2) the exposure time. We assumed 
that the acquisition day is the same day as the detection of positive culture. Colonization 
pressure (CPd) was defined daily as the fraction of all patients in the ICU who were 
MRSA colonized and/or infected, expressed as  
                 ,where  ! " #$%& 
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With the day d = 0 as the first day of positive culture for MRSA-positive patients 
or the last day of swabs for the MRSA-negative patients, is the number of MRSA-
positive patients who were present on day d prior to day 0.  is the total number of 
patients in the SICU on the d day prior to day 0. For example, CP1 is the colonization 
pressure on the day prior to the acquisition day. Additionally, we categorized 
colonization pressure on the day prior to the acquisition day into 4 groups according to 
the number of positive patients present on that day. CP1 categories 1, 2, 3, and 4 referred 
to 0, 1, 2-3 and 4-5 MRSA-positive patients, respectively.  
The room variables were prior room occupant status and duration of vacant room 
time between admissions. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to compare duration 
of prior vacant room time among at-risk patients who remained negative, patients who 
acquired early and had positive second swabs, and patients who acquired later and had 
positive subsequent swabs.  
The patient’s information were age, gender, APACHE score, history of previous 
year hospitalization, length of stay in the hospital before SICU admission (preICU LOS), 
length of stay in SICU (ICU-LOS) and length of stay in the hospital after SICU discharge 
(post ICU-LOS). Correlation analysis among host factors was examined. The prediction 
of exposure by host factors was checked using linear regression analysis with the number 
of MRSA-positive patients (i.e. the exposure) as the dependent variable. A comparison of 
host factors between patients with a history of previous hospitalization and those without 
was assessed using student’s t-test. Equality of variances was checked. For variables 
whose variances were unequal, the Satterthwaite method of t-test was used. 
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We used Cox proportional hazards regression models in which the number of 
days until acquisition of MRSA or the number of days until the last negative culture was 
the dependent variable. In the univariate analysis, we included the independent variables 
as follows: the 4 categories of SICU colonization pressure on the day prior to the 
acquisition, the prior room occupant status, the prior vacant room time, and host factors 
including previous hospitalization, APACHE score, pre-ICU, ICU and post-ICU length 
of stay.  
According to our diagram of the environmental and healthcare worker’s hands 
mediated acquisition (Figure 4.1), two potential sources of confounders are the room 
environment contamination factors and host factors. The diagram is described in more 
detail in Appendix B. We performed a multivariate analysis to assess the adjusted 
acquisition hazard due to colonization pressure by controlling for the room factor in 
model 1, for the host factor in model 2, and for the combined room and host factors in 
model 3. To avoid over-fitting the model since the number of outcomes is small, we 
selected only a room factor and a host factor (see Appendix B). Interactions between 
covariates, and between covariates and time were assessed and retained if significant at 
the 5% level. A proportional hazard assumption was checked by Kaplan-Meier curves 
and by including the interactions of predictor covariates and the time. A finding of 
parallel K-M curves and insignificant time-dependent covariates would support 
proportionality assumption. All analyses were performed using SAS software, version 9.1 
(SAS Institute, Cary NC).  
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Figure 4.1:  Environmental and hand-mediated acquisition diagram. This diagram 
provides the relationships of the variables in the study. The arrows represent a direct 
effect of the tail variable on the head variable. The double arrow indicates bidirectional 
effects. The exposure of interest in this study is the presence of MRSA-positive patient in 
the surgical intensive care unit (SICU). The outcome is MRSA acquisition during the 
SICU stay.  
 
4.3 Results 
Of the total 2,038 SICU admissions, 1,817 (89%) participated in the surveillance 
program. Among these participants, 1,779 had their first culture performed within the 
first 2 days of SICU admission, and 120 (6.7%) were identified to have positive MRSA.  
Of 1,817 admissions, a total of 524 admissions had more than one culture taken. 
The other 1,293 (71%) had only one culture taken during their SICU stay. Of 524, there 
were 471 patients who had negative first cultures.  These compose our prospectively 
followed cohort referred to earlier.  
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Table 4.1 compares characteristics of the 24 (5.1%) patients who acquired MRSA 
after admission to the characteristics of the 447 patients who did not. Patients who 
acquired MRSA were exposed to higher colonization pressure compared to those who did 
not acquire MRSA, particularly on the day before the acquisition (7.94 % versus 5.49 %, 
p=0.15). However, this difference decreased and disappeared on day 4-7 before the 
acquisition.  
In view of the exposure in patients’ rooms, patients who acquired MRSA were 
admitted to rooms that were vacant for a significantly shorter duration than the rooms of 
those who did not acquire MRSA (0.56 versus 0.94 day, p= 0.01). Even though the 
difference is less than half a day, the duration distribution barely overlapped. We further 
examined the relationship between 16 patients who were found positive from their second 
swabs, 8 patients who were positive in their subsequent swabs and the remaining negative 
patients. We found that patients with positive second swabs had the shortest vacant room 
time. Their vacant room time was significantly shorter than patients who remained 
negative (0.53 vs 0.94, p=0.007).  
Regarding host factors, we found no differences in age, gender and APACHE 
score between patients who acquired and who did not acquire MRSA. Patients who 
acquired MRSA were more likely to have history of hospitalization in the previous year, 
have longer pre-ICU, ICU and post-ICU length of stay, although only post-ICU length of 
stay demonstrated a statistically significant difference. Patients with a history of previous 
hospitalizations were more likely to have higher colonization pressures and higher 
APACHE scores, compared to those without. Since patients with a history of previous 
year hospitalization tended to have higher colonization pressures and also had higher 
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hazards of MRSA acquisition, there was likely a confounder in the relationship between 
colonization pressure and the acquisition hazard. We included the previous 
hospitalization history in the subsequent multivariate analysis. 
 
Table 4.1: Comparison of variables related to patients who acquired MRSA and those 
who did not acquire MRSA. These 471 patients were patients admitted to 20-bed Surgical 
Intensive Care Unit between October 1, 2006 and June 15, 2008, and participated in the 
MRSA Nasal Colonization Active Surveillance Program. They were patients who had 
more than one culture taken and their first cultures were negative. Of 471 patients, 24 
were later found to have positive MRSA.  
 
Variables 
Mean (95%CI)a 
Patients who did  
not acquire MRSA 
(n = 447) 
Patients who 
acquired MRSA 
(n=24) 
P value 
Age 57.14 (55.60 – 58.69) 54.21 (45.61 – 62.81) 0.40 
Gender (% male)b 55 62.50 0.47 
History of hospitalization 
in previous year b 
32.70 50 0.08 
APACHE score c  61.50 (59.10-63.80) 65.50 (56.30 - 74.60) 0.44 
Pre-ICU length of stay 
(days) 
7.41 (6.27 – 8.54) 11.50 (5.03 – 17.97) 0.11 
ICU length of stay (days) 9.86 (9.00 – 10.72) 14.87 (9.56 – 20.19) 0.06 
Post-ICU length of stay 
(days) 
8.96 (7.71 – 10.21) 21.17 (9.62 – 32.71) 0.04 
Length of hospitalization 
(days) 
24.22 (22.03 – 26.41) 45.54 (29.38 – 61.70) 0.01 
Prior room occupant 
status (% positive MRSA 
status)b 
7.75 9.09 0.82 
Duration of prior vacant 
room time (days) 
0.94 (0.76 - 1.12) 0.56 (0.31 – 0.82) 0.02 
Bed occupancy (%) 93.35 (92.34 – 94.37) 90 (84.87 – 95.13) 0.14 
Daily colonization 
pressure d 
   
CP1 
 
5.49 (4.96 – 6.01) 7.94 (4.56 – 11.31) 0.15 
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CP2 
 
5.39 (4.86 – 5.91) 6.22 (3.61 – 8.82) 0.48 
CP3 
 
5.64 (5.11 – 6.16) 6.29 (3.68 – 8.89) 0.59 
CP4 
 
5.93 (5.35 – 6.51) 6.21 (3.95 – 8.46) 0.83 
CP5 
 
5.75 (5.18 – 6.33) 5.09 (2.51 – 7.68) 0.61 
CP6 
 
5.37 (4.8 – 5.91) 4.52 (1.98 – 7.06) 0.47 
CP7 
 
5.50 (4.96 – 6.04) 4.75 (2.17 – 7.33) 0.54 
Number of daily 
admissions of the day 
prior to the culture 
2.64 (2.48 – 2.80) 2.58 (2.07 - 3.10) 0.82 
Average number of daily 
admissions of the week 
prior to the culture 
3.41 (3.34 – 3.46) 3.38 (3.15 – 3.63) 0.85 
Number of daily 
discharges of the day prior 
to the culture 
3.05 (2.87 – 3.22) 3.04 (2.45 – 3.63) 0.98 
Average number of daily 
discharges of the week 
prior to the culture 
3.39 (3.33 – 3.44) 3.19 (2.99 – 3.39) 0.11 
Nurse to patient ratio 0.69 (0.68 – 0.70) 0.72 (0.67 -0.76) 0.12 
a These are upper and lower 95% confidence limits of the means using t-test. 
b Comparing proportions using χ2 test. 
c APACHE score stands for the Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation scores. It is an estimate 
of intensive care unit mortality based on a number of laboratory values and patient signs taking both acute 
and chronic disease into account.  
d Colonization pressure (CPd) is a daily fraction of all patients admitted in the SICU who were MRSA 
colonized and/or infected. CPd means the colonization pressure on the d day prior to the acquisition.  
 
In the Cox proportional hazard univariate analysis presented in Table 4.2., the 
fraction of patients colonized on the day prior to the culture was a statistically significant 
predictor for MRSA acquisition. During the study period of 624 days, the mean and 
median number of MRSA-positive patients per day was one. As the number of MRSA-
positive patients increased in the CP1 categories, the acquisition hazard increased. The 
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history of hospitalizations in the past year also increased acquisition hazard by 2 fold, 
although the relationship was statistically insignificant (p=0.06). 
 
In the multivariate analysis shown in Table 4.3., the dose response relationship of 
colonization pressure and MRSA acquisition remained. The adjusted hazard increased as 
the number of MRSA-positive patients increased. These adjusted hazards were not 
drastically different from the unadjusted in Table 4.2, likely due to the minimal 
confounding effects from the room and host factors. 
 
In view of the room factors shown in Table 4.1., patients who acquired MRSA 
had 60% shorter vacant room time prior to admission, when compared to those who did 
not acquire MRSA (0.56 vs 0.94 days).  By increasing vacant room time by one day, the 
acquisition hazard decreased by 26% (HR 0.74 (0.46 – 1.18), p = 0.20). After controlling 
for SICU colonization pressure and host factor, the hazard given one day of vacant room 
time decreased further to 32% (HR 0.68 (0.40 – 1.14), p =0.14). 
 
Table 4.2:  Cox proportional hazard univariate analysis of MRSA acquisition. Data was 
from the MRSA Nasal Colonization Active Surveillance Program of a 20-bed Surgical 
Intensive Care Unit from October 1, 2006 to June 15, 2008, and included 471 patients 
who had more than one culture taken with the first cultures being negative for MRSA. Of 
471 patients, 24 patients later acquired MRSA.  
Variables Hazard Ratio  
(95% CI) 
 
P value 
Age 0.99 (0.97 – 1.01) 0.48 
Gender  0.74 (0.32 – 1.69) 0.48 
History of hospitalization in the 
previous year  
2.17 (0.97 – 4.84) 0.06 
97 
 
APACHE a 0.99 (0.97 – 1.01) 0.27 
Prior room occupant status 0.73 (0.32 – 1.68) 0.47 
Prior vacant room days 0.74 (0.46 – 1.18) 0.20 
Colonization pressure of the day prior 
to the culture (CP1) b,c 
 
1.06 (1.00 - 1.13) 0.04 
 Category 1: CP1 with no positive 
patients (reference) 
  
Category 2: CP1 with 1 positive 
patients 
0.55 (0.17 – 1.78) 0.32 
 Category 3: CP1 with 2-3 positive 
patients 
1.11 (0.40 – 3.14) 0.84 
 Category 4: CP1 with 4-5 positive 
patients 
5.91 (1.95 – 17.86) <0.01 
Bed occupancy percentage 0.98 (0.95 – 1.02) 0.31 
Number of daily admissions of the 
day prior to the culture 
 
1.01 (0.79 – 1.29) 0.96 
Average number of daily admissions 
of the week prior to the culture 
 
0.94 (0.44 – 2.00) 0.87 
Number of daily discharges of the 
day prior to the culture 
 
0.98 (0.79 – 1.21) 0.85 
Average number of daily discharges 
of the week prior to the culture 
 
0.59 (0.27 – 1.27) 0.18 
Nurse/patient ratio 1.03 (0.98 – 1.07) 0.20 
a APACHE score stands for the Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation scores. It is an estimate 
of intensive care unit mortality based on a number of laboratory values and patient signs taking both acute 
and chronic disease into account.  
b Colonization pressure is a daily fraction of all patients admitted in the SICU who were MRSA colonized 
and/or infected. 
c The hazard ratio presented in this line represented the effect of colonization pressure as a continuous 
variable. The effect of colonization pressure as categorical variables were shown in the below lines 
corresponding to CP1 catergory 1, 2, 3 and 4.  
 
Table 4.3:  Cox proportional hazard multivariate analysis of MRSA acquisition. A 
multivariate analysis was performed to assess the adjusted acquisition hazard due to 
colonization pressure by controlling for the room factor in model 1, for the host factor in 
model 2, and for the combined room and host factors in model 3. Data was from the 
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MRSA Nasal Colonization Active Surveillance Program of a 20-bed Surgical Intensive 
Care Unit from October 1, 2006 to June 15, 2008, which included 471 patients who had 
more than one culture taken with the first cultures being negative for MRSA. Of 471 
patients, 24 patients later acquired MRSA.  
Variables Hazard Ratio 
(95% CI) P value 
Model 1: 
  
Prior vacant room days 0.68 (0.40 – 1.14) 0.14 
Colonization pressure of the day prior to the 
culture (CP1) a,b 
 
  
Category 1: CP1 with no positive patients 
(reference) 
  
Category 2: CP1 with 1 positive patient 0.56 (0.17 – 1.85) 0.34 
Category 3: CP1 with 2-3 positive patients 1.17 (0.41 – 3.39) 0.76 
Category 4: CP1 with 4-5 positive patients 6.80 (2.19 – 21.11) <0.01 
Model 2:   
History of previous hospitalization 2.10 (0.94 – 4.69) 0.07 
Colonization pressure of the day prior to the 
culture (CP1) a,b 
 
  
 Category 1: CP1 with no positive patients 
(reference) 
  
Category 2: CP1 with 1 positive patient 0.52 (0.16 – 1.70) 0.28 
Category 3: CP1 with 2-3 positive patients 1.12 (0.40 – 3.15) 0.83 
Category 4: CP1 with 4-5 positive patients 5.51 (1.81 – 16.80) <0.01 
Model 3:   
Prior vacant room days 0.69 (0.40 – 1.18) 0.18 
History of previous hospitalization 2.06 (0.91 – 4.69) 0.08 
Colonization pressure of the day prior to the 
culture (CP1) a,b 
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a Colonization pressure is a daily fraction of all patients admitted in the SICU who were MRSA colonized 
and/or infected. 
b The hazard ratio presented in this line represented the effect of colonization pressure as a continuous 
variables. The effect of colonization pressure as categorical variables were shown in below lines 
corresponding to CP1 catergory 1, 2, 3 and 4.  
 
4.4 Discussion 
Our study supported environmental factors as MRSA acquisition risks. We 
demonstrated the two exposure aspects of SICU colonization pressure: exposure time and 
exposure magnitude. Firstly, we found that a higher hazard of SICU exposure to MRSA-
positive patients was seen with a more recent exposure, which was in the prior day, 
compared to with a longer exposure. Secondly, we showed that the presence of greater 
number of MRSA-positive patients in the SICU led to the greater hazard of acquisition 
among other patients. When there were more than 3 MRSA-positive patients in the SICU, 
the acquisition hazard significantly increased by 6-8 fold. In addition to the SICU factor, 
we found that patients who acquired MRSA were more likely to be admitted to rooms 
that were vacant for a shorter duration between admissions. Increasing the vacant room 
time between patient admissions by 1 day decreased the acquisition hazard by 20-30%.  
While the concept that sharing the same physical space with MRSA positive 
patients can increase acquisition risk among other patients is widely accepted, the 
underlying mechanism is not well described. MRSA-positive patients may contaminate 
their environment as well as individuals who make direct contact with them [7, 15]. This 
Category 1: CP1 with no positive patients 
(reference) 
  
Category 2: CP1 with 1 positive patient 0.54 (0.16 – 1.80) 0.32 
Category 3: CP1 with 2-3 positive patients 1.19 (0.41 – 3.44) 0.74 
Category 4: CP1 with 4-5 positive patients 6.36 (2.03 – 19.92) <0.01 
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contamination may likely be the exposure source to other susceptible patients. A recent 
12-month prospective study that included both active MRSA screening and 
environmental sampling in a 23-bed emergency ward and a 7-bed respiratory intensive 
care unit showed that the weekly colonization pressure adjusted by degree of 
environmenal contamination was a better indicator for predicting MRSA acquisition than 
unadjusted colonization pressure [16].  
In regard to the exposure time, the duration that MRSA-positive patients affect 
risk of others is unclear. As seen in a systematic review of measurement of colonization 
pressure in MRSA, vancomycin resistant enterococci (VRE) and Clostridium difficile 
acquisition, the definition of colonization pressure varied considerably over periods of 
varying lengths from a day to a month [10]. Table 4.4 shows previous studies of MRSA 
acquisition that used colonization pressure in their analysis. Some studies used 
colonization pressure as correlation measures with MRSA acquisition rates [11, 16-18]. 
Others used preacquisition colonization pressure as predictors of MRSA acquisitions [19-
22].  
We found colonization pressure on the day prior to the detection of positive 
MRSA culture to be a more relevant predictor of acquisition than the colonization 
pressure earlier. This finding provided support that the exposure over a more recent 
interval conveys greater transmission risk when compared to an earlier interval. When 
comparing the magnitude of exposure in the day prior to acquisition, we found that a 
greater number of positive patients led to a higher acquisition hazard. Our findings might 
explain the discrepancy of results in previous studies, which used a varied period of time 
and likely had a varied magnitude of colonization pressure. 
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In our study we did not find an association between colonization pressure taken 
from the preceding week and the MRSA acquisition (data not shown). This result agreed 
with a previous retrospective study that also used colonization pressure from the week 
preceding acquisition, and did not find an association with MRSA acquisition [23]. This 
retrospective study instead found associations of acquisition with reduced number of 
trained nurses and hygiene failures of hand-touch site environmental surfaces [23]. 
Conversely, two other ICU studies using weekly colonization pressure found a 
statistically significant association with MRSA acquisition [19, 21]. However, we noted 
that the colonization pressure in these two studies were much larger than in our study. 
The colonization pressure in the 2005 and 2000 studies were in the range of 5 to 40% and 
<10 to <40%, respectively, while in our study the preacquisition colonization pressure 
measured in the preceding week was in the range of 3.7 to 7.8%.  
In regards to room environment, we found no significant association between 
MRSA acquisition and the prior room occupant’s MRSA status. Instead, we found that 
the vacant room time between admissions was 60% shorter in patients who acquired 
compared to those who did not. These findings differed from a previous 20-month 8-ICU 
cohort study which found increased odds of MRSA acquisition among patients whose 
prior room occupants were MRSA-positive, but did not find an association of vacant 
room time between patient admissions and MRSA acquisition [13]. However, we noted 
that the bed occupancy of this previous study was very high and likely impacted this lack 
of association. Their median vacant room day of all patients was zero, while the mean 
vacant room day for patients who acquired and who did not acquire MRSA were 0.5 and 
0.6 day, respectively.  
102 
 
Our findings are consistent with the previous observations that overcrowding and 
heavy workload, measured as high bed occupancy and turnover rates, correlate with 
MRSA acquisitions [24]. In the Netherlands, where there is a national policy of search 
and destroy regarding MRSA, the prevalence of MRSA among clinical S.aureus isolates 
as well as among those without risk factors is well below 1%, which is among the lowest 
in the world. In contrast in our study where the bed occupancy was 85-95%, the bed 
occupancy rate in the Netherlands is approximately 65% [25, 26].  
While our study supported that the environmental risk for MRSA acquisition 
existed, the small number of acquisitions limited our inference. Thus, the definitive 
inference about the recent exposure time relationship with the MRSA acquisition cannot 
be finalized. Nevertheless, our finding provided support for pursuing further investigation 
in these exposure time relationships, as well as assessment of environmental 
contamination with MRSA. 
In summary, our study demonstrated that the patient environment is an important 
risk factor in MRSA acquisition. Recent exposure to SICU where there were MRSA-
positive patients increased acquisition hazards among other patients. As numbers of 
MRSA-positive patients increased, the hazards increased. In regards to SICU room 
admission, longer vacant room time between admissions was associated with lower 
acquisition risks. Although our study had several limitations, we hope our observations of 
these associations will stimulate more careful attention to this issue in other studies. 
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Note: MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; MSSA, methicillin-sensitive 
Staphylococcus aureus, ICU, intensive care unit; CP, colonization pressure; WCP, 
weekly colonization pressure; WCPe, weekly colonization pressure adjusted for 
environmental contamination degree; OR, odds ratio; HR, hazard ratio; RR, risk ratio or 
relative risk 
a Finding interpretation: An OR = 1.01 means for each 1% increase of CP, the odds of 
MRSA acquisition increases by 1%; A HR of 1.01 means for each 1% increase of CP, the 
hazard of MRSA acquisition increases by 1%, A RR of 1.01 means for each 1% increase 
of CP , the risk of MRSA acquisition increases by 1%. 
b Other factors that were found to be associated with MRSA acquisition 
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CHAPTER V 
 
     The Effect of Continual MRSA Shedding on                             
Exposure Patterns and Surface Contamination 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Infections caused by methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) 
continue to increase in the U.S. and Europe [1-5]. Recommendations and guidelines for 
MRSA control originate from many professional organizations and national institutions 
[6-8]. In these documents, hand hygiene has indisputably been an integral part of 
infection-control measures, but the effect of environmental cleaning, if any, remains to be 
demonstrated [9].  
The presence of MRSA-positive patients affect the acquisition risk of other 
susceptible patients bedded in the same hospital unit [10]. However, the mechanisms 
through which such exposure affects the acquisition are not well characterized. 
Individuals who are colonized or infected with MRSA can shed MRSA via contaminated 
skin scales, even through clothing [11, 12]. As many as 106 to 107 of these 8 to 20 µm 
skin particles can be dispersed from the body in 24 hours [13]. These aerial skin scales 
sediment onto surfaces, become airborne when mechanically disturbed, and redeposit 
back on surfaces again [14]. Thus, the possible exposure pathways from a MRSA-
positive patient to the healthcare worker may be from direct skin-to-skin contact with 
MRSA-positive patients, or indirectly through the environment, such as from touching 
 112
contaminated environmental surfaces [15, 16]. Similarly, the exposure pathways to 
susceptible patients may be from direct skin-to-skin contact with a healthcare worker, or 
indirectly from touching contaminated room surfaces. 
Healthcare workers (HCWs) touch room surfaces more frequently than they touch 
patients. In a prospective study in a 12-bed intensive care unit, the frequency of direct 
contact (i.e. HCWs made contact with patients), and indirect contact (i.e. HCWs made 
contact with patients’ environment), and subsequent hand hygiene, were measured over 
120 hourly periods [17]. The study showed that each patient was contacted indirectly 
more frequently than directly (191 vs 159 times/day, respectively). Furthermore, 
healthcare workers who contacted more than one patient and were thus more likely to 
spread the pathogens had, on average, 22 direct and 107 indirect contacts without 
adequate hand hygiene per patient per day.  
Touching contaminated surfaces may result in contaminated hands. A study in 8 
general wards and ICUs evaluated hand imprint cultures after contact with environmental 
surfaces in patients’ rooms [16]. S.aureus, the most commonly identified pathogen, was 
found in 30% of hand imprint cultures in the randomly chosen occupied rooms, and 8% 
of cultures in clean rooms following terminal cleaning after patient discharge. Given the 
shedding of MRSA-positive patients onto surfaces, touching surfaces in MRSA-positive 
patients’ rooms may lead to more hand contamination. 
Moreover, hand hygiene compliance after indirect contact by touching surfaces 
was consistently less frequent than hand hygiene compliance after patient contact [17, 
18]. Therefore, collectively the indirect exposure may be high-risk exposure sources to 
healthcare workers, who may subsequently transfer MRSA to susceptible patients. This 
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underlies the need to improve our understanding of exposure patterns to healthcare 
workers and patients. 
The continuous dispersal of skin scales also means continuous environmental 
contamination, which presents challenges for maintaining adequate hand hygiene 
practices as well as ensuring adequate surface decontamination. These contaminated 
areas include various near-patient locations in patients’ rooms such as bed linen, over-bed 
tables, bedrails, floors, as well as in other common areas [19]. A study reviewing the 
thoroughness of hygiene cleaning in healthcare settings showed that only 40% of near-
patient surfaces are being cleaned in accordance with existing hospital policies [20]. 
Furthermore, when rooms were thoroughly cleaned following the use of hydrogen 
hydroxide vapor, MRSA recontamination on surfaces could occur within 24 hours after 
readmitting patients [21]. We hypothesize that the continual dispersal from a MRSA-
positive patient, resulting in rapid recontamination of surfaces, may impair the long-term 
benefit of surface decontamination. Similarly, this recontamination of surfaces may also 
lead to recontamination of cleaned hands and impair the potential benefits of hand 
hygiene. 
Many surface decontamination studies have focused on the efficacy of cleaning 
methods, while the frequency of decontamination has not received much attention [22-
24]. Surface decontamination generally refers to thorough, entire-surface disinfection. Its 
efficacy depends on its microbicidal activity, the quantity that is used, and the contact 
time on surfaces [22]. At this time, there is more effort in using wiping as a means for 
decontamination [25, 26]. Wipes use formulations with weak and/or limited microbicidal 
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activity; however, the mechanical action of wiping can substantially enhance the process 
of decontamination [22].  
In this study, we developed an MRSA fate and transport model to determine the 
effect of MRSA continual shedding i) on the direct and indirect exposure patterns of 
nurses and uncolonized patients, and ii) on the surface contamination levels following 
decontamination interventions. The surface decontamination interventions included daily 
surface decontamination, and decontamination by wiping after each nurse touches the 
nonporous surfaces. We also examined the effect of hand hygiene and its joint effects 
with two surface decontamination methods.  
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 The exposure pathway model 
Based on an Environmental Infection Transmission System (EITS) framework, 
we constructed and analyzed a deterministic compartmental model of MRSA fate and 
transport between two hypothetical hospital rooms including (1) MRSA shedding from a 
colonized patient, (2) MRSA transfer, deposition, and die-off on skin and hands and on 
room surfaces, (3) MRSA exposure to an uncolonized patient, and (4) two MRSA 
interventions: surface decontamination and hand hygiene.  
This model is an ordinary differential equation-based model consisting of 9 
compartments. These compartments include 1) the colonized patient (PTc), 2) the porous 
surface in the colonized patient’s room (Pc), 3) the nonporous surface in the colonized 
patient’s room (NPc), 4) the uncolonized patient (PTu), 5) the porous surface in the 
uncolonized patient’s room (Pu), 6) the nonporous surface in the uncolonized patient’s 
room (NPu), 7) the nurses (NS), 8) the uncolonized patient’s nose (PTun) and 9) the 
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nurses’ noses (NSn). Given the colonization status, the colonized patient’s nose is 
assumed to approximate a constant MRSA concentration.  
5.2.1.1 Model description 
Upon admission, the colonized patient sheds onto the environment through two 
pathways: (1) by continuously dispersing MRSA via skin squamous cells into the air, and 
(2) by touching environmental surfaces with contaminated hands. MRSA in the air is 
assumed to instantaneously settle on environmental surfaces. While on environmental 
surfaces, some MRSA may naturally die off. Nurses and patients who touch these 
surfaces will then pick up a fraction of MRSA that survive desiccation onto their hands. 
This fraction varies depending on transfer efficiency and MRSA quantity on the hands 
and the surfaces. Both nurses and patients touch the room surfaces, which may result in 
either hand contamination or surface contamination. They also touch their noses, which 
may lead to self-inoculation when their hands are contaminated. Nurses work in eight-
hour shifts; for each shift there is one nurse who visits a colonized patient’s room for the 
first 20 minutes, an uncolonized patient’s room for the next 20 minutes, and the nurses’ 
center for the last 20 minutes where there is no touching event. The cycle repeats hourly 
throughout their shift. In each room visit, the nurse touches the patient and the two 
environmental surfaces at specified touch rates.  
This model keeps tracks of changes in MRSA concentrations in each 
compartment. Model events are described in section 5.2.3. Model parameters are 
presented in Table 5.1. The literature review for parameterization was presented in 
Chapter III. 
5.2.2 Model assumptions 
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1. The only MRSA source is the MRSA colonized patient. This colonized patient 
sheds onto environmental surfaces by aerially dispersed MRSA-contaminated skin 
squamous cells that deposit on surfaces and by surface touching with contaminated 
hands. 
2. The MRSA exposure pathways to a susceptible patient are either by touching 
contaminated room surfaces or being touched by contaminated nurses’ hands.  
3. Nurses are not colonized with MRSA and do not shed MRSA. Their hands serve 
as vectors of the transmission process. 
4. MRSA instantaneously and homogenously mixes on surfaces, skin, and hands.  
5. Transfer efficiency is symmetrical. For example, in an event when a hand touches 
a nonporous surface, 40% of MRSA per 150 cm2 is transferred from that hand to the 
nonporous surface and 40% of MRSA per 150 cm2 from the nonporous surface is 
transferred to the hand. 
 
Table 5.1: Model parameters and their values.  
 Symbol Values Reference 
SHEDDING PARAMETERS:     
Shedding (air dispersal) rate 
(cfu/cm2/min) 
α 0.01 [12, 27, 28] 
SURVIVAL PARAMETERS:    
Die off rate on skin and hand (min-1) µsk 0.00353 [29] 
Die off rate on porous surface (min-1) µp 0.000632 [30] 
Die off rate on nonporous surface (min-1) µnp 0.0002 [31] 
CONTACTS PARAMETERS:    
Rate of patient touches surfaces (min-1) τpt-sf 0.134  
Rate of nurse touches patient (min-1) τns-pt 0.4  
Rate of nurse touches surfaces (min-1) τns-sf 0.4  
Rate of touching nose (min-1) τn 0.025  
Rate of nurse wipes nonporous surface ωnp 0.4  
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(min-1) 
TRANSFER EFFICIENCY 
PARAMETERS: 
   
Transfer efficiency from porous surface 
to fingertip  
ρp 0.1 [32] 
Transfer efficiency from nonporous 
surface to fingertip 
ρnp 0.4 [33] 
Transfer efficiency from hand to skin ρsk 0.35 [33] 
Transfer efficiency from finger to nose ρn 0.2  
SURFACE AREA PARAMETERS:    
Total exposed skin and hand surface area 
of patients (cm2) 
Apt 2000  
Total exposed skin and hand surface area 
of nurses (cm2) 
Ans 2000  
Total porous surface area (cm2) Ap 2000  
Total nonporous surface area (cm2) Anp 2000  
Nose surface area (cm2) An 4  
Hand contact surface area (cm2) Ah 300  
Fingertip contact surface area (cm2) Af 1  
INTERVENTIONS:    
Daily surface decontamination efficacy εd 0-100%  
Wiping efficacy εw 0-100%  
Hand hygiene efficacy εh 58%, 83% [34, 35] 
 
5.2.3 Model events 
5.2.3.1. Shedding  
The colonized patient sheds MRSA continuously onto porous and nonporous 
surfaces in the colonized patient’s room. This shedding quantity is governed by αAp or 
αAnp. Shedding rate is assigned at 0.01 cfu/cm2/min. We assume shedding only affects 
the colonized patient’s room surfaces. There is no MRSA aerial dispersal into the 
uncolonized patient’s room.  
5.2.3.2 Nurse visiting patient rooms  
At the beginning of each hour, a nurse will first visit the colonized patient for 20 
minutes and then visit the uncolonized patient for the next 20 minutes. Before and after a 
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visit, nurses may perform hand hygiene. While in a patient’s room, nurses touch the 
patient and the two room surfaces at given rates in Table 5.1. 
5.2.3.3 Touching   
Touching or contact is one of the main events that determine the changes of 
pathogen concentrations in each compartment. In this model, there are i) direct contacts, 
where nurses touch patients, ii) indirect contacts, where either nurses or patients touch the 
room surfaces, and iii) self-inoculation, where nurses and patients touch their noses with 
a fingertip. Each type of contact is governed by contact rate as in Table 5.1. 
For each contact event, there are bidirectional flows of pathogen transfers to and 
from the two contacting surfaces. The fraction of pathogens that is transferred from one 
contacting surface to another is called transfer efficiency. In this model, we assume 
symmetrical transfer efficiency.  
To illustrate these contact mediation processes, consider an example of a direct 
contact event where a nurse touches an uncolonized patient as seen in Table 5.2. For each 
touch, there is a quantity of MRSA transferred from the nurse’s hand to the patient 
(NS*150/2000*ρsk) and, as well, there is a quantity of MRSA transferred from the patient 
to the nurse’s hand (PTu*150/2000*ρsk). These MRSA quantities depend on 1) the 
bacterial concentrations at both contacting surfaces (i.e. NS and PTu), 2) the contact 
surface area (i.e. 150 sq.cm.), 3) the total surface area (i.e. 2000 sq.cm.), and 4) transfer 
efficiency. The assumption of symmetrical transfer efficiency in this case means the 
fraction of pathogen that is transferred from the nurse to the uncolonized patient is the 
same fraction that is transferred from the uncolonized patient to the nurse, which is the 
transfer efficiency of hands to skin or skin to hands, i.e. 0.35 (ρsk).  
 119
 The net quantity of pathogens transferred and the result of the contact depend on 
the contamination levels on contacting surfaces. In this case, nurses are the only sources 
of MRSA into the uncolonized patient’s room. Thus, the direct contact of nurses and the 
uncolonized patient results in an increase in contamination of the uncolonized patient. 
 
Table 5.2: A direct contact event between nurses’ hands (NS) and the uncolonized 
patient (PTu). NS represents the concentration of MRSA cfu on nurses (MRSA cfu/2000 
sq.cm.). PTu represents the concentration of MRSA cfu on the uncolonized patient 
(MRSA cfu/2000 sq.cm.). Contact surface area is 150 sq.cm. Transfer efficiency for the 
direct contact event (ρsk) is 0.35. The transfer efficiency of MRSA from nurses’ hands to 
the uncolonized patient’s skin is assumed to be the same as transfer efficiency from the 
uncolonized patient’s skin to nurses’ hands. Thus, MRSA quantity that is transferred 
from nurses’ hands to the uncolonized patient’s skin is NS*150/2000*0.35. MRSA 
quantity transferred from the uncolonized patient’s skin to nurses’ hands is 
PTu*(150/2000)*0.35.  
 Nurses (NS) Uncolonized patient 
(PTu) 
Total surface area (sq.cm.) 2000 2000 
Contact surface area (sq.cm.) 150 150 
Transfer efficiency (ρsk) 0.35 0.35 
MRSA concentration per total 
surface area (cfu/2000 sq.cm.) 
NS PTu 
Bidirectional flows between the two contacting surfaces: 
 
 
 
 
5.2.3.4  Natural die-off event or survivability of MRSA 
MRSA on surfaces, patients, and nurses continuously decreases with fixed die-off 
rates depending on whether they are on the skin and hands, porous surfaces, or nonporous 
surfaces. 
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5.2.4  Model interventions 
We studied the effect of three interventions separately and jointly: daily surface 
decontamination, surface decontamination by wiping, and hand hygiene.  
5.2.4.1 Daily surface decontamination  
Daily surface decontamination affects both porous and nonporous surfaces and is 
scheduled every 24 hours. Following each decontamination event, a fraction of MRSA 
will be removed depending on surface decontamination efficacy (εd).  
5.2.4.2 Surface decontamination by wiping.  
Wiping only affects nonporous surfaces. After each nonporous surface touch, 
nurses wipe the surface.  Thus, the wiping rate is the same as the rate that nurses touch 
the nonporous surfaces. Following each wipe, a fraction of MRSA will be removed 
depending on wiping efficacy (εw).  
5.2.4.3  Hand hygiene  
Hand hygiene is scheduled before and after each nurse visit, i.e. at time 0 and 20 
minutes of the hour for the colonized patient’s room visit and time 21 and 40 minutes for 
the uncolonized patient’s room visit. Following a hand-hygiene event, a fraction of 
MRSA will be removed depending on hand hygiene efficacy (εh). The two efficacy 
parameters depend on the hygiene methods. Hand hygiene efficacy for soap and water is 
58%, and for alcohol hand gel rub is 83% [34, 35].  
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Figure 5.1: A diagram of the compartmental model with ten compartments. These are 
exposed skin and hands of the colonized patient (PTc), porous surface in the colonized 
patient’s room (Pc), nonporous surface in the colonized patient’s room (NPc), exposed 
skin and hand of the uncolonized patient (PTu), porous surface in the uncolonized 
patient’s room (Pu), nonporous surface in the uncolonized patient’s room (NPu), exposed 
skin and hand of the nurse (NS), the colonized patient’s nose (PTcn), the uncolonized 
patient’s nose (PTun), and the nurse’s nose (NSn). Solid arrows are pathogen flows due to 
touching events or due to the natural die off. Dashed arrows are shedding from colonized 
patient to the porous and nonporous surfaces in the room. Red arrows are flows within 
colonized patient’s room that are independent of time. Green arrows are flows within 
uncolonized patient’s room that are also independent of time. Nurses’ flows are, 
however, time-dependent. Blue arrows indicate flows in and out of the nurse 
compartment during the first 20 minutes of the hour. Purple arrows indicate flows in and 
out of the nurse compartment during the next 20 minutes of the hour. Black arrows 
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indicate flows resulting from touching noses, which are time-independent. The flow 
numbers are row numbers correspondent to Table C.1. in Appendix C. 
 
5.2.5 Differential equations 
Figure 5.1 shows the diagram of this compartmental model. The mathematical 
flow descriptions between compartments are in Table C.1: Appendix C. 
5.2.5.1 The colonized patient (PTc) 
We assume that the colonized patient maintains a steady MRSA concentration on 
the exposed skin and hands (PTc). This balance is achieved by the gain and loss in 
MRSA. The colonized patient gains MRSA from the replenishment of the contaminated 
skin scales and from touching the nose. The replenishing rate is assumed to be the same 
as the dispersal rate. A concentration of MRSA in the nose (PTcn) is assigned at a 
constant of 1000 cfu/4 cm2. On the other hand, the colonized patient loses MRSA from 
natural die-off, and from pathogen flows out to surfaces and nurses after touching events. 
The colonized patient is touched by the nurses only during the first 20 minutes of the 
hour.  
The change of MRSA on the skin and hand of the colonized patient (PTc) are 
given by: 
 !/!0  123  / 2423 5676 8 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/ 2/23 53733 8 / 2/23 53733 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63 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?	0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?	0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           (5.2.1) 
 
Where n ∈ Ζ+, and 
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The function f(t) is a time indicator function for a nurse’s visit in the colonized 
patient’s room. F(t) is equal to one during the first 20 minutes, allowing a nurse’s 
touching events to occur and equal 0 during other times.  
PTc is initialized at the equilibrium MRSA level of 6,000 cfu/2000 cm2. MRSA 
concentration in a colonized patient’s nose is set at an equilibrium level of 1000 cfu/4 
cm2.  
5.2.5.2 The porous surface in the colonized patient’s room (Pc) 
  Changes of MRSA on the porous surface in the colonized patient’s room (Pc) as 
seen in equation 5.2.3 are driven by the deposition of MRSA dispersal on the surface, 
surface touches by the colonized patient, surfaces touches by the nurses during the first 
20 minutes of the hour, the natural die-off, and the daily surface decontamination.  
 !/!0  123 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                                                                                                                                (5.2.3) 
where n ∈ Ζ+, and   J	0  K$0  (  LM$0JNOPQRNH 
          (5.2.4) 
The function h(t) is a time indicator function for the every 24 hours 
decontamination schedule. 
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5.2.5.3 The nonporous surface in the colonized patient’s room (NPc) 
  Changes of MRSA on the nonporous surface in the colonized patient’s room 
(NPc) as seen in equation 5.2.5 are driven by the deposition of MRSA dispersal on the 
surface, surface touches by the colonized patient, surfaces touches by the nurses during 
the first 20 minutes of the hour, the natural die-off, and the daily surface 
decontamination. The structural changes of the nonporous surface is similar to the porous 
surface, except that only the nonporous surfaces can be wiped off following each nurse 
touch. The wiping rate is as frequent as the rate that nurses touch the nonporous surface. 
The efficacy of the wipes and the wiping rate is denoted by εw and ωns-np. 
 !=/!0  1263  =/ 2/263 5637363 8 / 2/23 5637363  =/ 2/263 5637663?	0 8=@ 2/26 5637663?	0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           (5.2.5) 
 
5.2.5.4 The uncolonized patient (PTu) 
  Changes of MRSA on the skin and hands of the uncolonized patient (PTu) as seen 
in equation 5.2.6 are driven by contacts with nurses during the second 20 minutes of the 
hour, contacts with the two room surfaces, contact with own nose, and the natural die-off 
on the skin and hand.  
 !!0   2423 5676 8 6 2426 5676   2/23 53733 8  2/23 53733  2/23 5637363 8= 2/263 537363   2/23 5,763	0 8 =@ 2/26 5,763	0 B, 
           (5.2.6) 
where n ∈ Ζ+, and   
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The function g(t) is a time indicator function for a nurse’s visit in the uncolonized 
patient’s room. g(t) is equal to one during the second 20 minutes of the hour, allowing a 
nurse’s touching events to occur and equal 0 during other times.  
5.2.5.5 The porous surface in the uncolonized patient’s room (Pu) 
 Changes of the porous surface in the uncolonized patient’s room as in equation 
5.2.8 are similar to those of the porous surface in the colonized patient’s room except that 
there is no MRSA dispersal and deposition in the uncolonized patient’s room. Surface 
touches by nurses occur during the second 20 minutes of the hour. 
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           (5.2.8) 
5.2.5.6 The nonporous surface in the uncolonized patient’s room (NPu) 
  Changes of the nonporous surface in the uncolonized patient’s room as in 
equation 5.2.9 are similar to those of the nonporous surface in the colonized patient’s 
room except that there is no MRSA dispersal and deposition in the uncolonized patient’s 
room. Surface touches by nurses occur during the second 20 minutes of the hour. 
!=!0  =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           (5.2.9) 
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5.2.5.7 The nurses (NS) 
  Changes of MRSA on the exposed skin and hands of nurses (NS) as in equation 
5.2.10 are driven by all nurses’ activities and natural die-off on skin and hands. Nurses’ 
activities include touching the colonized patient and the room surfaces during the first 20 
minutes while in the colonized patient’s room, touching the uncolonized patient and the 
room surfaces during the second 20 minutes while in the uncolonized patient’s room, and 
touching own noses. Nurses wash hands before and after a patient’s room visit. The time 
indicator for before and after the colonized patient’s room visit are u(t) and v(t). The time 
indicator for before and after the uncolonized patient’s room visit are x(t) and y(t). Nurses 
may also wipe the nonporous surfaces after surface touches. Nurses are assumed to have 
clean skin and hands at the beginning of each 8-hour shift. The time indicator for the 
beginning of the shift is s(t). 
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The other two compartments are MRSA accumulated in the uncolonized patient’s 
nose and nurse’s nose. They are given by: 
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5.2.6  Model analysis 
The analysis is divided in three parts. First, we examine the effect of continual 
shedding to the contamination levels or MRSA concentrations (cfu/2000 cm2) in both 
patients’ rooms at baseline scenario with no intervention. The initial condition is set to 
reflect clean room surfaces, nurses and the uncolonized patient with MRSA 
concentrations at zero. The initial MRSA concentration for the colonized patient and the 
colonized patient’s nose are 6,000 cfu/2000cm2, and 1000 cfu/4cm2, respectively. The 
outcome measurements are 1) the MRSA contamination levels, which are the net MRSA 
concentrations in the compartments, 2) the MRSA exposure dose to the nurses in the 
colonized patient’s room, which is the net flow to the nurses from the colonized patient 
and surfaces, and 3) the MRSA exposure dose to the uncolonized patient, which is the net 
flow to the uncolonized patient from nurses and surfaces. According to the diagram, the 
net flow to the nurses (the blue flows) is (6ib-6ia)+(5ib-5ia)+(5iib-5iia). The net flow to 
the uncolonized patient (the purple and green flows) is (6iia–6iib) + (4ib-4ia) + (4iib-
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4iia).We compared these direct and indirect exposure sources to the nurses in the 
colonized patient’s room and to the uncolonized patient.  For example, direct exposure to 
the uncolonized patient is the net flow resulting from the skin-to-skin contact with nurses, 
which is (6iia-6iib). Indirect exposure to the uncolonized patient is the net flow to the 
uncolonized patient from touching the two surfaces in the room, which is (4ib-4ia) + 
(4iib-4iia).  
Second, we evaluated and compared the effect of two surface decontamination 
methods. The once daily surface decontamination was evaluated with 0%, 50% and 100% 
efficacy. The decontamination by wiping following each nurse touch was also examined 
with 0%, 50% and 100% efficacy. These two decontamination methods may differ in 
three aspects, which are the surface area that is cleaned each time, the cleaning efficacy, 
and the frequency of cleaning. We compared the effect of the decontamination frequency 
while the efficacy is 100%. The effect of the surface-decontamination frequency every 
24, 12 and 8 hours was examined. Surface wiping frequency is at the same rate a nurse 
touches the nonporous surface, which is eight times every hour while the nurse is in the 
room. The outcome measure for this comparison is the total MRSA exposure dose to the 
uncolonized patient.  
Third, we examined the effect of hand hygiene when compliance is ideally at 
100%, while the efficacy varies according to the hygiene method. Hand hygiene efficacy 
for soap with water is 58%, and for alcohol hand gel rub is 85% [34, 35]. We then 
examined the joint effect of surface decontamination and hand hygiene when compliance 
is 100% and efficacy for each intervention varies at 0%, 50%, and 100%.  
5.2.7 Sensitivity analysis 
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We explore how sensitive the system is to various model parameters including 
contact surface area, total exposed surface area, transfer efficiency, survivability, and 
contact rates using parameter plots and the total MRSA exposure dose to the uncolonized 
patient. To relax the assumption of instantaneous and homogenous mixing of the 
pathogen, we create and compare models where contact and total surface areas are equal 
and do not require the instantaneous and homogenous mixing and models where there is a 
difference between the two areas and the above assumption is needed. To relax the 
assumption of continuous touches modeling using touch rates, we explicitly define touch 
and wipe time points and create a discrete event model for direct comparison with the 
original model.  
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Baseline scenario with no intervention 
At baseline scenario with no intervention, Figure 5.2 shows that regular patterns 
of MRSA concentrations with constant averages are reached in each compartment by 24 
to 48 hours. Comparing the patient and the two surfaces in the colonized patient’s room, 
surfaces accumulate higher MRSA concentration than the colonized patient. This is 
largely due to the longer survival time on surfaces than on skin and hands. All lines show 
jagged patterns, which correspond to changes of MRSA concentrations due to the nurse’s 
hourly room visits and the change of shift every eight hours.  
Comparing the two surface compartments (Pc and NPc) in the colonized patient’s 
room, the porous surface accumulated a higher concentration than the nonporous surface. 
As seen in equations 5.2.3 and 5.2.5, the surfaces share the same structure of flows in and 
out of the compartments; the same total surface area, which results in the same MRSA 
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deposition; and the same patient’s and nurse’s touch rates. The two surfaces have 
different die-off rates, but are still within the same order of magnitude. Of the four main 
events on the surfaces, (1) MRSA deposition on surfaces, (2) contact with the colonized 
patient, (3) contact with nurses, and (4) natural die-off (survivability), contact with nurses 
is the most influential in determining the MRSA levels in the compartment, since it 
results in the largest net transfer. Thus, the porous surface has smaller transfer efficiency; 
lower net MRSA transfers from the porous surface to nurses, resulting in a higher MRSA 
concentration remaining in the porous surface compartment (Pc). 
In the uncolonized patient’s room, the nonporous surface (NPu) has a higher 
concentration than the porous surface (Pu) and the uncolonized patient (PTu). As seen in 
equations 5.2.8 and 5.2.9, the two surfaces share the same flows due to patient contacts, 
nurse contacts, and natural die-off. The uncolonized patient receives no direct deposition 
from the shedding process. The only source of MRSA to the uncolonized patient is from 
nurses, either directly by being touched by nurses or indirectly by touching surfaces that 
were contaminated by nurses. The nonporous surface has a higher transfer efficiency—
that is, more MRSA transfers into the nonporous surface compartment, which leads to a 
higher accumulated concentration on the nonporous surface (NPu). 
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Figure 5.2: MRSA quantity at baseline scenario without intervention. The Y-axis 
represents MRSA quantity on the entire surface area (cfu/2000 cm2) from the seven 
compartments including the exposed skin and hand of the colonized patient (PTc), the 
porous surface in the colonized patient’s room (Pc), the nonporous surface in the 
colonized patient’s room (NPc), the exposed skin and hand of the uncolonized patient 
(PTu), the porous surface in the uncolonized patient’s room (Pu), the nonporous surface in 
the uncolonized patient’s room (NPu), and the exposed skin and hand of the nurse (NS).  
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a) 
b) 
Figure 5.3: Effects of daily surface decontamination (SDd) at 0%, 50% and 100% 
efficacy levels. Figure 5.3a shows the effects of SDd on the nonporous surface in the 
uncolonized patient’s room. Figure 5.3b shows the average MRSA concentrations on the 
seven compartments, which are the exposed skin and hand of the colonized patient (PTc), 
the porous surface in the colonized patient’s room (Pc), the nonporous surface in the 
colonized patient’s room (NPc), the exposed skin and hand of the uncolonized patient 
(PTu), the porous surface in the uncolonized patient’s room (Pu), the nonporous surface in 
the uncolonized patient’s room (NPu), and the exposed skin and hand of the nurse (NS). 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Time (hrs)
M
R
S
A
 c
o
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
 (
cf
u
/2
00
0s
q
.c
m
.)
Effect of daily surface decontamination on NPu
 
 
SDd 0% efficacy
SDd 50% efficacy
SDd 100% efficacy
PTc PTu Pc Pu NPc NPu NS
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
M
R
S
A
 c
o
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
 (
cf
u
/2
00
0 
sq
.c
m
.)
Effects of daily surface decontamination
 
 
0% Efficacy
50% Efficacy
100% Efficacy
 133
5.3.2 Daily surface decontamination 
Figure 5.3 shows the effect of daily room surface decontamination at 0%, 50%, 
and 100% efficacy. Figure 5.3a shows changes of MRSA concentrations on the 
nonporous surface in the uncolonized patient’s room (NPu) through time and 
demonstrates a distinct pattern, which is also noted throughout other compartments. The 
pattern shows the short-lived effect of the daily decontamination in decreasing MRSA. 
After 24 hours MRSA concentration quickly returned to the level prior to the cleaning.  
Figure 5.3b shows the effects of daily decontamination to the average MRSA 
concentrations in the seven compartments. On an absolute scale, the porous surface in the 
colonized patient’s room (Pc) was the most affected with the largest decrease in MRSA 
concentration. Interestingly, both the colonized and the uncolonized patients as well as 
nurses also demonstrated the decreasing patterns corresponding to the cleaning of the 
porous and nonporous surfaces. The pattern is due to the sudden decrease in pathogen 
flows from both surfaces to the patients and nurses. 
5.3.3 Decontamination by wiping after each nurse touches nonporous surfaces 
Figure 5.4a shows the effect of decontamination by wiping at 0%, 50%, and 100% 
efficacy. Here, there is no fluctuation pattern as was seen with daily decontamination. In 
Figure 5.4b, with 50% efficacy, the total exposure dose to the uncolonized patient is 
reduced by 54%, while 100% efficacy decontamination decreased the exposure dose 
further to 63%. This shows that increasing efficacy from 50% to 100% does not linearly 
decrease exposure to the uncolonized patient. This is due to the fact that only the contact 
surface area is wiped each time, not the entire surface area. Nevertheless, wiping with 
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50% efficacy decreases the concentration of MRSA more substantially than daily 
decontamination with 100% efficacy. 
a) 
b) 
Figure 5.4: Effects of surface decontamination by wiping (SDw) at 0%, 50% and 100% 
efficacy levels. Figure 5.4a shows the effects of SDw on the nonporous surface in the 
uncolonized patient’s room. Figure 5.4b shows the average MRSA concentrations on the 
seven compartments, which are the exposed skin and hand of the colonized patient (PTc), 
the porous surface in the colonized patient’s room (Pc), the nonporous surface in the 
colonized patient’s room (NPc), the exposed skin and hand of the uncolonized patient 
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(PTu), the porous surface in the uncolonized patient’s room (Pu), the nonporous surface in 
the uncolonized patient’s room (NPu), and the exposed skin and hand of the nurse (NS). 
 
Table 5.3: Comparison of the frequency of the two decontamination methods and the 
affected surface area. 
 Routine surface 
decontamination (SDd) 
Surface decontamination 
by wiping (SDw) 
Comparison for 
each surface 
a. 
Every 24 
hours 
b. 
Every 12 
hours 
c. 
Every 8 
hours 
d. 
Nurses touch 
8 times/hour 
e. 
Nurses touch 
3 times/hour 
Total surface 
area 
decontaminated 
(cm2 per each 
cleaning event) 
8000 8000 8000 300 300 
Number of 
cleaning events 
per hour 
0.0417 0.0833 0.125 8 3.333 
Numbers of 
cleaning events 
per day 
1 2 3 192 80 
Total surface 
area 
decontaminated 
per hour 
333.36 666.67 1000 2400 1000 
Total surface 
area 
decontaminated 
per day 
8000 16000 24000 57600 24000 
 
5.3.4 Comparison of daily surface decontamination and decontamination by wiping 
To further understanding of the effects of decontamination in relation to the 
mechanical process, the surface area cleaned and the frequency of decontamination are 
compared in Table 5.3. While daily decontamination affects a larger surface area (2000 
cm2) each time and decreases total concentration on surfaces to zero with 100% efficacy, 
MRSA can quickly redeposit on the surfaces. On the other hand, wiping affects a much 
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smaller surface area (150 cm2), but due to the wiping frequency the accumulated total 
surface area per day is much larger. The surface area cleaned by daily decontamination is 
8000 cm2/day, while by wiping it is 57600 cm2/day. Figure 5.5a compares the two 
decontamination methods with 100% efficacy:  Decontamination by wiping was superior 
to the daily decontamination (even when increased to twice per day), leading to much 
less total exposure dose to the uncolonized patient.  
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b) 
Figure 5.5: The effect of the routine surface decontamination and decontamination by 
wiping to the mean exposure dose to the uncolonized patient (MRSA cfu/2000 cm2). 
Figure 5.5a compares three different schedules of the surface decontamination and 
decontamination by wiping. The three schedules are decontamination (SDd) every 24, 12, 
and 8 hours. All lines overlap in the beginning since there is no intervention until their 
scheduled time. Figure 5.5b compares the every 8 hours decontamination and 
decontamination by wiping when both affect the same total surface area (scenario c and e 
from Table 5.3). 
 
Figure 5.5a also shows that in order to decrease MRSA exposure to the 
uncolonized patient to the same level decreased by wiping, the routine daily 
decontamination needs to increase its frequency to every eight hours. In comparison to 
the total surface area cleaned in Table 5.3, cleaning every eight hours affects less than 
half the surface area decontaminated by wiping (column c - 24,000 versus column e - 
57,600 cm2). When adjusting the two cleaning methods to affect the same total surface 
area cleaned by decreasing the nurse touching rate (Table 5.3 column c and e), the 
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thorough cleaning every eight hours is superior to decontamination by wiping, leading to 
less exposure dose to the uncolonized patient as in Figure 5.5b.  
5.3.5 Hand hygiene 
In addition to surface decontamination, we examined the effect of hand hygiene in 
decreasing the total exposure dose of MRSA to the uncolonized patient. Figure 5.6 
compared the effect of the two hand-hygiene methods [34, 35], assuming 100% 
compliance. Hand hygiene with soap and water, where efficacy is 58%, decreases the 
total dose exposed by approximately 38% in comparison to no intervention. Alcohol hand 
gel rub, where efficacy is 83%, decreases the total dose exposed further to 48%. 
 
Figure 5.6: Effects of hand hygiene to the mean exposure dose to the uncolonized patient 
(MRSA cfu/2000 cm2). The figure compares the effects of hand hygiene when using soap 
and water, where efficacy is 58% versus alcohol hand gel rub, where efficacy is 83%.  
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5.3.6 Joint effect of surface decontamination and hand hygiene 
While studying the effect of interventions separately in the model is essential, in 
the real world, infection-control strategies always incorporate multiple interventions. As 
in this model, we found that MRSA concentrations on room surfaces and on nurses are 
positively correlated. For example, when wiping efficacy increases, MRSA 
concentrations both on the surfaces as well as on nurses decrease. Applying intervention 
to one contamination site, either to the surface or to the hand, will likely affect the other. 
Here we examined joint effects of the two surface decontamination methods in 
conjunction with hand hygiene.  
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c) 
Figure 5.7: Joint effects of the two surface decontamination methods and hand hygiene 
to the total MRSA mean exposure dose to the uncolonized patient. Figure 5.7a, 5.7b and 
5.7c represent three efficacy levels of daily surface decontamination (SDd) at 0%, 50% 
and 100%, respectively. The three lines in each figure represent three hand hygiene (HH) 
efficacy levels at 0%, 50% and 100%. 
 
In Figure 5.7a-c, we examined the joint effects of interventions on hands and 
surfaces to exposure dose to the uncolonized patient. All three figures show the same 
patterns: as wiping efficacy increases, the exposure dose to the uncolonized patient 
decreases. Similarly, As hand-hygiene efficacy increases, the exposure dose to the 
uncolonized patient decreases. However, the benefit of hand hygiene varies at different 
levels of surface contamination. Increasing hand hygiene efficacy from 0% to 100% 
results in greater absolute reduction of exposure dose when decontamination efficacy is 
low compared to when efficacy is high. In a scenario when decontamination and hand-
hygiene efficacies are zero and both surfaces and nurses are highly contaminated, 
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performing surface decontamination or hand hygiene will suppress exposure to the 
uncolonized patient. However, all three figures show that increasing hand-hygiene 
efficacy from 0% to 100% decreased the exposure dose less than increasing wiping 
efficacy from 0% to 100%.  
5.4 Discussion 
With our applied EITS model that integrates host, pathogen, and environment 
parameters, we demonstrate a significant role of environmental surfaces in contaminating 
and recontaminating nurses, who are the only vectors that transfer MRSA from the 
colonized patient’s room into the uncolonized patient’s room. The model also revealed 
the effect of S. aureus continuous shedding from the colonized patient onto room 
surfaces. The surfaces were quickly recontaminated with MRSA even after the most 
efficacious decontamination. It highlights the importance of decontamination frequency 
in addition to decontamination efficacy.  
Over 30 years ago, E. H. Spaulding devised an approach to disinfection and 
sterilization of patient-care instruments and equipment. These patient-care items were 
divided into three categories of critical, semicritical, and noncritical based on the degree 
of the potential infection risk involved in their uses. Items and surfaces are considered 
noncritical if they come in contact with intact skin [36]. While noncritical surfaces are 
viewed as uncommonly associated with infection transmission, they are required to be 
cleaned and disinfected on a regularly scheduled basis. Nevertheless, the frequency of 
cleaning has been emphasized less than the efficacy of cleaning. An example of the 
current cleaning recommendations for bed frames, and nonporous surfaces includes 
decontamination between room occupancy, or once weekly if the room is occupied by the 
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same patient [37]. This frequency is far from what appears most effective based on the 
results from our model.  
In our study, daily surface decontamination was not able to maintain a constant 
low level of contamination because of continual shedding from the MRSA-positive 
patient. Our finding supports the results from a hydrogen peroxide vapor (HPV) 
intervention study [21]. The study was a prospective study in a 9-bed open-plan ICU 
without isolation facilities. Environmental screening was monitored monthly for 3 
months and weekly for 4 weeks and immediately prior to the HPV intervention. 
Thereafter, environmental screening was carried out immediately after, daily for 2 days, 
and weekly for 8 weeks after the HPV use. Patients were removed from the ICU prior to 
the HPV use and returned to the unit the next morning. After the HPV decontamination 
and before patient readmission into the ICU, no MRSA was isolated from the 
environment. However, 24 hours after readmitting patients, including two colonized with 
MRSA, MRSA was isolated from the environmental surfaces. These environmental 
strains were indistinguishable from a strain from one of the colonized patients, and were 
not all confined to the immediate vicinity of the colonized patient. The authors of that 
intervention study concluded that HPV is effective in eliminating MRSA from the 
environment, but the rapid recontamination suggested that, by itself, it is not an effective 
means of maintaining low levels of contamination. Our data supports this finding and 
also suggests that for an intervention to be effective, it needs to be both efficacious in 
eradicating the pathogen and as well as implemented with adequate frequency. 
While our model suggested that the cleaning frequency is an important aspect of 
decontamination, the practical aspects of its implementation are also important to 
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consider. A previously published review of environmental hygiene in healthcare settings 
showed an imperfect thoroughness of cleaning [20]. Eight studies were included in this 
review, and by using direct covert observations or a fluorescent targeting method showed 
that only 40% of near patient surfaces were being thoroughly cleaned in accordance with 
existing policies [20]. In conjunction, using an environmental cleaning monitoring system 
could improve the thoroughness of disinfection cleaning [38-40]. Further analysis 
showed that such improvement was associated with an average decrease of MRSA 
infection [41, 42]. In one study, the enhanced cleaning required an extra person to clean, 
who performed more frequent cleaning of hand touch sites at near-patient locations and 
the nurses’ station. This enhanced cleaning was associated with a 32.5% reduction in 
environmental contamination sites and 26.6 % reduction of new MRSA infections [42]. 
In contrast to routine surface decontamination where sufficient disinfectant 
quantity and adequate contact time is required, surface wiping may require a lower 
concentration of disinfectants [22]. A recent study to evaluate efficacy of various 
commercially available wipes in comparison with normal saline wipes, when used to 
wipe across plastic one, three, and five times, showed that wiping with any type of moist 
wipe decreased bacterial burden. Furthermore, a saline-moistened wipe appeared to be as 
effective as wipes containing disinfectant [25].  
Even though introducing surface wiping to healthcare workers’ responsibilities 
may appear as a threat to success given the potential compliance obstacle, providing 
surface wipes in patients’ room may offer the opportunities for patients and visitors to 
partake in the decontamination responsibility. A 24-hour observational study of hand 
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hygiene showed that patients and visitors had better hand hygiene compliance than 
doctors (57% vs. 47%), but less than nurses (75%) [43]. 
Our model showed the interaction of hand hygiene and surface decontamination 
can work together to decrease the total exposure dose of MRSA to the uncolonized 
patient, and confirmed the necessity to clean environmental surfaces. Furthermore, 
MRSA levels on nurses were directly correlated with MRSA levels on the nonporous 
surfaces. In order to keep the surfaces in the uncolonized patient’s room less 
contaminated, both increasing hand-hygiene effects and decreasing the exposure dose to 
the uncolonized patient were required to reduce MRSA transmission when the patient 
touched contaminated surfaces. 
Although this model is more realistic than the original model based on the 
Environmental Infection Transmission System (EITS) framework [44], it is still rather 
abstract. We kept it simple to provide insight to model behaviors, but is strictly a fate and 
transport model with no prediction of risk or interpretation of the total exposure dose to 
the uncolonized patient. However, conventional wisdom would suggest that the smaller 
dose exposed to the patient the better. According to the quantitative risk assessment 
paradigm, exposure assessment is an initial and essential step toward improving our 
understanding in transmission systems. To develop a full transmission system model, we 
also require a dose response function. However, at this point, existing applicable dose 
response studies for S. aureus are limited to artificial colonization studies in newborns in 
1963 and an artificial inoculation study in healthy adults using over 107 cfu, which is 
much higher than the total exposure dose to the uncolonized patient in our model [45-47]. 
These studies revealed substantial information regarding single exposure dose-response 
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relationship. However, they are not readily applicable for modeling where exposure may 
be continuous and cumulative over time [48]. A full risk assessment model will require 
additional assumptions. In our model, patients are exposed to pathogens continuously by 
direct contact with nurses and indirect contact with contaminated surfaces. Future dose 
response studies may need to consider cumulated time-dependent dose responses as well 
as more realistic dose exposure pathways. 
Our model identified several parameters which have a high impact in the system. 
Transfer efficiency is the main parameter that differentiates behavior of the two 
environmental surfaces. Also, according to our sensitivity analysis, survivability on 
surfaces has a high impact on the constant averages of MRSA concentration when 
contact surface area is much smaller than total surface area. 
One of the main assumptions inherent to the deterministic model is the 
homogenously mixed assumption. This leads to the instantaneous equilibration of MRSA 
in each compartment following each event. To evaluate the effect of this assumption, we 
performed experiments to compare different levels of equilibration by stratifying 
nonporous surface area and nonporous touching rates, while keeping the strata sums of 
surface areas and touch rates the same as the original scenario. The analysis showed 
unchanged qualitative model behaviors. However, quantitatively there are small 
differences of the total exposure dose to the uncolonized patient. Future studies that relax 
this assumption to evaluate the effect of surface touching will be needed. For 
decontamination purposes, much attention is on frequently touched surfaces; however, 
with the survivability of S. aureus and its presence in dusty, inaccessible, high surfaces, 
one cannot ignore the less frequently touched surfaces [49].  
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Overall, this model demonstrates how using EITS framework can provide insight 
into the dynamics of host, pathogen, and environment. It reveals the importance of 
surface decontamination frequency in addition to decontamination efficacy given the 
continual pathogen exposure. It shows how healthcare workers’ hands and contaminated 
surfaces are directly correlated, resulting in various levels of hand-hygiene effect 
dependent on surface contamination levels. It indicates expected benefits of surface 
wiping in conjunction with our current MRSA infection-control armamentarium. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
The Effect of Hand Hygiene at the Entry and Exit of a Patient’s Room Visit  
on the Exposure of MRSA to the Uncolonized Patient 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The hands of healthcare workers are key vectors for nosocomial transmission of 
MRSA [1]. For hands to transmit these pathogens, several sequential events must occur. 
First the healthcare workers must acquire the pathogen either by directly touching a 
patient’s skin, wound or body fluid where MRSA is present, or by indirectly touching the 
contaminated surrounding surfaces where the pathogens have been shed. In addition, the 
pathogens must survive for at least several minutes on the hands and hand hygiene must 
be inadequate. Finally, these contaminated hands must transfer the pathogen by touching 
another patient or a surface that the patient subsequently touches [1-3]. Since the 
exposure pathways can be through hands, environment, or both, these interdependent 
pathways will need to be addressed together when hand hygiene efficacy is evaluated.  
Hand hygiene is undoubtedly the cornerstone of infection control. Several aspects 
of hand hygiene can influence its effectiveness, including the timing of when hand 
hygiene is performed, the efficacy of the techniques, and importantly, the compliance.  A 
concept called ‘My five moments for hand hygiene’, developed for the Swiss Hand 
Hygiene Campaign in 2005, described the fundamental reference points for healthcare 
workers (HCW) in a time-space framework, and designated the moments when hand 
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hygiene is required to effectively interrupt microbial transmission during patient care [4]. 
This concept has been adopted and adapted by the World Health Organization (WHO) for 
inclusion in the implementation strategy proposed in the 2009 WHO Guidelines on Hand 
Hygiene in Healthcare [4, 5].  These ‘five moments’, or opportunities to initiate hand 
hygiene, are 1) before touching a patient, 2) before a clean/aseptic procedure, 3) after 
body fluid exposure, 4) after touching a patient, and 5) after touching patient 
surroundings [5]. Currently, direct observation of hand hygiene by trained observers is 
considered the gold standard for determining hand hygiene compliance among HCWs 
[6]. However, the direct observation method has several limitations, including the fact 
that they are time-consuming and costly [6]. They provide only a small proportion of all 
hand hygiene opportunities in healthcare [7]. Direct observation may also spuriously 
result in high compliance related to the Hawthorne effect [8], and may also be inaccurate 
unless performed by trained personnel [9]. 
As a result of these limitations, several alternative techniques for monitoring 
compliance have been developed and include sophisticated electronic hand hygiene 
monitoring systems [6]. These monitoring systems provide great potential in capturing 
large quantities of hand hygiene opportunities with less human and time resources, while 
avoiding an observation bias. However, the systems are not readily adapted to capture all 
five moments.  Some require a compromise to include only before and after patient care 
(moments 1 and 4), or on entry and exit of a patient room [10, 11]. This raises several 
concerns whether this compromise is appropriate, and what should be the outcome 
measure of hand hygiene effectiveness. We argue that the outcome for effective hand 
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hygiene should be the lowest microbial exposure dose that delivers minimum risk to 
susceptible patients from each contact with HCWs.  
From the previous chapter using the environmental infection transmission system 
(EITS) framework in two hypothetical hospital rooms, we demonstrated that the 
contaminated nonporous surface was an important source of contamination to nurses in 
the colonized patient’s room. This model assumed no dispersal across rooms, so nurses 
were the only sources of MRSA to the uncolonized patient’s room. We found that the 
contaminated surfaces in the uncolonized patient’s room, which resulted from nurses’ 
touching, also contributed to contamination to the uncolonized patient. While this 
previous deterministic model provided insights into the interdependency among the 
colonized patient’s shedding, nurses’ hands contamination and environmental surfaces 
contamination, it was not appropriate to examine hand hygiene compliance.  
In this chapter, we will examine the effects of hand hygiene compliance by using 
a stochastic model with more realistic features. The model structure remains the same as 
was described for the two hypothetical hospital rooms. The comparison of chapter V and 
VI is in Table 7.1. Hand hygiene opportunities are at the entry and exit of a patient room, 
while nurses can touch the patients and the surfaces in a random order. To examine the 
role of environmental contamination on MRSA transmission, we vary the shedding 
magnitude that the colonized patient sheds MRSA to the room environment. We evaluate 
the effect of dispersal across rooms by allowing MRSA dispersal and deposition on both 
patients’ room surfaces. We also perform sensitivity analysis of the model parameters, as 
well as of the symmetrical transfer efficiency assumption. 
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6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 The exposure pathway model 
Based on an Environmental Infection Transmission System (EITS) framework, 
we constructed and analyzed an individual-based model of MRSA fate and transport 
between two hospital rooms including (1) MRSA shedding from a colonized patient, (2) 
MRSA transfer, deposition, and die-off on skin and hands and on room surfaces, (3) 
MRSA exposure to an uncolonized patient, and (4) two MRSA interventions: surface 
decontamination and hand hygiene.  
The model consists of three types of entities: patients, nurses, and environmental 
surfaces in the patient rooms (Table 6.1). A colonized patient resides in one room, while 
an uncolonized patient resides in the other. Patients remain in the same rooms throughout 
the simulation. In each room, there is one porous surface and one nonporous surface. 
There are three nurses (NS). Each nurse works an eight-hour shift. Nurses stay in a 
nurses’ center during shifts when they are not in a patient’s room. The model keeps track 
of MRSA pathogen concentration (MRSA cfu per surface area) on each entity (patient, 
nurse, and surface). We use 2000 cm2 to represent exposed skin and hands surface area 
for patients and room surfaces, and 300 cm2 to represent a surface area for both hands of 
nurses.  
The model runs with discrete fixed time steps. It starts at the beginning of a 
nurse’s shift at 8:00 a.m. and terminates after seven days. Each time step corresponds to 
two minutes. The simulation is repeated 100 times for each scenario. In the following 
sections, we describe in greater detail the model entities, events, and assumptions 
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inherent to this model. The model diagram, which captures the main entities and events, 
is in Figure 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1: Model entities and their events 
Entity Sub-entity Variables Events 
Patients Colonized patient 
(PTc) 
 
1. MRSA concentration 
on the skin and hands 
2. MRSA concentration 
in the nose 
1.  Shedding 
2. Touching surfaces 
3. Touching nose 
4. Natural die off  
Uncolonized patient 
(PTu) 
1. MRSA concentration 
on the skin and hands 
2. MRSA concentration 
in the nose 
1. Touching surfaces 
2. Touching nose 
3. Natural die off 
Nurse (NS)  1. MRSA concentration 
on both hands 
2. MRSA concentration 
in the nose 
1. Visiting patient’s 
room 
2. Touching surfaces 
3. Touching the 
patient  
4. Touching nose 
5. Natural die off 
6. Hand hygiene 
Surfaces 1. The porous 
surface in the 
colonized 
patient’s room 
(Pc) 
2. The nonporous 
surface in the 
colonized 
patient’s room 
(NPc) 
3. The porous 
surface in the 
uncolonized 
patient’s room 
(Pu) 
4. The nonporous 
surface in the 
uncolonized 
patient’s room 
(NPu) 
 
1. MRSA concentration 
on the surface 
 
1. Natural die off 
2. Surface 
decontamination 
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Figure 6.1: The model diagram including the model entities and main events. The model 
entities include the exposed skin and hands of the colonized patient (PTc), the porous 
surface in the colonized patient’s room (Pc), the nonporous surface in the colonized 
patient’s room (NPc), the exposed skin and hand of the uncolonized patient (PTu), the 
porous surface in the uncolonized patient’s room (Pu), the nonporous surface in the 
uncolonized patient’s room (NPu), the nurses’ hands (NS), the colonized patient’s nose 
(PTcn), the uncolonized patient’s nose (PTun), and the nurse’s nose (NSn). Black double 
arrowed lines are pathogen flows in and out of model entities due to touching events. Red 
double and single arrowed lines represent shedding and contamination process when the 
colonized patient touches the porous and nonporous surfaces and the nose. Green single 
arrowed lines represent pathogen flows out of the model entities due to the natural die off 
process, which are governed by the parameter, µ. Purple single arrowed lines arrows 
represent pathogen flows out of the entities due to the daily surface decontamination 
process, governed by the parameter, εd. The decontamination process affects the entire 
surface area of each surface. Blue single arrowed lines represent pathogen flows out of 
nurses following each hand hygiene event, governed by the parameter εh. This hand 
hygiene event affects both hands surface area, which is 300 cm2.   
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6.2.2 Model entities  
6.2.2.1 Patients 
In this model each patient is described by two properties: (1) MRSA 
concentration on the exposed skin and hands and (2) the MRSA concentration in the 
nose.  
The colonized patient can shed MRSA or touch room surfaces and their nose, 
while the MRSA naturally die-off on the skin and hands. The uncolonized patient cannot 
shed MRSA, but can perform the other events the same way as the colonized patient. 
6.2.2.1.1 Initialization and the balance of colonized state 
At the start of the simulation, the colonized patient is assigned an MRSA 
concentration in the nose and on the skin and hands. A number representing initial 
MRSA concentration in the nose is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution from 10 
and 2,000 cfu/4 cm2 [12, 13]. This concentration remains constant assuming the continual 
MRSA proliferation in the nose of the colonized patient. Another number representing 
initial MRSA concentration on the exposed skin and hand is randomly drawn from a 
uniform distribution between 10 and 100,000 cfu/2000 cm2 to be the MRSA 
concentration on the skin and hands [26]. This concentration, however, changes during 
model execution due to touching events and die-off.    
We assume that MRSA replenishes itself on the colonized skin with the same rate 
at which the colonized patient sheds MRSA onto the environmental surfaces. Shedding 
rate is assigned at 0.004 cfu/cm2/min to represent a low shedding scenario and 0.04 
cfu/cm2/min as a high shedding scenario. The colonized patient loses MRSA through 
natural die-off and touching surfaces or nurses.  
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6.2.2.2 Nurses 
Nurses are also described by two properties: (1) the MRSA concentration on both 
hands, and (2) the MRSA concentration in their noses.  
Nurses work in eight-hour shifts, and at the beginning of each shift are assumed to 
have no MRSA on their hands and in the nose. Nurses can enter patient rooms, touch the 
patients, touch room surfaces, touch their own noses, and perform hand hygiene, while 
MRSA naturally dies off on their hands. When nurses are not in patient rooms, they are at 
the nurses’ center, where we assume there is no surface touching occurring. 
6.2.2.3 Room surfaces 
Both porous and nonporous surfaces are described by their MRSA concentration 
levels.  These levels change with the touching events and natural die-off. The surfaces 
may also be decontaminated daily at 8:00 a.m. 
6.2.3 Model parameters 
Literature review for model parameterization is in the Chapter III. Table 6.2 
shows the model parameters and their values. 
 
Table 6.2: Model parameters and their values in the baseline scenario.  
 Symbol Values Reference 
SHEDDING PARAMETERS:     
Shedding rate (cfu/cm2/min) α 0.004-0.04 [14-16] 
SURVIVAL PARAMETERS:    
Die off rate on skin and hand  
(logcfu /min) 
µsk 0.00353 [17] 
Die off rate on porous surface  
(logcfu /min) 
µp 0.000632 [18] 
Die off rate on nonporous surface 
(logcfu /min) 
µnp 0.0002 [19] 
CONTACTS PARAMETERS:    
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Rate of patient touches surfaces (min-1) τpt-sf 0.134  
Rate of nurse touches patient (min-1) τns-pt 0.4  
Rate of nurse touches surfaces (min-1) τns-sf 0.4  
Rate of touching nose (min-1) τn 0.025  
TRANSFER EFFICIENCY 
PARAMETERS: 
   
Transfer efficiency from porous surface 
to fingertip 
ρp 0.1 [20] 
Transfer efficiency from nonporous 
surface to fingertip 
ρnp 0.4 [21] 
Transfer efficiency from skin to skin ρsk 0.35  
Transfer efficiency from finger to nose ρn 0.2  
SURFACE AREA PARAMETERS:    
Total exposed skin and hand surface 
area of patients (cm2) 
Apt 2000  
Both hands surface area of nurses (cm2) Ans 300  
Total porous surface area (cm2) Ap 2000  
Total nonporous surface area (cm2) Anp 2000  
Anterior nares (nose) surface area An 4  
Hands surface area (cm2) Ah 300  
Fingertip surface area (cm2) Af 1  
INTERVENTIONS:    
Hand-hygiene compliance εhc 0.5 [1] 
Hand-hygiene efficacy εhe 0.7 [22, 23] 
Surface-decontamination efficacy   εd   
 
6.2.4 Model events  
6.2.4.1 Shedding  
The colonized patient sheds MRSA continuously onto the porous and nonporous 
surfaces in the colonized patient’s room. This shedding quantity is governed by αAp or 
αAnp. The shedding rate is assigned at 0.004 cfu/cm2/min to represent a low shedding 
scenario and 0.04 cfu/cm2/min as a high shedding scenario. In the baseline scenario, we 
assume shedding only affects the colonized patient’s room. For sensitivity analysis we 
relax this assumption and allow MRSA dispersal and deposition in both room surfaces.  
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6.2.4.2 Nurse visiting patient rooms  
At the beginning of each hour, a nurse will first visit the colonized patient and 
then visit the uncolonized patient. Once the nurse enters the colonized patient’s room, a 
number representing the visit duration in minutes is randomly drawn from a uniform 
distribution between 10 and 30. When the visit ends, the nurse leaves the colonized 
patient’s room to enter the uncolonized patient’s room. Once in the room, another 
number is randomly drawn to determine the visit duration in the uncolonized patient’s 
room. 
6.2.4.3 Touching   
While in the room, the nurse will touch the patient and the two surfaces in a 
random order. Similarly, the colonized patient and the uncolonized patients touch the two 
surfaces in a random order. Nurses and patients also touch their noses at a defined rate. 
All touching rates in Table 6.2 are converted to risks or probabilities of touching across 
two-minute periods.  
In the model, there are two main types of contacts: direct contact when nurses’ 
hands touch either the colonized or uncolonized patient, and indirect contact where hands 
of either nurses or patients touch the surfaces. For both types of contacts, we assume 
symmetric transfer efficiencies. For each touching event, there is a transfer of pathogens 
to and from the two contacting surfaces. For each direct contact as seen in Figure 6.2, 
there is a quantity of MRSA transferred from the nurse’s hands to the patient (NS*ρsk) 
and vice versa there is a quantity of MRSA transferred from the patient to the nurse’s 
hands (PTu*300/2000*ρsk). These MRSA quantities depend on 1) the bacterial 
concentration at both contacting surface areas, 2) the contact surface areas (i.e. 300 
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sq.cm.), 3) the total surface areas (i.e. 2000 sq.cm. for patients and surfaces, and 300 
sq.cm. for nurses’ hands), and 4) transfer efficiency, which is a fraction of MRSA on the 
contacting surface area that is transferred. The net quantity and its direction depend on 
the difference of both quantities. Given that nurses are the source of MRSA in the 
uncolonized patient’s room, the sum of these net quantities for all the direct contact 
events in an hour is then the hourly exposure dose to the uncolonized patient through 
direct contact route. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 6.2: A direct contact event between nurses’ hands (NS) and the uncolonized 
patient (PTu). NS represents the concentration of MRSA cfu on nurses’ hands (MRSA 
cfu/300 sq.cm.). PTu represents the concentration of MRSA cfu on the uncolonized 
patient’s skin (MRSA cfu/2000 sq.cm.). The contact surface area is 300 sq. cm. The 
transfer efficiency for the direct contact event (ρsk) is 0.35. The transfer efficiency of 
MRSA from nurses’ hands to the uncolonized patient’s skin is assumed to be the same as 
transfer efficiency from the uncolonized patient’s skin to nurses’ hands. Thus, MRSA 
quantity that is transferred from nurses’ hands to the uncolonized patient’s skin is 
NS*0.35. MRSA quantity transferred from the uncolonized patient’s skin to nurses’ 
hands is PTu*(300/2000)*0.35.  
 
For each indirect contact as seen in the example of the uncolonized patient (PTu) 
touching the nonporous surface (NPu) in Figure 6.3, there is a quantity of MRSA 
transferred from the uncolonized patient’s hands to the nonporous surface 
(PTu*300/2000*ρnp), and vice versa there is a quantity of MRSA transferred from the 
nonporous surface to the uncolonized patient’s hands (NPu *300/2000*ρnp). The net 
quantity and its direction depend on the difference of both quantities. This contact event 
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may result in an increase in contamination of the nonporous surface or increase exposure 
to the uncolonized patient.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: An indirect contact event between the uncolonized patient (PTu) and the 
nonporous surface (NPu). PTu represents the concentration of MRSA cfu on the 
uncolonized patient’s exposed skin and hands (MRSA cfu/2000 sq.cm.). NPu represents 
the concentration of MRSA cfu on the nonporous surface (MRSA cfu/2000 sq. cm.). The 
contact surface area is 300 sq. cm. The transfer efficiency for contact event with 
nonporous surface (ρnp) is 0.4. The transfer efficiency of MRSA from the uncolonized 
patient’s hands to the nonporous surface is assumed to be the same as transfer efficiency 
from the nonporous surface to the uncolonized patient’s hands. Thus, MRSA quantity 
that is transferred from the uncolonized patient’s hands to the nonporous surface is 
PTu*300/2000*0.4. MRSA quantity transferred from the nonporous surface to the 
uncolonized patient’s hands is NPu*(300/2000)*0.4.  
 
6.2.4.4  Natural die-off event or survivability of MRSA 
MRSA on surfaces, patients, and nurses continuously decreases with fixed die-off 
rates depending on whether they are on the skin and hands, porous surfaces, or nonporous 
surfaces. 
6.2.4.5  Hand-hygiene event 
Nurses may perform hand hygiene before and after visiting a patient room. If a 
number randomly drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 is less than the 
defined hand-hygiene compliance probability, then hand hygiene will occur. When the 
event is executed, a fraction of pathogen (i.e. hand-hygiene efficacy) is removed from 
both hands surface area, which is 300 cm2.    
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6.2.4.6  Surface decontamination 
Surface decontamination may be scheduled on a daily basis at 8:00 a.m., affecting 
MRSA on both porous and nonporous surfaces of each room. For each decontamination 
event, a fraction of MRSA (i.e. decontamination efficacy) is removed from the entire 
surface area.  
6.2.5  Model assumptions 
1. The only MRSA source is the MRSA colonized patient. This colonized patient 
sheds MRSA onto environmental surfaces in the room by aerially dispersed MRSA 
contaminated skin squamous cells that instantaneously deposit on surfaces and by surface 
touching with contaminated hands. 
2. The MRSA exposure pathways to the uncolonized patient are either by being 
touched by contaminated nurses’ hands (hand-mediated route), or by touching 
contaminated room surfaces that result from nurses’ touching (hand-to-surface 
contamination). In the sensitivity analysis, which allows MRSA aerial dispersal and 
deposition on the uncolonized patient’s room surfaces, the uncolonized patient may also 
be exposed to MRSA by touching these environmental contaminations from MRSA 
dispersal and deposition (air-to-surface contamination).  
3. Nurses are not colonized with MRSA and do not shed MRSA. Their hands only 
serve as vectors of the transmission process. 
4. MRSA instantaneously and homogenously mixes on surfaces, skin, and hands.  
5. Transfer efficiency is symmetrical for each contact. For example, in an event 
when hands touch a nonporous surface, 40% of MRSA presented on a 300 cm2 contact 
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surface is transferred from hands to the nonporous surface, and 40% of MRSA presented 
on a 300 cm2 from the nonporous surface is transferred to hands. 
6. The total surface area for patients and surfaces is 2000 cm2. The surface area for 
nurses’ hands is 300 cm2, which is a surface area of both palms and is used to represent 
contact surface areas in all types of contacts [37, 38]. 
6.2.6  Analysis of the simulated data  
The initial conditions of all simulations are clean room surfaces, and no 
contamination on nurses or the uncolonized patient. The colonized patient has initial 
MRSA contaminations in the range of 10 to 100,000 cfu/2000 cm2 on the exposed skin, 
and in the range of 10 to 2000 cfu/4 cm2 in the nose. The shedding rate is assigned at 
0.004 cfu/cm2/min to represent a low shedding scenario and 0.04 cfu/cm2/min as a high 
shedding scenario. Nurses have opportunities to perform hand hygiene at the entry and 
exit of a patient’s room. Compliance may vary from 0%, 50% and 100%, and is the same 
at both hand hygiene opportunities. For each scenario, the reported measures are the 
averages from 100 simulations.  
The simulation outcome is different in each room. In the colonized patient’s room 
the outcomes are the contamination levels on nurses’ hands, and the hourly-cumulated 
net MRSA quantities resulting from nurses’ contacts with the colonized patient and the 
two room surfaces. Whereas in the uncolonized patient’s room the outcome measures are 
the exposure dose to the uncolonized patient and the resulting contamination levels of the 
room surfaces from nurses’ touching. The exposure dose is the hourly-cumulated net 
MRSA quantities resulting from the uncolonized patient’s contacts with nurses and room 
surfaces.  
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6.2.7  Sensitivity Analysis 
To examine the primary assumption that aerially dispersed MRSA only confines 
depositions within the colonized patient’s room, we relaxed this assumption by allowing 
MRSA dispersal and deposition on the uncolonized patient’s room surfaces. We 
examined two levels of dispersal, i.e. 1% and 10%. The reference scenario with no 
dispersal is a scenario where the colonized patient has a high shedding rate of 0.04 
cfu/cm2/min, and nurses perform 100% hand hygiene compliance with 70% efficacy. A 
scenario with 1% dispersal means there is 0.0004 cfu/cm2/min MRSA deposition on the 
uncolonized patient’s room surfaces, and 0.0396 cfu/cm2/min MRSA deposition on the 
colonized patient’s room. By relaxing this assumption, we can examine the effect of hand 
hygiene in settings where environmental contaminations originate from both 1) hands-to-
surface contamination, as well as 2) air-to-surface contamination. 
 To examine the assumption of symmetrical transfer efficiency between hands and 
surfaces, we relaxed this assumption and set the transfer efficiency from hands to 
surfaces to be 1% and 10% of hand hygiene efficacy, i.e. 0.07 and 0.007. We keep the 
symmetrical assumption between hands and skin when nurses touch patients. The 
reference scenario with symmetrical transfer efficiency is the scenario where the 
colonized patient has a high shedding rate of 0.04 cfu/cm2/min, and nurses perform 100% 
hand hygiene compliance with 70% efficacy.  
 Also, we perform sensitivity analysis of model parameters including die-off rates, 
transfer efficiencies, and contact rates, to the exposure dose to the uncolonized patient. 
We evaluate the effect of touching frequency by assigning the two room surfaces to be 
frequently touched and infrequently touched nonporous surfaces. Nurses and patients 
touch these two surfaces according to frequently and infrequently touch rates. We then 
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compare the MRSA concentration of these two surfaces in each room and their 
contributions to the uncolonized patient exposure.  
6.3  Results 
6.3.1  Effect of hand hygiene compliance to nurses’ hands contamination levels in 
low (0.004 cfu/cm2/min) and high (0.04 cfu/cm2/min) shedding scenarios.  
Figure 6.4 shows average MRSA contamination levels on nurses’ hands in 6 
different simulated conditions over time. In these simulations nurses touch the patient and 
the two room surfaces in a random order while in the room. All lines show small jagged 
patterns and large decreases every 24 hours. The 24 hour pattern corresponds with the 
scheduled daily surface decontamination, reflecting the correlation of surface 
contamination and the contamination on nurses’ hands. In comparing the two shedding 
scenarios, as the colonized patient sheds with a higher rate and contaminates the 
colonized patient’s room surfaces, the nurses’ hands also become more contaminated 
compared to lower shedding scenarios. It is noted that in the high shedding scenario, with 
an idealistic 100% compliance, nurses’ hands are even more contaminated than when 
shedding rate is low and compliance is 0%. This finding emphasizes the need for hand 
hygiene after touching patient’s surrounding since contamination on hands can be 
influenced by the contextual contamination within the room as long as nurses continue to 
touch those surfaces. 
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Figure 6.4: Comparison of MRSA contamination levels on nurses’ hands in six 
simulation settings at low (0.004 cfu/cm2/min) shedding rate in dashed lines and high 
(0.04 cfu/cm2/min) shedding rate in solid lines and three hand hygiene compliance levels 
of 0%, 50% and 100%. Hand hygiene opportunities are at entry and exit of a patient’s 
room. The simulation setting is in two hypothetical hospital rooms where nurses touch 
the patient and the room surfaces in a random order. 
 
6.3.2  Comparison of the contamination sources to nurses’ hands while nurses 
perform 100% hand hygiene compliance at the entry and exit of a patient’s room 
In this model, nurses touch the patient and the two room surfaces four times each 
in a random order during each patient visit. Each contact results in bidirectional flow of 
MRSA. One flow is from the patient or the surfaces to nurses’ hands and the other is 
from the nurses’ hands to the patient and the surfaces. The hourly sum of the net quantity 
of these bidirectional flows from each type of contact is displayed in Figure 6.5. A 
positive quantity represents a net MRSA flow to nurses from the patient or the surfaces. 
A negative quantity represents a net MRSA flow from the nurses to the patient or the 
surfaces. The spike of MRSA transferred to nurses from the colonized patient in the first 
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hour of simulation is due to the broad range of initial MRSA concentrations on the 
colonized patient’s skin.  
At the beginning of each day, which is the time of daily decontamination and the 
beginning of a nurse shift, there is a regular pattern of increase in MRSA quantity transfer 
to the nurse from the colonized patient. This finding is related to the largest difference of 
bidirectional flows between nurses’ hands and the colonized patient. At this time, nurses’ 
hands and the room surfaces have the least contamination levels. Therefore, nurses 
receive the largest net quantity from contacts with the colonized patient. Also, nurses 
contaminate the surfaces as a result of their contacts during these initial hours of the day 
as seen in the negative quantities of the Y-axis. 
Also shown in this figure is that the room surfaces are the dominant 
contamination sources to nurses, more than the colonized patient. The net MRSA 
quantities to nurses from contacts with the nonporous surface are higher than from 
contacts with the porous surface and from contacts with the colonized patient. This 
finding is due to the differences in contamination levels on the colonized patient and the 
room surfaces, as well as the differences of transfer efficiency of the nonporous surface 
(i.e. 0.4), the porous surface (0.1) and the skin (0.35) to hands.  
Figure 6.6 shows the comparison of MRSA concentrations per contact surface 
(cfu/300 sq.cm.). The colonized patient’s room surfaces have higher MRSA 
concentrations than the colonized patient. Parameter sensitivity analysis suggested that 
this finding is contributed to the survivability, which is much longer on surfaces than on 
human skin. Die-off rates for porous, nonporous surfaces and the skin are 6.32x10-4, 
2x10-4 and 3.53x10-3 logcfu/min. When comparing the two surfaces, the porous surface 
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has a smaller transfer efficiency, so smaller net quantities transferred to nurses’ hands 
allow higher accumulation of MRSA contamination over time. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Comparison of mean hourly-cumulated net quantities after nurses’ contacts 
with the colonized patient, the nonporous and porous surfaces in the colonized patient’s 
room. The + quantity in Y-axis represent the MRSA quantity to nurses’ hands, and the – 
quantity in Y-axis represent the MRSA quantity out of nurses’ hands. The simulation 
setting is where the colonized patient sheds with a high shedding rate (0.04 cfu/cm2/min) 
and nurses perform 100% hand hygiene compliance at the entry and exit of a patient’s 
room. 
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Figure 6.6: Comparison of contamination levels of the colonized patient, nurses’ hands 
and the room surfaces in the colonized patient’s room. The simulation setting is where 
the colonized patient sheds with a high shedding rate (0.04 cfu/cm2/min) and nurses 
perform 100% hand hygiene compliance with 70% efficacy at the entry and exit of a 
patient’s room. The concentrations are the averages of 100 simulations. 
 
6.3.3  Effect of hand hygiene compliance in suppressing exposure doses to the 
uncolonized patient in low (0.004 cfu/cm2/min) and high (0.04 cfu/cm2/min) shedding 
scenarios. 
In this simple structure of two hypothetical hospital rooms where nurses are the 
only source of MRSA into the uncolonized patient’s room and nurses exhibit varying 
hand hygiene compliance with 70% efficacy at the entry and exit of a patient’s room, 
figure 6.7 shows the exposure doses transfer to the uncolonized patient. Of note, the 
uncolonized patient receives MRSA predominantly from nurses. The nonporous surface 
in the uncolonized patient’s room, which becomes contaminated from nurses’ touching, 
also contributes to contamination of the uncolonized patient when the patient touches the 
nonporous surface.  
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Figure 6.7a shows that the exposure doses from nurses decrease substantially 
when compliance increases from 0% to 100%, but not completely due to the imperfect 
hygiene efficacy of 70%. It is noted that in settings where the colonized patient sheds 
with a high shedding rate where nurses perform 100% hand hygiene compliance, 
exposure to the uncolonized patient from nurses is higher than in settings with low 
shedding rate where nurses’ compliance is 0%.  
Figure 6.7b shows similar patterns with 6.7a.  As hand hygiene compliance 
increases, the nonporous surface becomes less contaminated and transfers less exposure 
doses to the uncolonized patient. With the assumption of no MRSA dispersal and 
depositions on surfaces (air-to-surface contamination), the origin of room surface 
contamination is all from nurses’ hands (hand-to-surface contamination). This figure 
shows that the effect of nurses’ hand hygiene not only decreased exposure doses to the 
uncolonized patient from nurses’ hands (hand mediated route), but also decreased 
exposure doses from contaminated surfaces (hand-to-surface contamination). A large 
variability of the exposure is related to the fluctuation of contamination after the daily 
surface clean. 
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a. 
 
b. 
 
Figure 6.7a and 6.7b: A comparison of the exposure dose to the uncolonized patient 
(PTu) from nurses (hand-mediated route) in 6.7a and from the nonporous surface (NPu) in 
the uncolonized patient’s room (hand-to-surface route) in 6.7b. Simulation scenarios are 
with low (0.004 cfu/cm2/min) and high (0.04 cfu/cm2/min) shedding rates and three hand 
hygiene compliance (HC) levels at 0%, 50% and 100%. Hand hygiene opportunities are 
at the entry and exit of a patient’s room. The exposure dose is the hourly-cumulated net 
MRSA quantities resulting from the uncolonized patient contacts with nurses and 
nonporous surfaces. 
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6.3.4  Sensitivity analysis 
6.3.4.1 Effect of 100% hand hygiene compliance when relaxing the assumption of no 
MRSA dispersal in the uncolonized patient’s room 
To examine the impact of the no dispersal across rooms assumption, we allow 1% 
and 10% MRSA aerial dispersal to deposit on the uncolonized patient’s room surfaces. 
The reference scenario is where the colonized patient sheds in high shedding rate (0.04 
cfu/cm2/min) and nurses perform 100% hand hygiene compliance with 70% hygiene 
efficacy at the entry and exit of a patient’s room. A scenario with 1% dispersal means 
there is 0.0004 cfu/cm2/min MRSA deposits on the uncolonized patient’s room surfaces, 
and 0.0396 cfu/cm2/min MRSA on the colonized patient’s room surfaces. 
Figure 6.8 shows the impact of dispersal to contaminations in the uncolonized 
patient’s room surfaces, the uncolonized patient and nurses. Small increases are seen with 
1% dispersal. As dispersal and direct MRSA deposition on surfaces increases, the porous 
surface appears to show similar characteristics as in the colonized patient’s room porous 
surface. That is, it collects and accumulates higher MRSA concentrations than the 
nonporous surface. The sum of the direct deposition of MRSA and the contamination 
from nurses touches exceeds the smaller MRSA quantity that is transferred from the 
porous surface to hands, due to the smaller transfer efficiency of porous surfaces. This net 
quantity leads to higher MRSA concentrations on the porous surface compared to the 
nonporous surface in a setting with 10% dispersal. Nevertheless, despite a higher 
contamination of the porous surface, the exposure dose to the uncolonized patient from 
the porous surface is much smaller than from the nonporous surface as seen in Figure 6.9. 
 178
Although the total MRSA loads to both rooms in the three scenarios are the same, 
we note that nurses have higher contamination in 10% dispersal scenario compared to 
both a 1% and a no dispersal scenario, as seen in Figure 6.8. This finding may be 
explained by the contact process where there are bidirectional flows of pathogens for 
every touch. As surfaces and the uncolonized patient have higher MRSA contaminations 
in a 10% dispersal scenario, the net flows from nurses to surfaces and to the uncolonized 
patient decrease. This allows nurses to retain higher MRSA, when compared to 1% and 
no dispersal. Nevertheless, Figure 6.9 shows that this increase in nurses’ hands 
contamination does not lead to an increase in exposure doses to to the uncolonized 
patient, when compared to 1% and no dispersal scenarios. 
Allowing aerial MRSA dispersal and deposition onto the uncolonized patient’s 
surfaces means increasing air-to-surface contamination. Figure 6.9 shows the variation in 
the effect of 100% hand hygiene compliance in settings with high air-to-surface 
contamination (10% dispersal), low air-to-surface contamination (1% dispersal) and only 
hand-to-surface contamination (no dispersal). As air-to-surface contamination increases 
in a 10% dispersal scenario, the effect of hand hygiene in suppressing exposure dose 
decreases. The exposure doses from the nonporous surface and the porous surface to the 
uncolonized patient are higher with 10% dispersal, compared to 1% and no dispersal 
scenarios. 
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Figure 6.8: Comparison of MRSA concentrations on nurses and in the uncolonized 
patient’s room in settings where there are no dispersal, 1% dispersal and 10% dispersal to 
the uncolonized patient’s room. In these simulations, nurses perform 100% hand hygiene 
compliance with 70% efficacy at the entry and exit of a patient’s room. In a scenario with 
no dispersal, the colonized patient sheds at the rate of 0.04 cfu/cm2/min on the colonized 
patient’s room surfaces. A scenario with 1% dispersal means there is 0.0004 cfu/cm2/min 
MRSA dispersal and deposition on the uncolonized patient’s room surfaces, and 0.0396 
cfu/cm2/min MRSA deposition on the colonized patient’s room surfaces.  
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Figure 6.9: Comparison of MRSA exposure doses to the uncolonized patient from nurses 
and the room surfaces in the uncolonized patient’s room in settings where there is no 
dispersal, 1% dispersal and 10% dispersal to the uncolonized patient’s room. In these 
simulations, nurses perform 100% hand hygiene compliance with 70% efficacy at the 
entry and exit of a patient’s room. In a scenario with no dispersal, the colonized patient 
sheds at the rate of 0.04 cfu/cm2/min on the colonized patient’s room surfaces. A scenario 
with 10% dispersal means there is 0.0004 cfu/cm2/min MRSA dispersal and deposition 
on the uncolonized patient’s room surfaces, and 0.0396 cfu/cm2/min MRSA deposition 
on the colonized patient’s room surfaces.  
 
6.3.4.2  Effect of 100% hand hygiene compliance when relaxing the assumption of 
symmetrical transfer efficiency 
The model assumes symmetrical transfer efficiency between hands and surfaces, 
as well as between hands and skin. To relax this assumption, we set the transfer 
efficiency from hands to surfaces to be 1% and 10% of hand hygiene efficacy (i.e. 0.007 
and 0.07). Transfer efficiency between nurses’ hands and the patients in both directions 
remains the same, which is 0.35. The reference scenario is where the colonized patient 
sheds with a high shedding rate (0.04 cfu/cm2/min) and nurses perform 100% hand 
hygiene compliance with 70% hygiene efficacy at the entry and exit of a patient’s room. 
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In the reference scenario, transfer efficiency from nurses’ hands or patients to the 
nonporous surface is 0.4, and transfer efficiency from nurses’ hands or patients to the 
porous surface is 0.1. 
With the assumption of no dispersal and deposition in the uncolonized patient’s 
room, the only source of surface contamination is through contaminated nurses’ hands. 
Thus, as transfer efficiency from hand to surface decreases, contamination levels on 
surfaces decreases as in Figure 6.10 and the exposure doses from the nonporous surface 
decreases as in Figure 6.11.   
On the contrary, the decrease in transfer efficiency from hands to surfaces allows 
for higher accumulation of MRSA on nurse’s hands, which later transfer to the 
uncolonized patient. As noted in Figure 6.11, there is an increase in hand-mediated route 
exposure to the uncolonized patient as transfer efficiency from hands-to-surface 
decreases. 
 
 
Figure 6.10: A comparison of MRSA concentrations on nurses and in the uncolonized 
patient’s room in a reference scenario with symmetrical transfer efficiency (TE), and 
scenarios where transfer efficiency from hands to surfaces (TEhtosf) is set at 0.07 and 
0.007. In these simulations, nurses perform 100% hand hygiene compliance with 70% 
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efficacy at the entry and exit of a patient’s room. The colonized patient sheds at the rate 
of 0.04 cfu/cm2/min on the colonized patient’s room surfaces, with no dispersal to the 
uncolonized patient’s room.  
 
 
 
 Figure 6.11:  A comparison of MRSA exposure doses to the uncolonized patient from 
nurses and the nonporous surface in the uncolonized patient’s room in reference scenario 
with symmetrical transfer efficiency (TE), and scenarios where transfer efficiency from 
hands to surfaces (TEhtosf) is set at 0.07 and 0.007. In these simulations, nurses perform 
100% hand hygiene compliance with 70% efficacy at the entry and exit of a patient’s 
room. The colonized patient sheds at a rate of 0.04 cfu/cm2/min on the colonized patient’s 
room surfaces, with no dispersal to the uncolonized patient’s room. 
 
6.4  Discussion 
Using an EITS framework in two hypothetical hospital rooms, we demonstrate 
that the healthcare workers’ compliance is essential in determining the effectiveness of 
hand hygiene, although the time when it is performed and its efficacy are also important. 
The model emphasizes the significance of the hand hygiene opportunity before and after 
touching the patient’s surrounding environment, in addition to at the entry and exit of a 
patient’s room. Despite 100% compliance at the entry and exit of a patient’s room, we 
show that the contaminated environmental surfaces are the dominant contamination 
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sources to nurses’ hands in the colonized patient’s room. Additionally, this model shows 
the value of hand hygiene efficacy. With 100% compliance and 70% efficacy, in the 
uncolonized patient’s room, nurses’ hands remain contaminated enough to subsequently 
contaminate the patient’s environment, which later become another exposure route to the 
uncolonized patient. Our model revealed that when surfaces become contaminated from 
aerially dispersed MRSA in addition to contamination from nurses’ hands touching, the 
total environmental mediated route can be exaggerated. For hand hygiene to be effective 
in suppressing exposure to the uncolonized patient, healthcare workers’ compliance, high 
efficacious techniques, and hand hygiene opportunities need to be considered. 
While several aspects of hand hygiene can alter its benefit, this model also shows 
that the surrounding environmental contaminations can impact the effect of hand hygiene. 
Even with 100% hand hygiene compliance, the exposure dose to the uncolonized patient 
is higher in a scenario where the colonized patient sheds with a high shedding rate 
resulting in high surface contamination, compared to a low shedding scenario. A high 
shedding magnitude has been shown to be associated with carriers who are colonized at 
certain body sites such as at the perineum or in the gastrointestinal tract, or in patients 
with burns or wound infections [24-28]. A study to investigate the relationship between 
patients’ MRSA colonization body sites and the frequency of environmental 
contamination suggested that MRSA colonization of the groin area correlates most 
strongly with environment contamination [26]. An earlier study in 1964 screened 3,508 
patients admitted to a medical ward and showed that perineal carriers were not 
uncommon, found in 13% of screened patients [29]. A dissertation in 1965 performed 
bacterial quantification of S. aureus carriers at various body sites including nose, throat, 
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different skin areas (hand, finger, ear, lip, axilla, perineum and wound), vagina, feces and 
surrounding air.  One of the main conclusions from this study was that the heaviest 
dispersers were among the perineal carriers who were able to disperse far greater 
numbers of staphylococci into the air than the nasal carriers [30].  Although early 
detection of these high shedder individuals may allow early isolation, active surveillance 
programs in the U.S. typically only include nasal swabs [31]. Not all nasal carriers are 
perineal carriers. In screened populations who had negative nasal swabs, 4-25% may be 
perineal carriers [29, 32]; among perineal carriers, 50-70% are also nasal carriers [30]. A 
cost-effectiveness analysis study suggested the use of chromogenic agar screening of 
multiple body sites to maximize the identification of MRSA carriers [33]. The successful 
search and destroy strategy of the Netherlands also used multiple body sites screening 
including nose, throat, perineum, feces, sputum (if present), urine (in the event of a 
bladder catheter), skin lesions, and wounds [34].  
In our sensitivity analysis, relaxing the MRSA dispersal assumption allows us to 
further evaluate the difference between hand-to-surface contamination and air-to-surface 
contamination. With no MRSA dispersal in the uncolonized patient’s room, hand hygiene 
at the entry and exit of a patient’s visit can significantly decrease hand-to-surface 
contamination depending on hand hygiene efficacy. Whereas in settings with MRSA 
dispersal and deposition on the uncolonized patient’s room surfaces, hand hygiene at the 
entry and exit of a patient’s visit has a limited effect in decreasing exposure to the 
uncolonized patient from this air-to-surface contamination.  
Aerial dispersal across rooms is likely not a rare event. Prospective studies that 
performed surveillance of both patients and environments found indistinguishable MRSA 
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strains between patients and their environment. These strains were not all confined to the 
immediate vicinity of the colonized patient [35, 36]. Contamination of the same strains 
was seen in different patients’ rooms. A study that monitored S. aureus colony count on 
surfaces in surgical wards found that counts of S.aureus varied according to bed 
occupancy, with the highest counts (over 2.5 cfu/cm2) associated with bed occupancies 
>95% [37]. A study that collected both clinical and air sampling from 0.5, 1, and 2-3 
meters from the patients showed no decreasing trend in MRSA cfu counts with increasing 
distances (0.5 to 3 meters) [15]. These findings confirm that dispersal could occur farther 
than near to patient sites. However, quantifying the dispersal may not be straightforward 
as it may be influenced by many factors such as the patient’s activity, the airflow in the 
ward, and the healthcare workers’ activities [38, 39]. Healthcare workers’ gowns and 
uniforms are known to carry and disperse MRSA in the air, regardless of their 
colonization status [40].   
 All models have limitations in that they represent a simple view of a real-world 
complex system and require the simplifying of assumptions. Therefore, inferences from 
any model rely heavily on the underlying assumptions. While there is an enormous 
amount of available literature that can support choices of model parameters, 
parameterization still requires further assumption. The same parameters may be used 
differently depending on model forms and research questions. The transfer efficiency is a 
key parameter in contact-mediated exposure assessment. It is defined as a fraction of 
pathogens transferred from one surface to another contacting surface after each touch 
[21]. Within the EITS community, only a few experiments have been used and referred to 
[20, 21, 41]. One experiment measured the quantity of bacteria from contaminated fabrics 
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to a clean fingertip [20]. The other measured the quantity of bacteria transferred from 
contaminated surfaces to a clean hand, as well as the quantity of bacteria transferred from 
a contaminated fingertip to a clean lip [21]. These data are informative and specific to 
various surfaces. Nevertheless, they require additional assumptions in order to use in the 
EITS model. 
 In our model there are bidirectional MRSA flows between two contacting 
surfaces. Thus, we assume that the transfer efficiency between clean and contaminated 
surfaces as calculated from the experiments is the same transfer efficiency between two 
contaminated surfaces used in the model. We assume that the unidirectional transfer 
efficiency from surfaces to hands from the experiments is the same as those from hands 
to surfaces. Similarly, we assume that the unidirectional transfer efficiency from fingertip 
to lip is the same as those from lip to fingertip, from hand to skin and from skin to hand.  
The original EITS model was a simpler model of a more complex system, 
compared to this model [42]. The 2009 model used the EITS framework to analyze 
influenza transmission using 5 parameters. The average transfer efficiency of porous and 
nonporous surfaces, combined with 10 other factors were used to estimate a composite 
parameter called the ‘pick up rate’, which is the number of pathogens picked up by a 
single person per day based on the breathing and touching rates. Another EITS model 
also analyzed influenza transmission using the average transfer efficiency of porous and 
nonporous surfaces (0.1)[43]. This latter 2010 model assumed equal transfer efficiencies 
from hand to surface and from surface to hand, similar to this model. More recent EITS 
work in influenza examined hand-to-fomite and droplet-to-fomite contact mediated 
transmission [44]. This study used a transfer efficiency in the mid-range between porous 
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and nonporous surfaces (0.2). This work briefly included sensitivity analysis of 
asymmetrical transfer efficiency. It showed that varying transfer efficiency from hand to 
surface from 0 to 0.5 does not substantially affect the fomite-mediated transmission. 
Nevertheless, influenza and S. aureus largely differ in their inherit property to survive on 
hands as well as in the environment. Inactivation rates of influenza in air, surfaces and on 
hands are 0.006, 0.01, and 0.92 min-1, respectively [45, 46], which are all much quicker 
than those of S. aureus. Inference in regards to the mode of transmission is also pathogen 
specific. Although hand-to-surface contamination may appear to play a small role for 
influenza due to shorter survivability on hands, our model shows that nurses’ hands play 
a role in spreading contamination to surfaces in the uncolonized patient’s room. These 
surfaces subsequently become an exposure route to the uncolonized patient. 
The role of hand-to-surface contamination, however, is sensitive to the underlying 
assumption of symmetrical transfer efficiency. While it may appear unrealistic to assume 
such symmetry, this symmetrical assumption allows us to understand the different 
behaviors of contact surfaces due to the inherit differences in transfer efficiency. 
However, allowing symmetrical transfer efficiency also means allowing a fraction (0.4) 
of MRSA transfer from hands to nonporous surfaces. This fraction is relatively high 
when compared to the hand hygiene efficacy of 0.7, an average between soap and water 
and alcohol-based hand solution [22, 23]. We then performed sensitivity analysis to relax 
this symmetrical assumption by assigning transfer efficiency from hand to surface as 1% 
and 10% of hand hygiene efficacy (i.e. 0.007, 0.07). Assuming no MRSA dispersal 
across rooms, our finding shows that as transfer efficiency from hand to surface 
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decreases, the hand-to-surface contamination decreases and environmental mediated 
exposure to the uncolonized patient decrease.  
From our analyses we demonstrated that the effect of hand hygiene at the entry 
and exit of a patient’s room can decrease exposure from both the hand-mediated and 
hand-to-surface contamination routes.  However, exposure from the air-to-surface 
contamination route could still be a threat to the uncolonized patient.  
To further develop and gain insights from the EITS model, more experimental 
data is needed to support model parameters as well as environmental surveillance studies 
to quantitatively measure aerial dispersal in hospital settings. Compared to the previous 
EITS models, this model has more realistic features for hypothetical hospital rooms with 
patients, nurses and room surfaces. However, for the purposes of simplification, we made 
an important but unrealistic assumption that will need further exploration: we assume 
healthcare workers are only vectors of transmission with no capability to shed MRSA. 
Having nurses who can shed MRSA may increase exposure to the uncolonized patient 
both by direct hand mediated route, and by environmental mediated routes, either hand-
to-surface contamination or air-to-surface contamination. In endemic settings, 2% to 15% 
of healthcare workers are known to carry MRSA [47]. Moreover, a survey showed 22% 
of male medical students to be perineal carriers [48]. Excluding nurses and other 
healthcare providers as potential shedders simplified the model and allowed us to 
improve our insight of patient-to-patient transmission. However, it may underestimate the 
exposure assessment overall.  
In summary, this study has demonstrated that hand hygiene compliance is 
important in reducing MRSA exposure to the susceptible patient. Moreover, the 
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opportunities to perform hand hygiene before and after touching a patient’s surrounding 
environment, as well as its efficacy, are also essential. Contaminated nurses’ hands may 
transfer MRSA from direct contact with the uncolonized patient or transfer MRSA to 
surrounding surfaces, which subsequently become an exposure source to the patient. 
Also, we showed the impact of having MRSA aerial dispersal in the uncolonized 
patient’s room. The effect of this air-to-surface contamination route can significantly 
increase total exposure to the uncolonized patient. MRSA infection control planning will 
need to emphasize both hand-based and environmental-based interventions. 
 
 
  
 190
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI REFERENCES 
 
1.  Pittet D, Allegranzi B, Sax H, Dharan S, Pessoa-Silva CL, Donaldson L, et al. 
Evidence-based model for hand transmission during patient care and the role of 
improved practices. Lancet Inf Diss 2006;6(10):641-52. 
2.  Shinefield HR, Ruff NL. Staphylococcal infections: a historical perspective. Infect 
Dis Clin North Am 2009;23(1):1-15. 
3.  Boyce JM, Pittet D. Guideline for Hand Hygiene in Health-Care Settings. 
Recommendations of the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory 
Committee and the HICPAC/SHEA/APIC/IDSA Hand Hygiene Task Force. Society 
for Healthcare Epidemiology of America/Association for Professionals in Infection 
Control/Infectious Diseases Society of America. MMWR. Recommendations and 
reports : Morbidity and mortality weekly report. Recommendations and reports / 
Centers for Disease Control 2002;51(RR-16):1-45, quiz CE1-4. 
4.  Sax H, Allegranzi B, Uckay I, Larson E, Boyce J, Pittet D. 'My five moments for 
hand hygiene': a user-centred design approach to understand, train, monitor and 
report hand hygiene. J Hosp Infect 2007;67(1):9-21. 
5.  WHO Guidelines on Hand Hygiene in Health Care: First global patient safety 
challenge clean care is safer care.: World Health Organization; 2009. 
6.  Boyce JM. Measuring healthcare worker hand hygiene activity: current practices and 
emerging technologies. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2011;32(10):1016-28. 
7.  Marra AR, Moura DF, Jr., Paes AT, dos Santos OF, Edmond MB. Measuring rates 
of hand hygiene adherence in the intensive care setting: a comparative study of 
direct observation, product usage, and electronic counting devices. Infect Control 
Hosp Epidemiol 2010;31(8):796-801. 
8.  Kohli E, Ptak J, Smith R, Taylor E, Talbot EA, Kirkland KB. Variability in the 
Hawthorne effect with regard to hand hygiene performance in high- and low-
performing inpatient care units. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2009;30(3):222-5. 
9.  Gould DJ, Drey NS, Creedon S. Routine hand hygiene audit by direct observation: 
has nemesis arrived? J Hosp Infect 2011;77(4):290-3. 
10.  Edmond MB, Goodell A, Zuelzer W, Sanogo K, Elam K, Bearman G. Successful 
use of alcohol sensor technology to monitor and report hand hygiene compliance. J 
Hosp Infect 2010;76(4):364-5. 
 191
11.  Stewardson A, Sax H, Longet-Di Pietro S, Pittet D. Impact of observation and 
analysis methodology when reporting hand hygiene data. J Hosp Infect 
2011;77(4):358-9. 
12.  Mermel LA, Eells SJ, Acharya MK, Cartony JM, Dacus D, Fadem S, et al. 
Quantitative analysis and molecular fingerprinting of methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus nasal colonization in different patient populations: a 
prospective, multicenter study. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2010;31(6):592-7. 
13.  White A. Quantitative studies of nasal carriers of staphylococci among hospitalized 
patients. J Clin Invest 1961;40:23-30. 
14.  Hare R, Ridley, M. Further studies on the transmission of Staphyloccus aureus. Br 
Med J 1958:69-73. 
15.  Gehanno JF, Louvel A, Nouvellon M, Caillard JF, Pestel-Caron M. Aerial dispersal 
of meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus in hospital rooms by infected or 
colonised patients. J Hosp Infect 2009;71(3):256-62. 
16.  Hill J, Howell A, Blowers R. Effect of clothing on dispersal of Staphylococcus 
aureus by males and females. Lancet 1974;2(7889):1131-3. 
17.  Yabe S, Takano T, Higuchi W, Mimura S, Kurosawa Y, Yamamoto T. Spread of the 
community-acquired methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus USA300 clone 
among family members in Japan. J Infect Chemother 2010;16(5):372-4. 
18.  Cuesta A, Nastri N, Bernat M, Brusca M, Turcot L, Nastri M, et al. Survival of 
Staphylococcus aureus on fomites. Acta Odontol Latin 2008;21(2):141-6. 
19.  Masago Y, Shibata T, Rose JB. Bacteriophage P22 and Staphylococcus aureus 
attenuation on nonporous fomites as determined by plate assay and quantitative 
PCR. Appl Environ Microbiol 2008;74(18):5838-40. 
20.  Sattar SA, Springthorpe S, Mani S, Gallant M, Nair RC, Scott E, et al. Transfer of 
bacteria from fabrics to hands and other fabrics: development and application of a 
quantitative method using Staphylococcus aureus as a model.  J Appl Microbiol 
2001;90(6):962-70. 
21.  Rusin P, Maxwell S, Gerba C. Comparative surface-to-hand and fingertip-to-mouth 
transfer efficiency of gram-positive bacteria, gram-negative bacteria, and phage.  J 
Appl Microbiol 2002;93(4):585-92. 
22.  Zaragoza M, Salles M, Gomez J, Bayas JM, Trilla A. Handwashing with soap or 
alcoholic solutions? A randomized clinical trial of its effectiveness. Am J Infect 
Control 1999;27(3):258-61. 
 192
23.  Girou E, Loyeau S, Legrand P, Oppein F, Brun-Buisson C. Efficacy of handrubbing 
with alcohol based solution versus standard handwashing with antiseptic soap: 
randomised clinical trial. Br Med J 2002;325(7360):362. 
24.  Boyce JM, Havill NL, Otter JA, Adams NM. Widespread environmental 
contamination associated with patients with diarrhea and methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus colonization of the gastrointestinal tract. Infect Control Hosp 
Epidemiol 2007;28(10):1142-7. 
25.  Burke JF, Corrigan EA. Staphylococcal epidemiology on a surgical ward. 
Fluctuations in ward staphylococcal content, its effect on hospitalized patients and 
the extent of endemic hospital strains. N Engl J Med 1961;264:321-6. 
26.  Rohr U, Kaminski A, Wilhelm M, Jurzik L, Gatermann S, Muhr G. Colonization of 
patients and contamination of the patients' environment by MRSA under conditions 
of single-room isolation. Int J Hyg Environ Health 2009;212(2):209-15. 
27.  Boyce JM, White RL, Causey WA, Lockwood WR. Burn units as a source of 
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus infections. JAMA 1983;249(20):2803-7. 
28.  Casewell MW, Hill RL. The carrier state: methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus. J Antimicrob Chemother 1986;18 Suppl A:1-12. 
29.  Boe J, Solberg CO, Vogelsang TM, Wormnes A. Perineal Carriers of Staphylococci. 
Br Med J 1964;2(5404):280-1. 
30.  Solberg C. A study of carriers of Staphylococcus aureus with special regard to 
quantitative bacterial estimations. Acta Med Scand 1965;436:1-96. 
31.  Lee AS, Huttner B, Harbarth S. Control of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus. Infect Dis Clin North Am 2011;25(1):155-79. 
32.  Dancer SJ, Noble WC. Nasal, axillary, and perineal carriage of Staphylococcus 
aureus among women: identification of strains producing epidermolytic toxin. J Clin 
Pathol 1991;44(8):681-4. 
33.  Wassenberg MW, Kluytmans JA, Bosboom RW, Buiting AG, van Elzakker EP, 
Melchers WJ, et al. Rapid diagnostic testing of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus carriage at different anatomical sites: costs and benefits of less extensive 
screening regimens. Clin Microbiol Infect 2011;17(11)1704-10. 
34.  Vandenbroucke-Grauls CM. Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus control in 
hospitals: the Dutch experience. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 1996;17(8):512-3. 
35.  Hardy KJ, Gossain S, Henderson N, Drugan C, Oppenheim BA, Gao F, et al. Rapid 
recontamination with MRSA of the environment of an intensive care unit after 
decontamination with hydrogen peroxide vapour. J Hosp Infect 2007;66(4):360-8. 
 193
36.  Dancer SJ, White LF, Lamb J, Girvan EK, Robertson C. Measuring the effect of 
enhanced cleaning in a UK hospital: a prospective cross-over study. BMC Med 
2009;7:28. 
37.  Dancer SJ, White L, Robertson C. Monitoring environmental cleanliness on two 
surgical wards. Int J Environ Health Res 2008;18(5):357-64. 
38.  Foord N, Lidwell OM. Airborne infection in a fully air-conditioned hospital. I. Air 
transfer between rooms. J Hyg 1975;75(1):15-30. 
39.  Lidwell OM, Brock B, Shooter RA, Cooke EM, Thomas GE. Airborne infection in a 
fully air-conditioned hospital. IV. Airborne dispersal of Staphylococcus aureus and 
its nasal acquisition by patients. J Hyg 1975;75(3):445-74. 
40.  Hambraeus A. Transfer of Staphylococcus aureus via nurses' uniforms. J Hyg 
1973;71(4):799-814. 
41.  Scott E, Bloomfield SF. The survival and transfer of microbial contamination via 
cloths, hands and utensils. J Appl Bacteriol 1990;68(3):271-8. 
42.  Li S, Eisenberg JNS, Spicknall I, Koopman J. Dynamics and controls of infections 
transmitted from person to person through the environment. Am J Epidemiol 
2009;170(2):257-65. 
43.  Spicknall IH, Koopman JS, Nicas M, Pujol JM, Li S, Eisenberg JN. Informing 
optimal environmental influenza interventions: how the host, agent, and environment 
alter dominant routes of transmission. PLoS Comp Biol 2010;6(10):e1000969. 
44.  Zhao J, Spicknall,I.H., Sheng,L., Eisenberg,J.N.,Koopman,J.S. Model analysis of 
fomite mediated influenza transmission.(Unpublished - manuscript in preparation) 
45.  Bean B, Moore BM, Sterner B, Peterson LR, Gerding DN, Balfour HH, Jr. Survival 
of influenza viruses on environmental surfaces. J Infect Dis 1982;146(1):47-51. 
46.  Hemmes JH, Winkler KC, Kool SM. Virus survival as a seasonal factor in influenza 
and polimyelitis. Nature 1960;188:430-1. 
47.  Hawkins G, Stewart S, Blatchford O, Reilly J. Should healthcare workers be 
screened routinely for meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus? A review of the 
evidence. J Hosp Infect 2011;77(4):285-9. 
48.  Ridley M. Perineal carriage of Staph. aureus. Br Med J 1959;1(5117):270-3. 
 
 
  
  
 194
  
 
  
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
 
7.1  Summary 
The original motivation of this dissertation was to pursue a risk analysis model of 
MRSA transmission in a 20-bed intensive care unit. The model was intended to help 
provide infection control inferences and to help define what further data was needed to 
make these inferences. However, along the path of model development, it became 
apparent that there is a need to first understand the fate and transport processes. Thus, we 
elected to perform an exposure assessment in Chapters V and VI as a first step towards a 
future risk analysis model that can generate the data as in Chapter IV. 
Our exposure assessment contributed further insight into the implication of the 
contaminated environment in the transmission of MRSA. This was achieved by the use of 
the Environmental Infection Transmission System (EITS) principle, which allows 
incorporation of three essential elements in infection transmission, which are the host, 
pathogen and environment. This dissertation also demonstrated that insight could be 
improved by keeping the model simple, as we have used two hypothetical hospital rooms 
instead of a full 20-bed unit.  
7.1.1  Chapter III 
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From the literature review there is substantial evidence supporting environmental 
mediation of S. aureus transmission. S. aureus is a greatly adaptable commensal 
organism, as well as a major human pathogen. Colonized or infected individuals can shed 
S. aureus into air through contaminated skin scales. Several important features in regards 
to S. aureus shedding should be noted. First, there is a great variability of the shedding 
magnitude both within and between individuals. Some individuals appear to have a heavy 
dispersing ability. These individuals may include perineal carriers, gastrointestinal 
carriers, or nasal carriers with a high bacterial load. Second, shedding occurs 
continuously. Third, aerially dispersed skin scales can deposit and contaminate 
environments such as surfaces, floors, and clothing of healthcare workers as well as 
patients. Given that S. aureus can be shed into the environment, can survive outside of a 
host, and can be transferred from the environment back to a host, there is a need to 
further understand the fate and transport of this organism and the exposure to hosts in 
order to better address and understand the risk of acquisition. 
7.1.2  Chapter IV 
We conducted a 20-month prospective study using a nasal swab surveillance and 
clinical data from a 20-bed surgical intensive care unit (SICU). We examined the 
relationship between MRSA acquisition risk and the contextual environmental exposure 
to patients. These environmental exposures include the daily preacquisition colonization 
pressure in the SICU, the prior room occupant MRSA status, and the vacant room time 
between patient admissions.  
Although our inferences were limited by the small sample size, our findings 
supported environmental factors as MRSA acquisition risks. We demonstrated the two 
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exposure aspects of SICU colonization pressure: exposure time and exposure magnitude. 
We found that a higher hazard of SICU exposure to MRSA-positive patients was seen in 
more recent exposures, which were in the prior day, compared to longer exposures. Also, 
we showed that the greater numbers of MRSA-positive patient present in the SICU led to 
a greater hazard of acquisition among other patients. When there were more than 3 
MRSA-positive patients in the SICU, the acquisition hazard significantly increased by 6-
8 fold. Additionally, patients who acquired MRSA were more likely to be admitted to 
rooms that were vacant for shorter durations between admissions.  
7.1.3  Chapter V 
We used mathematical modeling to help understand the complex mechanistic 
processes about which inferences are not intuitively obvious. We developed an MRSA 
fate and transport model based on the EITS framework to determine the effects of MRSA 
continually shedding i) on the direct and indirect exposure patterns of nurses and the 
uncolonized patient, and ii) on surface contamination levels following decontamination 
interventions. We also examined the effect of hand hygiene and its joint effects with two 
surface decontamination methods. These surface decontamination interventions were 
daily surface decontamination, and decontamination by wiping after each nurse touching 
of the nonporous surfaces.  
With our deterministic differential equation based model, we described changes 
of MRSA contamination levels over time and the exposure patterns of the nurses and the 
uncolonized patient. Given the model assumptions and the parameters that were used, the 
model’s main findings were as follows: 
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(a) Nurses became contaminated from indirect contact with the contaminated 
room surfaces more than from direct contact with patients, given the same direct and 
indirect touching frequency. Interestingly, this finding agrees with a recent study to 
examine whether healthcare workers’ fingertips were contaminated with MRSA in a 
clinical hospital setting [1]. The study took place in 8 wards in a tertiary care hospital, 
and included 822 fingertip imprint cultures on MRSA chromogenic ager plates from 523 
healthcare workers. The study showed that overall, 38/822 (5%) fingertips were MRSA-
positive; 10/138 (10%) after contact with the patient’s environment, 12/196 (6%) after 
clinical contact, and 15/346 (4%) of after no specific contact [1]. The implication of this 
finding is closely related to the importance of hand hygiene opportunities before and after 
contact with a patient’s environment. It also highlighted potential problems with the 
misconception that hand hygiene is unnecessary if one does not touch the patient [2]. 
These selective missed opportunities may indeed pose a higher risk of MRSA transfer to 
the uncolonized patient than random missed opportunities. 
(b) The surface decontamination frequency is as important as the surface-
decontamination efficacy. With continuing MRSA shedding of the colonized patient and 
the ability to survive out of a host, room surfaces become re-contaminated quickly. Our 
model finding is supported by a study that examined the effectiveness of hydrogen 
peroxide vapor (HPV) decontamination in a 9-bed open-plan intensive care unit (ICU). 
This study showed that prior to the use of HPV, circulating MRSA strains in the 
environment were similar to those in colonized patients. Immediately before HPV use, all 
patients were removed from the ICU. After the use, HPV successfully eradicated MRSA 
from all environmentally sampled sites. However, within 24 hours after readmitting 
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patients, including two colonized patients, room surfaces were re-contaminated with 
MRSA. Within one week contamination was back to the level before the cleaning [3]. 
The authors concluded that HPV is effective in eradicating bacteria from the 
environment, but it is an ineffective means of maintaining low levels of contamination by 
itself, due to the rapid rate of recontamination. Our model findings supported their 
conclusion drawn from a clinical setting. We would suggest further that means to 
maintain low levels of contamination could be achieved by increasing the frequency of 
cleaning. 
(c) Wiping nonporous surfaces after touching them was an efficacious 
decontamination method. This type of decontamination allows for more frequent cleaning 
of a smaller surface area. As a result, cleaning by wiping of surfaces is able to cover 
larger surface areas over time than daily decontamination. In order for routine surface 
decontamination to have the same effect, the frequency needs to be increased from once 
daily to every eight hours. Aside from the ease of use, wiping offers an environmentally 
friendly option with weak or limited microbicidal activities [4]. Nonetheless, some 
concerns have been raised that wipes may further spread contamination from one location 
to others if not used properly [4, 5]. 
(d) Transfer efficiency is a key parameter that differentiates surface behavior, and 
may be important when selecting hospital upholstery. In general, porous surfaces are 
harder to clean and disinfect, compared to nonporous surfaces [6]. However, in our model 
we demonstrated that while the porous surfaces retain higher levels of contamination, 
they do not contribute to exposure to nurses and the uncolonized patient as much as the 
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nonporous surfaces, which were less contaminated. This phenomenon is largely driven by 
the differences in their transfer efficiency.  
(e) There is a joint effect between the surface-decontamination efficacy and hand-
hygiene efficacy to the MRSA exposure dose to the uncolonized patient. While hand 
hygiene is intentionally modeled unrealistically with 100% compliance, we showed that 
the effect of hand hygiene to the uncolonized patient’s exposure dose is less when surface 
contamination is high compared to when the surface contamination is low. 
Overall, the model has proved to be informative and provided much insight into 
the role of the environment in the MRSA fate and transport process. We have shown that 
a simpler 2-bed model could make a clearer understanding, when compared to the 
attempt of a 20-bed model. Nevertheless, the deterministic nature did not fit well to 
address hand hygiene compliance, an important measure of MRSA infection control. We 
then took a step forward to examine hand hygiene compliance in a more realistic 
stochastic model as in chapter VI. The differences between the models in chapter V and 
VI are summarized in Table 7.1. 
 
 
Table 7.1:  Summary of differences between the deterministic ordinary differential 
equation based model in chapter V and the stochastic agent based model in chapter VI. 
 
Features Chapter V Chapter VI 
Structure: two hypothetical hospital 
rooms 
Same Same 
Basic assumptions: 
i) The homogenously mixing 
assumption  
ii) The colonized patient as a single 
source of MRSA 
iii) Nurses as vectors of the 
Same Same 
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transmission 
iv) Symmetrical transfer efficiency 
MRSA dispersal assumption In all analysis MRSA 
dispersal and 
deposition only occurs 
in the colonized 
patient’s room. 
In baseline scenario 
MRSA dispersal and 
deposition only occurs 
in the colonized 
patient’s room. 
However, we included 
the sensitivity analysis 
when MRSA dispersal 
and deposition occurs 
in both patients’ 
rooms. 
Total surface area (cm2) 
- Patients 
- Nurses 
- Surfaces 
 
2000 
2000 
2000 
 
2000 
300 
2000 
Contact surface area (cm2) 150 300 
Surface area affected by each hand 
hygiene event (cm2) 
300 300 
Hand hygiene compliance before 
and after a patient’s room visit 
0% or 100% Variable 
Surface area affected by each 
surface decontamination event per 
one surface (cm2) 
2000 2000 
Surface area affected by wiping per 
one nonporous surface (cm2) 
150 N/A 
Nurse visit duration (minutes) 20 10-30 
Nurse contacts with the patient and 
the two room surfaces during the 
visit 
Contacts are defined as 
rates. Each contact 
averages 4 times per 
visit. 
Contacts are defined 
as risk; probabilistic 
event per one unit time 
step. Each contact 
occurs approximately 
4 times per visit in a 
random order.  
Patient contacts with the surfaces Contacts are defined as 
rates. Each contact 
averages 4 times per 
hour. 
Contacts are defined 
as risk; probabilistic 
event per one unit time 
step. Each contact 
occurs approximately 
4 times per hour in a 
random order. 
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7.1.4  Chapter VI 
In this chapter, we examined the effect of hand hygiene compliance by using a 
stochastic agent based model with more realistic features. Hand hygiene opportunities 
were at the entry and exit of a patient room, while in the room nurses could touch the 
patients and surfaces in a random order. Also, patients touched the two room surfaces in a 
random order. We examined the role of environmental contamination by varying the 
shedding magnitude that the colonized patient shed MRSA to the room surfaces. We 
evaluated the effect of the assumption that there was no dispersal across rooms by 
allowing MRSA dispersal and deposition on both patients’ room surfaces. We also 
examined the symmetrical transfer efficiency assumption. 
We demonstrated that healthcare workers’ compliance is essential in determining 
the effectiveness of hand hygiene, although the time when it is performed and its efficacy 
are also important. Our model emphasizes the significance of the hand hygiene 
opportunity before and after touching patients’ surrounding environment, in addition to at 
the entry and exit of a patient’s room. Despite 100% compliance at the entry and exit of a 
patient’s room, we show that the contaminated environmental surfaces can serve as 
pathogen reservoirs for recontamination of nurses’ hands in the colonized patient’s room. 
Additionally, this model shows the value of hand hygiene efficacy. With 100% 
compliance and 70% efficacy, nurses’ hands remain contaminated enough to 
subsequently contaminate the uncolonized patient’s environment, which later become 
another exposure route to the uncolonized patient. For hand hygiene to be effective in 
suppressing exposure to the uncolonized patient, healthcare workers’ compliance, high 
efficacious techniques, and hand hygiene opportunities all need to be considered. 
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Given the model assumptions and parameters, the main exposure route to the 
uncolonized patient is through contaminated nurse’s hands (hand-mediated route). Less 
exposure occurs from the contaminated environmental surfaces, which are contaminated 
from nurses’ hands (hand-to-surface contamination). In our sensitivity analysis, where we 
allowed MRSA dispersal and deposition in the uncolonized patient’s room, our model 
revealed that when surfaces become contaminated from MRSA dispersal and deposition 
(air-to-surface contamination), in addition to contamination from nurses’ hands touching 
(hand-to-surface contamination), the total environmental mediated exposure to the 
uncolonized patient can be greatly exaggerated.  
Once again in this model, transfer efficiency is highlighted as a key parameter that 
needs more supporting data. In both models we assume symmetrical transfer efficiency. 
However, in this model setting, we only include both nurses’ hands surfaces area to 
represent the pathogen vectors in the system. Transfer efficiency of the nonporous 
surface, which is 0.4, appears to be unrealistically high, when compared to the average 
hand hygiene efficacy of 0.7 [7-9]. We then examined asymmetrical transfer efficiency 
by allowing transfer efficiency from hand to surface to be only 1% and 10% of hand 
hygiene efficacy. We found a drastic drop of hand-to-surface contamination. This further 
emphasizes the need to understand the extent of air-to-surface contamination, which 
might be the dominant source of environmental contamination in hospitals.  
These two chapters are complimentary. While the deterministic model produces a 
single pattern of output, given the same initial conditions, it is not a flexible platform to 
evaluate probabilistic events and possible variations of output. Nevertheless, the 
deterministic model is helpful in the initial attempt to understand the system. It was also 
 203
useful in docking the stochastic counterpart. The advantage of the stochastic model is the 
ability to assess hand hygiene compliance and the flexibility to relax certain unrealistic 
assumptions. We elected to use an agent-based model for the flexibility to include 
different behaviors of individuals. Even though there are only small numbers of 
individuals in this model, our platform is already set up for elaboration into a 20-bed unit 
model.  
7.2  Suggestions for future work 
Our suggestions for future direction include three aspects. First, we need studies 
that help verify our model parameters as well as studies that collect enough relevant data, 
such as contact pattern data, patient colonization, and environmental contamination data. 
Second, we need to extend this fate and transport model into a full infection transmission 
model. This could be done with proper dose response data. Finally, future work should 
utilize molecular typing tools in combination with our models. This method would use 
real-world data to help improve our theory-based modeling work [10, 11]].  
7.2.1  Studies to improve the model parameterization 
Model parameter values are based on existing literature. Those that are not 
available require additional assumptions. One of the key parameters is transfer efficiency. 
Thus far, we assume that transfer efficiency from a contaminated to a clean surface as 
measured in the experiments are the same as transfer efficiency between two 
contaminated surfaces in the model. We also made a likely unrealistic assumption of 
symmetry. At this point, we need studies that examine transfer efficiency between two 
contaminated surfaces measured in both directions.  
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While experimental data is needed, generalization to clinical settings will need to 
be examined as well. Another method to estimate parameters could be done by using 
observational data in real-world settings. Since transfer efficiency varies greatly 
depending on many local factors related to the hosts, the surfaces, and the surrounding 
environment, transfer efficiency parameters obtained by this latter method may likely be 
more accurate. This parameter estimation could be achieved in a model that allows the 
parameter to vary in a prior set distribution. By using different sets of observational data 
from various possible contact scenarios in the model, we can determine what factors 
affect transfer efficiency. 
Observational studies of healthcare workers’ and patients’ contact patterns are 
also needed. Studies of hand-hygiene compliance frequently counted a number of missed 
opportunities for each patient’s visit. This compliance data is relevant. However, it will 
be more helpful to obtain more detailed contact pattern information, such as the 
description of the contacts, where in the rooms patients and nurses touch, how frequently 
the touches occur, and how frequently hand hygiene is performed following each types of 
touch. 
7.2.2  Developing risk analysis models 
This dissertation focused on the fate and transport processes of the transmission 
system. The next step would be to extend the model to a full transmission model, so we 
can use the model to reproduce real-world data, either that is already collected or that is 
to be collected. To develop such a model, a dose response function is needed to 
determine the colonization or infection outcome. At the present time, the only S. aureus 
dose response data available was from bacterial interference studies in newborns from 
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1963 [12]. More recent nasal artificial inoculation was performed in adult volunteers 
using high concentrations of organism [13, 14]. These studies are not easily applicable to 
the EITS model. An informative source of data may need to be from time dependent 
cumulated dose response experiments [15]. Additionally, we need an exposure pathway 
specific dose response experiment such as dose given to the skin or hands, as well as by 
the airborne route. While it is possible that susceptible patients may inhale these 
contaminated particles, the two models in this dissertation assume complete air 
deposition. Further exposure assessments may need to consider this airborne route. 
7.2.3  Prospective genotyping surveillance study of patients, environment and 
healthcare workers  
The purpose of the surveillance is to use this genotyping database in the EITS 
model. In this model there will be different MRSA genotypes that can be updated with 
surveillance data.  
Thus, the surveillance will include healthcare workers, patients, and the 
environment. Selecting bacterial typing techniques depends on the intended 
epidemiological application [16]. Given that our objective is to trace person-to-person 
transmission through healthcare workers’ hands and the hospital environment, we would 
need a technique with high discriminatory power, speed, and ability to handle large 
numbers of samples at the same time at a reasonable cost. A recent study of MRSA 
hospital transmission and intercontinental spread used a sequencing technology by 
mapping genome wide single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) and insertions or 
deletions compared to a reference sequence [17]. This technique bridged the gap of an 
impractical full-genome sequence and the low discriminatory power of the multilocus 
sequence typing (MLST). This technique would be ideal to use in this type of study. 
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As demonstrated in this dissertation, contextual environmental exposure can 
affect acquisition risks, which is a risk at both the individual and population levels. 
Although we have not addressed issues at a microbial population level, studies have 
shown that there are bacterial interferences among common commensal organisms in the 
nose [18, 19]. Also, we have not addressed specific host factors which may contribute to 
transmission. Using a human nasal artificial inoculation model, a study demonstrated that 
the human factor is an important determinant of S. aureus nasal carriage. After being 
treated with intranasal antibiotic to eradicate the nasal carriage status, the majority of 
persistent carriers tested positive for their original resident strains after artificial 
inoculation with a mixture of S.aureus strains including their original strains [13]. To 
incorporate bacterial interference and host factors, a more elaborate complex system 
model will be needed.   
While much can be pursued to further our understanding in MRSA transmission, 
at this point we have established an exposure assessment framework that can also be 
applied to other nosocomial pathogens. Several nosocomial pathogens are shed by 
patients and contaminate hospital surfaces, survive for extended periods, persist despite 
attempts to disinfect, and can be transferred to the hands of healthcare workers. Some of 
these pathogens include Clostridium difficile, vancomycin-resistant enterococci, 
Acinetobacter baumannii, and norovirus [20]. A comparative exposure assessment of 
these pathogens can certainly be informative for hospital infection control communities. 
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APPENDIX A 
PREAMBLE  
 
In this dissertation, the deterministic model was written in Berkeley Madonna 
version 8.3.22. The agent-based model was written in MATLAB version 7.8.0.347 
(R2009a). Simulations were run on personal computers as well as on computers at the 
Center for Study of Complex System (CSCS) at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
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APPENDIX B  
TO CHAPTER IV  
 
This appendix contains additional discussion of the proposed environmental and 
hand-mediated MRSA acquisition diagram with the purpose to improve our 
understanding of the system and to provide information in the multivariate analysis plan. 
Even though this diagram is not the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) due to the 
unavoidable loops: 1) between ‘HCW contamination’ and ‘ICU surface contamination’, 
and 2) between ‘HCW contamination’ and ‘Susceptible patient’s room contamination’, 
we assume that rules for causal diagrams are still applicable here.  
This diagram is based on prior knowledge and the relationship found in our data 
analysis. The exposure of interest is the presence of MRSA-positive patients in the SICU. 
The outcome is MRSA acquisition during SICU admission. The two potential sources of 
bias that are discussed here are the room factors and the host factors.  
B.1  Room factors 
Susceptible patients’ room contamination can be either a confounder or an 
intermediate variable depending on the time and sources of contamination, i.e. 1) from 
the current MRSA-positive patient through air dispersal, or 2) from the previous 
occupant’s room contamination of the prior admission. 
Considering Figure B.1, where an MRSA-positive patient dispersed and 
contaminated a susceptible patient’s room, which led to contamination and acquisition of 
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the patient. For this scenario, room contamination is an intermediate variable and should 
not be adjusted for. 
However, in another scenario, as in Figure B.2, there was no air dispersal across 
rooms, and the susceptible patient’s room contamination was the result from a previous 
admission. Thus, room contamination becomes a confounder and should be controlled 
for. 
 
  
 
 
Figure B.1: Diagram showing the effect of room contamination that resulted from air 
dispersal from an MRSA-positive patient. This susceptible patient’s room contamination 
leads to acquisition of the susceptible patient. 
 
  
 213
 
 
 
Figure B.2: Diagram showing the effect of room contamination that resulted from either 
the previous room occupant who was MRSA-positive or from prior inadequate room 
decontamination that may have been related to short vacant room time between 
admissions.   
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Figure B.3: Diagram of the relationships among host factors, the presence of MRSA-
positive patient in the ICU and the MRSA acquisition in the susceptible patient. Solid 
lines depict associations (straight lines) or causal prediction (arrows) from the study. 
Dashed lines are from prior knowledge. PreICU-LOS means the length of stay in the 
hospital prior to the intensive care unit admission. ICU-LOS means the length of stay 
while in the intensive care unit. APACHE score stands for the Acute Physiology and 
Chronic Health Evaluation scoring system.  
 
 
B.2 Host factors 
The temporality of the time of the event is important and relevant to identifying 
confounders and colliders. In general, confounders should be adjusted for to minimize 
bias, while adjusting for colliders may create bias. In other words, an uncontrolled 
common cause of exposure and outcome causes bias, which is referred to as confounding. 
Whereas controlling for a common effect of exposure and outcome may cause bias. This 
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is referred to as collider-stratification-bias, selection bias or bias due to conditioning on a 
collider [1]. In view of time, common cause must be ‘temporally prior’ to both exposure 
and outcome. However, a measured confounder may be temporally posterior to exposure 
if it is on a causal pathway from the common cause to the outcome, or temporally 
posterior to both exposure and outcome if it is a descendent of the common cause. In 
contrast, a common effect must be temporally posterior to both exposure and outcome 
[1]. 
In this study there are four groups of host factors in relation to the time of 
exposure, which is the time that the susceptible patient was present in the SICU with 
other MRSA-positive patients. The first group is the factor that is unaffected by time of 
exposure, which is age and gender. The second group includes the host factor that is 
temporally prior to exposure, which are a history of previous year hospitalizations, pre-
ICU length of stay (preICU_LOS), and APACHE score from an assessment upon ICU 
admission. The third group is ICU length of stay, which is the time when exposure and 
outcome occur. The last group is post-ICU length of stay, which is the host factor 
temporally posterior to both the exposure and outcome. 
We assessed relationships among the host factors, between host factors and 
exposure, and between host factors and outcome. We performed linear regression to 
assess the relationship of host factors and the exposure (Table B.1); t-test and χ2 test to 
compare continuous and categorical variables between 2 patient groups with and without 
a history of previous hospitalization (Table B.2); correlation analysis between the 
continuous factors (Table B.3); and Cox-proportional hazard regression to assess 
predictors of the outcome (Table 4.2). 
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Relationships of host factors, exposure and outcome are displayed in Figure B.3. 
The figure is based on prior knowledge and on the data analysis. Prior knowledge 
suggested that host risk factors for MRSA acquisition may include older age, prolonged 
hospitalization, use of a feeding tube, presence of skin lesions, wounds, ulcers, and 
previous hospitalization or surgery [2]. In our analysis, we noted that a history of 
hospitalization was a better predictor of changes of the exposure, compared to other 
factors (Table B.1). Patients with previous hospitalizations also had a higher hazard of 
MRSA acquisition (Table 4.2). This suggested that a history of previous hospitalization is 
a confounder of the relationship between the colonization pressure and the MRSA 
acquisition and should be controlled for. 
Patients with previous hospitalizations had higher APACHE scores than those 
without (Table B.2). In the correlation analysis in Table B.3, the APACHE score was 
significantly correlated with age, pre-SICU, SICU and post-SICU length of stay, although 
the correlation coefficients were rather small (r = 0.10 – 0.30). Intuitively, patients that 
are more severely ill likely have multiple invasive medical devices that disrupt their 
normal host defense mechanism, which leads to a higher risk of MRSA acquisition. 
However, a study of over 10,000 ICU patients in Europe showed that the relationship of 
the APACHE II score and prevalence of MRSA infection was not linear. In the 
comparison to MRSA prevalence among ICU patients with various categories of 
APACHE scores, the prevalence increased as the score increased. The prevalence was 
highest among patients with a score of 16-20, and subsequently decreased as the score 
rose higher. The authors suggested that because of high mortality these patients expire 
before they can acquire MRSA [3]. While the APACHE score has a potential to be a 
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confounder, in this analysis the APACHE score was not found to be associated with 
either the exposure or outcome.  
The APACHE score is also not a collider, since it was temporally prior to both 
exposure and outcome, therefore it could not be a common effect. Post-ICU length of 
stay is a potential collider because it is likely a consequence of MRSA acquisition that 
prolongs hospitalization and there may be an unmeasured variable that was associated 
with the exposure and also lead to a prolonged hospitalization. We did not control for 
post-ICU length of stay. 
To conclude, due to the limited number of outcomes, we only chose one room 
factor and one host factor that were likely confounders in the multivariate analysis. These 
were the vacant room time and the history of previous hospitalization.  
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Table B.1: Analysis of host factors as predictors of the exposure. This exposure was the 
fraction of MRSA-positive patients prior to the day of acquisition.  The analysis was 
performed using a linear regression with exposure as the dependent variable. These 471 
patients were admitted to 20-bed Surgical Intensive Care Unit between October 1, 2006 
and June 15, 2008, and participated in an MRSA Nasal Colonization Active Surveillance 
Program. They were patients at-risk for MRSA. They had more than one culture taken 
and their first cultures were negative.  
Variables Parameter estimates 
Age -0.001 
Gender a 0.055 
APACHE score  -0.001 
History of hospitalization in 
previous year b 
0.216 
Pre-ICU length of stay (days) 0.001 
ICU length of stay (days) -0.000 
Post-ICU length of stay (days) 0.004 
a using female as the reference group. 
b  p < 0.05 
 
Table B.2:  Comparison of host factors and the exposure, i.e. the fraction of MRSA-
positive patients present in the day prior to the acquisition or the swab (CP1) between 
patients with history of hospitalization in the past year and those without. These 471 
patients were admitted to 20-bed Surgical Intensive Care Unit between October 1, 2006 
and June 15, 2008, and participated in an MRSA Nasal Colonization Active Surveillance 
Program. They were patients at-risk for MRSA. They had more than one culture taken 
and their first cultures were negative.  
Variables Patients without 
history of previous 
year hospitalization 
Patients with 
history of previous 
year hospitalization 
P value 
Mean (95%CI)a 
(n = 313) (n=158)  
Age 56.87 (54.93 – 58.82) 57.22 (54.81– 59.65) 0.83 
Gender (% male)b 55.59 55.06 0.91 
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APACHE score  59.34 (56.57 – 62.10) 66.81 (63.08– 70.54) <0.01 
Pre-ICU length of stay 
(days) 
7.43 (5.98 – 8.88) 7.99 (6.26 – 9.71) 0.64 
ICU length of stay 
(days) 
10.46 (9.32 – 11.59) 9.43 (8.19 -10.67) 0.28 
Post-ICU length of stay 
(days) 
10.11 (8.22 – 11.99) 8.54 (7.15 – 9.93) 0.19 
CP1c 5.21 (4.57 – 5.85) 6.41 (5.50 – 7.32) 0.03 
a These are upper and lower 95% confidence limits of the means using t-test. 
b Comparing proportions using χ2 test. 
c Colonization pressure or a fraction of MRSA-positive patient in the surgical intensive care unit on the day 
prior to acquisition.  
 
Table B.3: Correlation between host factors. These patients’ characteristics were from 
471 patients enrolled in a prospective cohort study in a 20-bed Surgical Intensive Care 
Unit between October 1, 2006 and June 15, 2008, and participated in an MRSA Nasal 
Colonization Active Surveillance Program. These were patients at-risk for MRSA 
acquisition. They had more than one culture taken and their first cultures were negative 
for MRSA.  
Correlation 
coefficient,    
p value 
Age APACHEa PreICU
_LOSb 
ICU_LOSc postICU
_LOSd 
CP1d 
Age - 0.13 
<0.01 
0.006 
0.90 
-0.03 
0.55 
-0.03 
0.57 
-0.02 
0.70 
APACHEa  - 0.22 
<0.01 
0.30 
<0.01 
0.10 
0.03 
-0.02 
0.61 
preICU_ 
LOSb 
  - 0.17 
<0.01 
0.22 
<0.01 
0.01 
0.89 
ICU_LOSc    - 0.15 
<0.01 
-0.00 
0.95 
postICU_ 
LOSd 
    - 0.05 
0.23 
CP1d      - 
a APACHE score stands for the Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation scores. It is an estimate 
of intensive care unit mortality based on a number of laboratory values and patient signs taking both acute 
and chronic disease into account.  
b preICU_LOS is the number of days that the patient stayed in the hospital prior to the SICU admission.  
c ICU_LOS is the number of days that the patient stayed in the SICU.  
d postICU_LOS is the number of days that the patient stayed in the hospital following the SICU discharge. 
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APPENDIX C 
TO CHAPTER V 
 
Table C.1: Mathematical descriptions of model events and their compartmental flows 
Events Descriptions 
1. Shedding onto environmental surfaces  
      a.    PTc to the porous surface (Pc) 123 
      b.    PTc to the nonporous surface (NPc) 1263 
2. Input to the colonized patient  123 
3. The colonized patient touches surfaces  
    i. The colonized patient (PTc) touches the porous 
surface (Pc) 
 
a. Pathogens flow from PTc to Pc 
 / 2/23 53733 
      b.   Pathogens flow from Pc to PTc 
 / 2/23 53733 
   ii. The colonized patient (PTc) touches the 
nonporous surface (NPc) 
 
 
      a.   Pathogens flow from PTc to NPc / 2/23 5637363 
      b.   Pathogens flow from NPc to PTc =/ 2/263 5637363 
4. The uncolonized patient touches surfaces  
     i. The uncolonized patient (PTu) touches the 
porous surface (Pu) 
 
       a.  Pathogens flow from PTu to Pu 
  2/23 53733 
 222
       b.   Pathogens flow from Pu to PTu 
  2/23 53733 
    ii. The uncolonized patient (PTu) touches the 
nonporous surface (NPu) 
 
 
a. Pathogens flow from PTu to NPu 
  2/23 5637363 
            b.   Pathogens flow from NPu to PTu 
 = 2/263 5637363 
5. Nurses touch surfaces  
     i. Nurse (NS) touches the porous surface (Pc) in 
the colonized patient’s room  
 
         a.   Pathogens flow from NS to Pc     =@ 2/26 53763 
         b.   Pathogens flow from Pc to NS / 2/23 53763 
     ii.  Nurse (NS) touches the nonporous surface 
(NPc) in the colonized patient’s room 
 
         a.   Pathogens flow from NS to NPc =@ 2/26 5637663 
         b.   Pathogens flow from NPc to NS =/ 2/263 5637663 
     iii.  Nurse (NS) touches the porous surface (Pu) in 
the uncolonized patient’s room 
 
         a.  Pathogens flow from NS to Pu =@ 2/26 53763 
         b.  Pathogens flow from Pu to NS  2/23 53763 
     iv. Nurse (NS) touches the nonporous surface 
(NPu) in the uncolonized patient’s room 
 
        a.   Pathogens flow from NS to NPu =@ 2/26 5637663 
        b.   Pathogens flow from NPu to NS = 2/263 5637663 
6. Nurse touches patients  
     i. Nurse (NS) touches the colonized patient (PTc)  
         a.   Pathogens flow from NS to PTc =@ 2/26 5,763 
         b.   Pathogens flow from PTc to NS / 2/23 5,763 
      ii. Nurse (NS) touches the uncolonized patient  
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(PTu) 
          a.   Pathogens flow from NS to PTu =@ 2/26 5,763 
          b.  Pathogens flow from PTu to NS  2/23 5,763 
7. Self inoculation  
    i. The colonized patient (PTc) touches nose (PTcn)  
         a.  Pathogens flow from PTc to PTcn / 2423 5676 
        b.  Pathogens flow from PTcn to PTc /6 2426 5676 
    ii.  The uncolonized patient (PTu) touches nose 
(PTun) 
 
        a.   Pathogens flow from PTu to PTun  2423 5676 
        b.   Pathogens flow from PTun to PTu 6 2426 5676 
    iii.  Nurse (NS) touches nose (NSn)  
        a.  Pathogens flow from NS to NSn =@ 2426 5676 
        b.  Pathogens flow from NSn to NS =@6 2426 5676 
8. Natural die off  
     i.   On the colonized patient (PTc) /B, 
     ii.  On the porous surface (Pc) in the colonized 
patient’s room 
/B3 
    iii. On the nonporous surface (NPc) in the 
colonized patient’s room 
=/B63 
    iv. On the uncolonized patient (PTu)  B, 
    v.  On the porous surface (Pu) in the uncolonized 
patient’s room 
B3 
    vi. On the nonporous surface (NPu) in the 
uncolonized patient’s room 
=B63 
    vii.  On nurses =@B, 
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9. Start of nursing shift =@R	0$ 
PJNONR	0   
N]NO_cJ\OR$ 
0JNOPQRNR	0   
10. Surface decontamination  
     i.  Daily surface decontamination  
        a.  The porous surface in the colonized patient’s 
room (Pc) 
/[J	0$ PJNONJ	0   
N]NO_LMJ\OR$ 
0JNOPQRNJ	0   
        b.  The nonporous surface in the colonized 
patient’s room (NPc) 
=/[J	0 
       c.  The porous surface in the uncolonized 
patient’s room (Pu) 
[J	0 
       d.  The nonporous surface in the uncolonized 
patient’s room (NPu) 
=[J	0 
    ii.  Surface decontamination by wiping  
         a.  The nonporous surface in the colonized 
patient’s room (NPc) =/ 2/263 [ST663?	0$ PJNON?	0  $ 
0 " W(  $ (  LVX $ ( " d 8 
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         b.  The nonporous surface in the uncolonized 
patient’s room (NPu) = 2/263 [ST663	0$ PJNON	0  $ 
0 " W(  LV $ (  VX $ ( " d 8 
11. Hand hygiene  
       a.  Before the colonized patient’s room visit =@ 2Z26 [Z\	0$ PJNON\	0  $ 
0  (  $ ( " d 8 
       b. After the colonized patient’s room visit =@ 2Z26 IZ]	0$ PJNON]	0  $ 
0  (  LaV 
       c.  Before the uncolonized patient’s room visit =@ 2Z26 [Z^	0$ PJNON^	0   
0  (  LV 8 !0 
       d.  After the uncolonized patient’s room visit =@ 2Z26 IZ_	0$ PJNON_	0   
0  (  aV 
